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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
Online advertising is expanding at a significant rate1, and the sector is expected to take on increased 
importance as progress towards digitisation accelerates in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. In this 
context, consumers and SMEs as “end-users” of advertising are likely to become increasingly exposed 
to online advertising which is targeted on the basis of their behavioural patterns, raising important 
questions about privacy, and the potential for misleading or exploitative marketing or discrimination. 
At the same time, concerns are emerging about the challenges faced by smaller companies which may 
be seeking to provide or rely on these forms of advertising, but lack full information or the required 
bargaining power to ensure their products are fairly represented. 
Aim 
The European Commission has recently released two legislative proposals, the Digital Services Act2 and 
the Digital Markets Act3, which include provisions which are relevant to online advertising. In addition, 
there are other legislative measures targeted towards digital services4, as well as horizontal rules5 
regarding consumer protection, privacy and advertising which apply to the sector. 
This study aims to inform the IMCO Committee about emerging challenges resulting from online 
advertising practices, as well as identifying potential areas where legislative proposals could be 
improved, or new initiatives taken. 
How do online advertising markets work? 
There are three main types of online advertising: search advertising, display advertising and classified 
advertising. Online advertising has created a unique opportunity to tailor advertisements to reflect the 
interests or needs of consumers. Targeting can be done based on the content of the visited website or 
search query. However, targeting can also be based on information gathered about the consumer e.g. 
via cookies or other tracking technologies. This type of targeted advertising - called behavioural 
advertising - can involve extensive processing of consumers’ data. The provision of advertising can 
involve a number of different players, including not only the advertiser and the consumer, but also the 
“publisher” (the party which provides advertising space) and potentially an intermediary which acts to 
provide a matching service between the advertiser and the publisher, often with the aid of data 
analysis. 
Challenges and opportunities concerning digital advertising 
Online targeted advertising can generate benefits for both consumers and SMEs, specifically by 
tailoring advertisements to match consumers’ interests and even by enabling the protection of certain 
                                                             
1  In 2019, Europe accounted for 19.9% of the global market for online advertising. Recent trends include a shift from desktop to mobile 
content and associated advertising. Source: Statista, 2020, Digital Advertising Report. 
2  European Commission, 2020, Proposal of the Commission of 15 December 2020 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, COM(2020) 825 final, 2020/0361 
(COD). 
3  European Commission, 2020, Proposal of the Commission of 15 December 2020 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act), COM(2020) 842 final, 2020/0374 (COD). 
4  For example, the Platform to Business Regulation, and ePrivacy Directive and its proposed successor for an ePrivacy Regulation. 
5  These include the UCPD, Directive on misleading and comparative advertising, CRD, GDPR and Better Enforcement Directive. 
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consumers e.g. by screening out advertisements which may be unsuitable for minors. However, 
targeted advertising can also raise a number of concerns. Issues impacting consumers include: 
• A lack of understanding by consumers that their data are being used to target advertising; 
• Targeting which exploits the vulnerability of certain groups of consumers; 
• Consent forms and other design features which seek to steer consumers to make decisions 
against their interests (dark patterns); 
• Challenges to seek redress in cases where advertising or data collection / consent methods are 
inappropriate due to the range of bodies involved; and 
• The potential for the algorithms used to target advertising to result in intentional or 
unintentional harmful discrimination. 
Meanwhile the significant reach of the largest platforms, their access to extensive datasets (which 
enable targeting) and participation at multiple levels of the advertising value chain (which can be 
associated with bundling or self-preferencing practices) can create challenges for SMEs seeking to 
advertise or develop a competing advertising platform. 
How far does existing EU legislation go in addressing the problem? 
Digital advertising is covered by a wide range of existing EU legislation including legislation specific to 
digital platforms and services such as the eCommerce Directive, P2B Regulation, ePrivacy Directive and 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive as well as horizontal measures such as the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive, Directive on misleading and comparative advertising, Consumer Rights Directive 
and General Data Protection Regulation. Moreover, competition law applies to all digital platforms. 
However, the diversity of measures can make the legal framework complex to understand and apply. 
Moreover, the legal framework is also fragmented across the EU27, especially since the older Directives 
such as the eCommerce Directive are minimal harmonisation instruments, and some Member States 
have introduced more far-reaching rules. Important gaps remain. For example, there are no obligations 
to ensure that consumers are informed that they are being subject to targeted advertising, and to allow 
them to change the parameters under which they are being targeted or to opt out. In addition, there 
are no general rules which prevent minors from being subject to harmful targeted advertising. 
Moreover, the complexity of the rules and diversity of players along the value chain risks creating a 
vacuum in which the different players may not be aware of their responsibility to meet certain 
obligations. 
Some of these issues may be addressed within the proposed Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital 
Markets Act (DMA) as well as the proposed Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA). However, gaps remain, 
notably regarding the treatment of “dark patterns”, algorithmic discrimination, how to ensure that the 
relevant players take responsibility for their content and targeting methods, and how to enable 
consumers to seek redress in an increasingly complex system. The DSA, the DMA and the AIA do include 
provisions which aim to increase transparency towards consumers and purchasers of advertising. 
However, these could be further strengthened and extended.  
Conclusions and recommendations 
Based on an analysis of the problems and their causes, as well as legislative gaps, we have identified 
the following potential solutions that may be relevant to protect consumers and SMEs and facilitate 
the development of the single market for advertising in the context of the DSA and DMA as well as 
other legislative and soft law instruments. 
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a. Informing consumers about being targeted and improved consent mechanisms 
The DSA could contain a requirement for meaningful transparency concerning the existence of 
targeted advertising, alongside a requirement that information about targeted advertising should be 
conveyed in a manner which is clear to consumers. If these measures are insufficient, an opt-in to 
targeted advertising could be encouraged through the self and co-regulatory measures provided for 
in Article 36 of the DSA.  
b. Addressing “dark patterns” through guidelines  
EDPB guidelines cover the issue of “dark patterns” to some extent. However, further action could be 
taken such as defining design guidelines, among others, for cookie banners and consent forms and 
providing a user-friendly tool enabling consumers to report websites that may not comply6. 
c. Preventing discrimination and improving algorithmic transparency 
The DSA could further contribute to ensuring that rules regarding discrimination are adhered to in the 
context of digital advertising by enforcing greater meaningful transparency concerning the existence 
of targeted advertising and the parameters used. In addition, regular vetting of systems and training 
data by accredited researchers could offer new insights on how to mitigate systemic risks and reduce 
information asymmetries. 
d. Ensure that minors are not subject to targeted advertising which exploits their vulnerabilities 
The AVMS Directive already includes obligations to protect minors from harmful content in 
advertising7. However, the provisions apply only to video sharing platforms. The DSA could include a 
similar provision to that in Article 28b, paragraph 3 AVMS, to clarify that minors (and potentially other 
vulnerable customer groups) should be protected from harmful targeted advertising. 
e. Ensuring responsibility for targeted advertising when multiple actors are involved 
Actors which are responsible for targeted advertising solutions may not fall under the scope of the DSA, 
which is limited to intermediation services. A possible solution may be to clarify that Article 5.3 of the 
DSA proposal, which removes the liability exemption of the hosting platforms, could also apply to 
platforms which may lead a reasonably well-informed consumer to believe that advertising is provided 
by the online platform itself or by a recipient of the service who is acting under its authority or control. 
This would ensure that the platform has an incentive to comply with all the transparency rules. 
f. Improving consumers’ access to redress 
The proposed DSA sets out a generic mechanism for users to flag illegal content and to seek redress. 
However, this may not help consumers to identify how to make complaints and ensure that they reach 
the right enforcement body. The Digital Service Co-ordinators could be tasked with providing 
information to consumers on how to seek redress in relation to online advertising (among other areas). 
Another option would be to adopt a sector-specific directive addressing all consumer protection issues 
related to online advertising. 
                                                             
6  In the US, users can report websites to their respective Attorney General if they feel they are subjected to a dark pattern. Available at: 
https://darkpatternstipline.org/report/. 
7  Article 9(1) of AVMS Directive. 
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g. Facilitating the functioning of the internal market 
The risk of legal uncertainty deriving from the potential application of national rules to advertising 
services could be mitigated by clarifying the meaning of common terms and enforcing cooperation 
mechanisms between Member States. This could be done, for instance, by amending the eCommerce 
Directive (possibly through the DSA) by introducing precise deadlines and procedural conditions for 
the implementation of derogations by Member States8. Adopting EU-wide Codes of Conduct which 
could be ‘vetted’ by the European Commission to define which types of national restrictions would be 
compatible with the internal market clause might also be helpful. 
h. Addressing exploitation by platforms which hold a gatekeeper position in digital advertising 
Smaller firms in particular may be reliant on large gatekeepers to reach consumers, potentially allowing 
exploitation. The proposed DMA includes provisions which aim to shine a light on potential 
exploitation by requiring information on advertising prices and performance to be shared with 
advertisers. Alongside approving the DMA provisions, potential exploitation could be addressed by 
taking advantage of this information to pursue case by case enforcement under competition law. 
i. Increase transparency concerning advertising auctions and the performance of advertising 
The distribution of ads via ad-auctions is marked by a lack of transparency towards both advertisers 
and publishers. The current DMA proposal provides for some useful transparency provisions, but could 
be extended to require transparency for the criteria used by the ad-tech platform services in the auction 
process, including details of the price components as well as other factors which are taken into account 
in the auction process and their weighting. 
j. Tackling bundling and tying by gatekeeper intermediaries of premium advertising space 
Ad-inventory of vertically integrated large intermediaries (e.g., Facebook, YouTube, Google) is 
considered very valuable from an advertiser’s perspective but is often exclusively marketed via their 
own Ad-Network or Ad-Exchange. This could raise entry barriers and impede competition in the 
provision of advertising intermediary services. It may be appropriate to encourage the European 
Commission to closely monitor competition across the online advertising value chain, and if necessary 
consider separating intermediary services from the ad-inventory of their publisher’s sites. 
k. Addressing asymmetric access to consumer data 
Large providers of advertising services like Google and Facebook can access a huge amount of data 
that other companies do not have access to. Large providers may directly prohibit or introduce 
considerable obstacles to the use of the data via a competitor’s advertising services. The prohibition 
on bundling and self-preferencing in the DMA proposal may address the issue to some degree, but 
further analysis could be conducted to understand whether other measures may be necessary. 
  
                                                             
8  Such recommendations are inspired by the mechanisms laid down in Article 3 of the AVMS Directive (as amended as amended by 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2018, Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 November 2018 in view of changing market realities, OJ L 303/69 of 28.11.2018). 
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 HOW DO ONLINE ADVERTISING MARKETS WORK?  
Online advertising involves the interaction of a number of different players. In addition to the firms that 
wish to advertise their products and services and the consumers and businesses at the receiving end 
of the process, the market also involves a number of intermediaries, such as website operators 
(publishers) and advertising networks. 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the different types of digital advertising, and the main 
players in the market, as well as on the role played by “targeting” in digital advertising. 
1.1. Types of digital advertising 
There are three main types of digital advertising: search advertising, display advertising and 
classified advertising9. 
Advertising firms engaging in search advertising pay search engine operators to link their website (on 
which they sell products or services) in a user’s search results. When a user enters a search query, the 
specific advert (or sponsored link) is then shown together with the organic search results. The 
sponsored link is typically presented in short form so as to resemble a search result, however they are 
usually highlighted as advertisements by a short text identifier or additional colour highlights10. The 
operator of the search engine usually determines which sponsored link is shown to an individual user, 
and advertising firms compete to receive priority for display based on specific keywords and user 
segments. Typically, with this advertising method, the dependence on user data is relatively low 
because the selection of advertisements for presentation is mainly determined by the specific search 
query. However, in some cases user data can be used to support the matching process11. 
Search advertising is one of the most successful forms of online advertising in terms of conversion rate, 
i.e. the percentage of visitors to a website that complete the desired goal of clicking on an ad (a 
conversion) out of the total number of visitors who sees a specific ad. For example, the average 
conversion rate of a sponsored search result via Google Ads across all industries is 4.40%, whereas it is 
only 0.57% for display advertising12. The reason for this is that search advertising reaches consumers 
while they are already willing to make an active purchasing decision, since they have already expressed 
interest when searching for specific (product related) keywords13. Potentially as a result of its 
effectiveness, search engine advertising is the second largest online advertising segment worldwide in 
terms of revenue with a share of 43.3% in 2019. In the US and Europe, this segment is heavily dominated 
by Google and its service Google Ads. The ongoing development of search algorithms that will 
improve the targeting quality of search advertising as well as the emergence of more specialised 
product related search engines will drive future growth of this market segment. A steady annual 
growth of 6.7% in this segment is expected over the next years14.  
                                                             
9  See CMA, 2020, Online platforms and digital advertising, Market study final report.  
10  Autorité de la Concurrence, 2010, No 10-A-29 Opinion, 28:‘display is reserved for branding objectives and search-based ads for 
performance objectives. 
11  See CMA, 2020, Online platforms and digital advertising, Market study final report. 
12  See Wordstream, 2020, Conversion Rate Benchmarks: Find Out How Your Conversion Rate Compares. 
13  See Geradin, D. & Katsifis, D., 2019, ‘An EU competition law analysis of online display advertising in the programmatic age’, European 
Competition Journal, 15:1, 55-96.  
14  See Statista, 2020, Digital Advertising Report 2020.  
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Display advertising refers to advertisements that are displayed on websites or applications in various 
forms. It includes social media advertising, video advertisements as well as banner-
advertisements. Display advertising is the largest segment in the online advertising market behind 
search advertising and accounts for 51.8% of total online advertising revenue15.  
Social media advertising accounts for the largest share of display advertising revenue. This segment 
includes advertisements that are shown to users in the context of social networks (e.g., Facebook, 
Instagram, TikTok, etc.) and business networks (e.g. LinkedIn, etc.), irrespective of whether the 
advertisement is in the form of a text-based post, a picture or even a video. The advertised content is 
embedded in an individual user’s newsfeed and the operator of the network itself mostly directly 
markets the advertising space. Users’ personal profiles, interactions on the platform (e.g. likes, sharing 
of content) and browsing behaviour within the social networks provide very rich consumer data to the 
platform operator. This data can be used to deploy deeper targeting methods for the distribution of 
advertisements (see Section 1.2). The leading company in this segment is Facebook with a market 
share of between 75-80% in the US and Europe16. Furthermore, with the trend towards integrating 
eCommerce and payment solutions into social networks, social network providers could benefit from 
new monetisation opportunities in the future. Due to this development, consumer engagement and 
conversion rates from advertisements on social networks are expected to increase significantly17.  
Video advertising includes all advertisements provided within web- or app-based video-players. The 
advertising content can be displayed in the form of a video (e.g. pre-roll advertisements), as well as 
text- or image-based overlays. The increasing popularity of user-generated video content is a key driver 
for this advertising type. In 2019, the video advertising segment accounted for 9.4% of the global online 
advertising market18. The importance of this advertising type will further expand as developments in 
mobile infrastructure and the widespread availability of 5G may provide a new boost for this kind of 
advertising on mobile devices. While the field is dominated in the US and Europe by Google’s service 
YouTube, other subscription-based video streaming services may adapt their current business model 
and become publishers and offer video advertising space in the near future. 
Banner-advertisements are typically placed on a publisher’s website or in an app alongside their 
original content. The advertisement space is regularly marketed via a complex chain of intermediaries 
(e.g., Ad-Networks, Ad-Exchanges) that determine the placement of a specific banner-ad based on a 
real-time auction format (see Section 1.3.2)19. Banner-advertising accounted for 15% of global online 
advertising revenues in 2019. An important innovation in the distribution of these ads was the 
development and introduction of a system that allows for fully automated and individualised 
purchases of advertising space, also known as programmatic advertising20. This process of 
“programmatic advertising describes […] [a] method of buying, displaying, and optimizing of 
advertising space driven by audience data in order to better target certain potential customers”21. 
Nowadays, the majority of digital ad spending is processed via programmatic advertising22.  
                                                             
15  Ibid. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid. 
18  Ibid. 
19  See CMA, 2020, Online platforms and digital advertising, Market study final report. 
20  Bundeskartellamt, 2018, Online advertising. Series of papers on “Competition and Consumer Protection in the Digital Economy“. 
21  Statista, 2020, Digital Advertising Report 2020, p. 25. 
22  Statista, 2020, Digital Advertising Report 2020. 
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The third main category of online advertising is classified advertising. For this type of advertising, 
advertisers directly purchase an advertising slot on a publisher’s website. This allows for the specific 
targeting of the website’s user group and avoids losses that could arise from the extensive scattering 
of advertising across different settings, which is typical for display advertising. Sectors in which 
classifieds are frequently observed include recruitment, eCommerce, consumer finance, travel, real 
estate and cars23. Pricing schemes for classified advertisements are relatively transparent and often 
similar to offline advertisements, such as one-time payments which are independent of the 
advertisement’s success. This segment is the smallest in online advertising and represents only 5.2% of 
the global market revenue24. However, it is interesting to note that, the European market for classified 
online advertising is the world's largest25, and thus this type of advertising plays a larger role in Europe 
than it does elsewhere. 
1.2. The role of targeting in digital advertising 
Traditional advertising formats in TV, radio, print outlets or billboards have only limited targeting 
potential and thus advertisers spend money on consumers who are not receptive to the advertised 
content. In contrast, online advertising presents multiple opportunities for targeting. First, online 
advertising can be linked to the activity that users are currently engaged in (e.g., searching, browsing, 
watching videos, etc.) which allows for a segmentation of consumers26. Second, it is possible for 
advertisers to measure the efficacy of their advertising expenditure by analysing data on the visitors 
directed to their services by the ad, which enables more efficient spending of financial resources27. 
Thus, targeting methods in online advertising should in principle allow more efficient allocation of 
advertising resources and mitigate scattering losses from uninterested customers. 
Exploiting this “value added” is the core business of many intermediary stakeholders, which analyse 
available user data to offer sophisticated segmentation and targeting of consumer groups. In doing so, 
they use a range of different targeting methods specific to the respective type of online advertising, 
which can vary as regards their data requirements and potential efficacy28. 
In the following sections, we elaborate on contextual targeting, behavioural targeting and 
segmented targeting of online advertisements. 
Contextual targeting methods are based on the content of a visited website or the specific search 
query a user entered into a search engine. For example, a user browsing on a blog about ‘running’ will 
likely see ads about ‘running shoes’ or ‘sports apparel’. Thus, it can be characterised as the online 
equivalent of a tailored print-ad in a niche magazine. The placement of the specific advertisement or 
sponsored link is therefore only determined by the content of the website and not by information 
about the user itself. Hence, a record of specific user data or browsing history is not required. Elements 
of contextual targeting are prevalent especially in classified advertisements and to a lesser degree in 
search and various forms of display advertisement.  
                                                             
23  See CMA, 2020, Online platforms and digital advertising, Market study final report.  
24  See Statista, 2020, Digital Advertising Report 2020. 
25  Ibid. 
26  See Goldfarb, A., 2014, ‘What is different about online advertising?’, Review of Industrial Organization, 44(2), 115-129. 
27  Blake, T., Nosko, C. & Tadelis, S., 2015, ‘Consumer Heterogeneity and Paid Search Effectiveness: A Large‐Scale Field Experiment’, 
Econometrica, 83: 155-174. 
28  European Commission, 2018, Consumer market study on online market segmentation through personalised pricing/offers in the 
European Union. 
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In behavioural targeting, information that consumers have shared with the platform e.g. posts, likes, 
written reviews, purchase history, search history, browsing history and technical information about the 
individual user like e.g. device manufacturer, operating system, browser vendor, screen resolution and 
IP-address are used to attribute a specific consumer to a consumer group and their interests and needs. 
Hence, the data requirements to engage in behavioural targeting are relatively high compared to other 
types of advertising. Data collection is carried out via cookies and other tracking technologies (e.g. 
browser & canvas fingerprinting, unique device identifiers)29. Generally, the matching quality between 
a consumer and an advertisement increases with the depth of data available and when a narrow 
segmentation is possible. In practice this targeting method is regularly implemented in the so-called 
‘re-targeting’ of consumers who reveal their interest in buying a specific product but leave a seller’s 
website without a purchase. Over the course of a few days such a consumer then experiences an 
increased frequency of display advertisement of the previously searched product he or she did not buy. 
Similar methods are also used in search advertising. 
In contrast to the previous two types of advertisements, which are based on data on user preferences 
which has been gathered through the general use of the website or platform, advertisements delivered 
by segmented targeting rely on information that the user has provided voluntarily. This is especially 
relevant on websites which require a user to register a user profile and enter their name, age, gender 
and other contact information30. Although this information allows for a perfect identification of the 
user, it needs to be combined with other data to form a clearer picture of a user’s interests. 
The targeting of online advertisements has become increasingly popular among marketers, because 
they assume these ads are more effective and have a higher rate of return than standard non-targeted 
advertisings. Behavioural advertising is a particularly fast-growing segment, with revenues estimated 
to reach 21.4 billion EUR in Europe by 202031. It is estimated that the click-through rate (the likelihood 
that a user clicks on a displayed ad) for behavioural advertising is 5.3 times higher than for standard 
advertising. For re-targeted consumers (for explanation see above) who have previously shown an 
interest in a product, the click-through rate is estimated to be 10.8 times higher32. Nevertheless, it is 
generally difficult to measure the causal effect of targeted advertisements since one cannot rule out 
the possibility that a user would have bought a certain product even without seeing the advertisement. 
However, Blake et al. (2015) have measured the causal efficacy in a controlled experimental setting for 
search advertisements on eBay33. They find that there is a positive effect from search advertising, but 
this is mainly present for consumers that are new to the website or use it infrequently. The more familiar 
a user is with the search engine, the more she overlooks sponsored search results. 
A study by Bleier & Eisenbeiss (2015) which investigates the efficacy of personalised advertisements in 
banner advertising, observes a similar effect34. Advertisements in the field of retargeting that are 
substantially personalised (heavily targeted to a specific user) are especially effective in promoting 
purchases of consumers who are at an early information stage in their purchasing decision process. 
However, the effectiveness of these personalised ads decreases significantly over time after the last 
                                                             
29  Briz, N., 2018, This is Your Digital Fingerprint, Mozilla Blog. 
30  European Commission, 2018, Consumer market study on online market segmentation through personalised pricing/offers in the 
European Union. 
31  European Parliamentary Research Service, 2020, Digital Service Act: European Added Value Assessment.  
32  Ibid. 
33  Blake, T., Nosko, C. & Tadelis, S., 2015, ‘Consumer Heterogeneity and Paid Search Effectiveness: A Large‐Scale Field Experiment’, 
Econometrica, 83: 155-174. 
34  Bleier, A., & Eisenbeiss, M., 2015, ‘Personalized online advertising effectiveness: The interplay of what, when, and where’. Marketing 
Science, 34(5), 669-688. 
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visit of an advertiser’s online store. Therefore, medium or less personalised (re-targeted) ads 
outperform their heavily targeted counterparts in the long run. In addition, some studies even show 
that very high degree of personalisation led to less engagement in the first place. For instance, Tucker 
(2014)35 and Aguirre et al. (2015)36 each conducted field studies on Facebook to examine the 
effectiveness of personalised ads. The authors considered different levels of personalisation. Although 
both studies showed that personalised advertising generally has a greater effect on consumers and 
click-through rates than non-personalised ads, this effect is less pronounced if the personalisation is 
too precise. Thus, advertising messages that are not entirely generic, but address a user profile and 
interest in a broader way, were most effective. On the other hand, the most personalised forms of 
advertising were only effective in specific circumstances. Specifically, the studies found that consumers 
respond more positively to high levels of personalisation if they have trust in the respective vendor, or 
if the latter creates openness about how data is collected or/and provides consumers with greater 
control over their own data37.  
Usually, ad-networks combine behavioural advertising, which can be highly personalised, and 
contextualised advertising with lower levels of personalisation in their targeting service. The 
complementary nature of contextual and behavioural methods has also been recognised in academic 
literature and it has been found that the combined application of both elements results in significantly 
higher click-through rates38. 
From an economic perspective, behavioural targeting affects publishers of advertising space and 
advertising firms in two different ways. Chen and Stallaert (2014) characterise this as a competitive 
effect and a propensity effect39. The competitive effect is beneficial for advertisers but is negative for 
publishers. Behavioural targeting enables a more fine-grained segmentation of consumers with the 
result that fewer advertising firms compete for the same target group. The reduction in fixed 
advertising prices may be due to this. In contrast, the propensity effect implies that, due to behavioural 
targeting, the likelihood of a user clicking on an ad is higher. This should result in a higher click-through 
rate and, thus, more revenue from the success-based price components for publishers. Therefore, the 
overall effect hinges crucially on the efficacy of behavioural targeting (and other targeting methods), 
and on which of the two effects dominates. 
                                                             
35  Tucker, C. E., 2013, ‘Social Networks, Personalized Advertising, and Privacy Controls’, Journal of Marketing Research, 51 (5):546-562. 
36  Aguirre, E., Mahr, D., Grewal, D., de Ruyter, K. & Wetzels, M., 2015, ‘Unraveling the Personalization Paradox: The Effect of Information 
Collection and Trust-Building Strategies on Online Advertisement Effectiveness’, Journal of Retailing, 91 (1):34-49. 
37  e.g. Chellappa, R. K., & Sin, R. G., 2005,’Personalization versus Privacy: An Empirical Examination of the Online Consumer’s Dilemma’. 
Information Technology and Management, 6 (2):181-202; Tucker (2013); Aguirre et al (2015); Bleier, A., & Eisenbeiss, M., 2015, ‘The 
Importance of Trust for Personalized Online Advertising’, Journal of Retailing, 91 (3):390-409. 
38  Lu, X., Zhao, X., & Xue, L., 2016, ‘Is combining contextual and behavioral targeting strategies effective in online advertising?’, ACM 
Transactions on Management Information Systems (TMIS), 7(1), 1-20. 
39  Chen, J., & Stallaert, J., 2014, ‘An economic analysis of online advertising using behavioral targeting’, Mis Quarterly, 38(2), 429-A7. 
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1.3. Main actors and business models 
The online advertising environment involves different actors across the value chain. While there are 
subtle differences within each role, the main roles can be identified as advertisers, publishers, 
intermediators and consumers. This classification is based on Cai et al. (2020) and their assessment 
on the distinction made by the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB)40. A conceptual description of the 
online advertising ecosystem is provided in Figure 1. The characteristics of each of the players are 
described below. 
• Advertisers: Large businesses or SMEs which are interested in advertising their products or 
services. They may have a preference for specific target groups, which could give them 
guidance on where to place their ads. If the chosen advertising type allows for design elements 
(text, images, etc.), these tend to be designed by the advertisers themselves. Advertisers pay 
according to a sophisticated success-based measure which usually includes “cost-per-
impression” (CPI) and “cost-per-click” (CPC) elements. 
• Publishers: Platform operators and owners of websites that offer space for advertisements to 
be shown. Publishers’ dependence on advertising revenue varies significantly as there are 
websites that are entirely financed by advertising, whereas others rely on advertising only as a 
supplementary revenue stream. 
• Intermediators: Companies which engage in the distribution and targeting of advertisements. 
Market players that fall under this category can be further characterised as either Supply Side 
Platforms (SSPs), Demand Side Platforms (DSPs) or Ad-Exchanges. While SSPs usually buy 
advertising spaces on publishers’ websites and sell these on Ad-Exchanges (brokers between 
both sides), DSPs buy these advertising inventories on Ad-Exchanges to fill them with matching 
advertisements from interested advertisers they represent. However, there are also large 
intermediaries who assume a dual role or combine each of the above mentioned three roles in 
their services. In this case they are referred to as “Ad Brokerage Network” in Figure 1. These 
intermediaries are also responsible for transferring payments from advertisers to publishers. 
• Users: Consumers and business users are the recipients of advertisements. They are likely to 
encounter a range of advertisements (search, display, etc.) during their regular browsing 
experience. Which specific advertisement is shown to an individual user is determined by 
sophisticated targeting methods.  
The following figure summarises the main actors across the online advertising value chain. We 
elaborate further below on the business models, with a focus on the intermediary actors who engage 
in the delivery of the advertisements and discuss how they interact with the other stakeholders 
involved. We also discuss the specific role played by SMEs and consumers at different points in the 
value chain. 
                                                             
40  Cai, Y., Yee, G. O., Gu, Y. X., & Lung, C. H., 2020, ‘Threats to online advertising and countermeasures: A technical survey’, Digital Threats: 
Research and Practice, 1, 2, Article 11. 
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Figure 1: Main players of the online advertising value chain41 
 
Source:  Cai et al. (2020). 
1.3.1. Ad-Networks  
The business model of an intermediary Ad Brokerage Network is based around aggregating advertising 
space from publishers and matching it against advertisers’ demand. It can offer any combination of 
services that would relate to a Supply Side Platform (SSP), Demand Side Platform (DSP) or Ad-Exchange. 
Table 1 provides definitions of these roles as described by the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB)42. 
Although Ad-Networks in the narrow sense represent only one element in an Ad Brokerage Network’s 
service umbrella, the term is often used as a synonym for the entire sector of intermediaries. For the 
remainder of the study we refer to “Ad-Networks” in relation to all Ad Brokerage services and refer to 
the elements of DSPs, SSPs and Ad Exchanges specifically where necessary. 
Ad-Networks in their role as intermediaries interact with advertisers and publishers. Advertising firms 
provide the network with the relevant campaign materials while the publishers offer advertising space 
on their website to be filled by the network. When planning their advertising campaign, advertisers can 
typically choose between different targeting options offered by the network. Targeting can for 
example be based on geolocation, specific keywords which define the contextual environment, time 
of day, browser type or operation system amongst other options. To identify these different consumer 
segments, Ad-Networks rely heavily on the analysis of click-stream data from users (i.e. data on the 
detailed interaction of users with elements of the web-service). 
                                                             
41  Cai, Y., Yee, G. O., Gu, Y. X., & Lung, C. H., 2020, ‘Threats to online advertising and countermeasures: A technical survey’, Digital Threats: 
Research and Practice, 1, 2, Article 11. 
42  Ibid. 
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Table 1:  Elements of an ad brokerage network (Ad-network)43 
Player Definition 
Agency 
An organisation that, on behalf of its clients, plans marketing and advertising 
campaigns, drafts and produces advertisements, places advertisements in the 
media. Agencies often use third-party technology (ad servers) and may place 




Organisations that provide centralised (aggregated) media buying from multiple 
sources including Ad Exchanges, Ad networks, and Supply Side Platforms, often 
leveraging real-time bidding capabilities of said sources. 
Ad-Exchanges 
Organisations that provide a sales channel to Publishers and Ad-Networks, as well 
as aggregated inventory to Advertisers. They bring a technology platform that 
facilitates automated auction-based pricing and buying in real-time. Ad 
Exchanges’ business models and practices may include features that are similar to 




Organisations that provide outsourced media selling and Ad-Network 
management services for publishers. Also known as sell-side platforms. Their 
business models and practices are similar to Ad Networks. SSPs are typically 
differentiated from Ad-Networks in not providing services for Advertisers. DSPs 
and Ad-Networks often buy from SSPs. 
Ad-Networks 
Organisations that provide an outsourced sales capability for publishers and a 
means to aggregate inventory and audiences from numerous sources in a single 
buying opportunity for media buyers. Ad Networks may provide specific 
technologies to enhance value to both Publishers and Advertisers, including 
unique targeting capabilities, creative generation, and optimisation. Ad Networks’ 
business models and practices may include features that are similar to those 
offered by Ad Exchanges. Usually, Ad-Networks rely on Content Delivery Networks 
to server advertising contents. 
Source:  Cai et al. (2020). 
Traditional payment models in advertising have been dominated by one-time (or potentially recurring) 
up-front payments for ad space, like the rental expenses of billboards or a fixed cost for a printed ad in 
a newspaper. While this still holds true for the classified sector within online advertising, in search and 
display advertising, however, performance-based measures such as cost-per-click (CPC), cost-per-mille 
(CPM – thousand impressions) and cost-per-action (CPA) (the desired action of the advertiser which is 
usually a purchase) are prevalent. These success-based measures serve to reduce the risk of advertisers 
of wasting resources on ad spaces which receive limited views or achieve only poor conversion. The 
delivery process for the example case of display advertising is displayed in Figure 2. 
                                                             
43  Ibid. 
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Figure 2:  Ad delivery process: impression, click and conversion44 
 
Source:  Dave et al. (2013). 
To improve efficiency in the intermediation process (and to maximise the profits generated by 
targeting) large Ad-Networks and Ad-Exchanges tend to employ an auction format to determine which 
advert is shown to a given user. After the Ad-Network/Exchange receives the JavaScript request for the 
display of an ad, this real-time auction process is triggered and returns the winning advertisement. The 
successful impression of the winning ad is recorded and the relevant advertiser is billed. Advertisers 
who are interested in targeting a specific consumer group can choose to do so by preselecting a 
keyword, industry sector or other identifiable metric. 
The largest players in the Ad-Networks space are Google, Facebook and Amazon, who not only act as 
SSP, DSP (thereby aggregating advertising demand and supply) but also operate an integrated Ad-
Exchange. Thus, these firms operate well beyond their self-generated ad spaces and additionally act as 
market makers, e.g. via Google Ads, Google AdSense, DoubleClick, the Facebook Audience Network or 
Amazon Advertising. The vertical integration of these large players contrasts with smaller market 
participants, which typically act only as DSP, SSP or provide Ad-Exchange services. We identify potential 
problematic practices arising from vertical integration by major players in online advertising in Section 
2.  
1.3.2. Ad-Exchanges and advertising auctions 
In contrast to Ad-Networks which aggregate the supply and demand side, Ad-Exchanges are brokerage 
platforms on which all market players interact. Large publishers may post their available inventory 
directly and link it to specific keywords to allow filtering and segmentation, while large advertisers 
provide their marketing material.  
                                                             
44  Dave, V., Guha, S., & Y. Zhang, 2013, ‘Viceroi: Catching click-spam in search ad networks’, Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Conference on 
Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 765–776. 
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Other Ad-Networks (DSPs & SSPs) may also use Ad-Exchanges themselves to buy relevant advertising 
space or offer advertising space from the publishers they represent. 
The Ad-Exchange is central to the Real-Time Bidding (RTB) process and hosts the auction in which the 
demand and supply of advertising space is brokered. Following a user’s visit to a website that includes 
advertisements, the request is sent to the Exchange along with relevant data that further characterises 
the user, his or her past browsing history, the context of the website, the device being used, and the 
location of the request among many others. Based on these characteristics, DSPs who represent 
advertisers that want to target the respective consumer group enter the RTB process and submit their 
maximum bid. The winning DSP will be determined and fills the inventory space with the advertising 
materials of their clients45. 
The auction format of the RTB follows the design of a second-price auction in which the advertisers’ 
maximum bids compete against each other. Under a second-price auction, the winner submitting the 
highest bid pays a price set by the second highest bid in the auction. These auction formats motivate 
bidders to increase the level of their bid as, if they win, they pay a lower amount than their bid price. 
Due to these dynamics, sellers or auction hosts may secure higher revenues under a second price 
auction than under a first-price auction where the winner pays the amount that they proposed in their 
own bid. 
In these ad auctions, advertisers tend to face higher price competition for popular search keywords and 
more general characteristics, which may increase incentives to bid for space on more niche keywords 
or user characteristics to avoid competition from other advertisers. The buyers’ maximum bids are 
usually measured in a CPM (cost-per-mille) price which is charged for each thousand impressions of 
the advertisement which is equivalent to an auction win in an identified consumer segment. This 
maximum bid is complemented by specific quality scores of the advertisement material provided. This 
auction format, equivalent to a stock-market, is easily scalable and Ad-Networks seek to optimise their 
RTB process such that the advert with the highest success rate (in terms of subsequent conversion) is 
shown to consumers46. 
A prime example of the auction process can be seen in Google’s so-called “Ad-Manager”47. This service 
is a fully automated auction, also referred to as a “programmatic auction”, and receives bids from 
advertisers based on their targeting settings and advertisers pay less or exactly their maximum bid48. 
Thus from a pricing perspective, the auction format is traditionally that of a second-price auction49, 
although the design has shifted more towards first-price elements recently50. The winning bidder, 
however, is determined not only by the price, but also by other factors which are weighted in a way to 
ensure the auction maximises the profits of the auction operator. According to Varian (2009) this is 
achieved through ranking the ads “…by bid times expected click through rates, and those ads with the 
highest expected revenue are shown in the most prominent positions”51. However, users’ current 
propensity to click on an ad is not the only weighting factor that is applied to a submitted bid.  
                                                             
45  For more details on the technical implementation of the RTB process the interested reader is referred to Wang, J., Zhang, W., & Yuan, S., 
2016, Display advertising with real-time bidding (RTB) and behavioural targeting. ArxivPreprint Arxiv:1610.03013(2016).  
46  EDRi, 2019, Real Time Bidding: The auction for your attention. 
47  Google, 2021, Ad Manager. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., & Schwarz, M., 2007, ‘Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars 
worth of keywords’. American economic review, 97(1), 242-259. 
50  Despotakis, S., Ravi, R., & Sayedi, A., 2019, First-price auctions in online display advertising. Available at SSRN 3485410. 
51  Varian, H. R., 2009,’ Online ad auctions’, American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 99(2), 430-34. 
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Measures that indicate an ad’s quality may also reflect future adaptions in users’ behaviour based on 
their anticipated positive or negative experiences when clicking on an ad52. Minimum bids or 
reservation prices can also be implemented in the auction process that are either specific to keywords 
or individual advertisers to increase the realised revenue53. All these different elements contribute to a 
lack of transparency within the automated ad distribution process and give rise to problems which may 
disadvantage other market players (see Section 2).   
Smaller or more unknown advertisers whose adverts are expected to generate only limited click 
through potential may be at a disadvantage in this process54. Due to the design of the auction and 
weighting of gross bids, those advertisers could be forced to submit higher maximum bids than they 
would otherwise submit in order to compete for the best advertisement space. This two-class society 
of advertisers is also reflected in ad-auctions operated by Google. Advertisers have the option to escape 
competition in the open auction format and enter a so-called “Preferred Deal” or private auction with 
a more restricted pool of competitors55. 
1.3.3. The role of SMEs 
SMEs can participate in all stages of the advertising value chain. However, they most often take on the 
role of advertisers in their goal to win more customers. Online advertising benefits SMEs in particular 
as a quick, flexible and relatively effective method to reach a large audience at low (up front) cost, 
compared to traditional offline media advertising. SMEs can also become publishers themselves in that 
they can generate and sell their advertising inventory. Both in the role of advertiser and publisher, SMEs 
are directly affected by their dependence on intermediaries and the advertising targeting mechanisms 
used. 
The market for designated Ad-Networks and Ad-Exchanges is dominated by large, mostly US based, 
firms and conglomerates. Nonetheless, some smaller EU based firms are also active in the broader 
intermediation market. Prime examples include the British Ad-Network adnow56 or the French Ad-
Network Criteo57. 
Lastly, SMEs can also represent a crucial consumer group that other SMEs try to sell to in the context of 
B2B transactions. As such SMEs can also be “consumers” of advertising. 
Along the online advertising value chain, SMEs have also developed complementary consulting 
services to support different stakeholders. Such business models can involve improving the design of 
adverts, the strategic choice of keywords and advising publishers on how to effectively monetise their 
advertisement inventory. 
1.3.4. Consumers  
Consumers are typically on the receiving end of the online advertising value chain. They encounter 
advertisements in various forms when they use a search engine or visit a website. Depending on the 
content and the context in which the ad is experienced, the user may view it as potentially valuable, 
                                                             
52  Ibid. 
53  Ostrovsky, M., & Schwarz, M., 2011, ‘Reserve prices in internet advertising auctions: A field experiment’, Proceedings of the 12th ACM 
conference on Electronic commerce (pp. 59-60). 
54  Liu, D., Chen, J., & Whinston, A. B., 2010, ‘Ex ante information and the design of keyword auctions’, Information Systems Research, 21(1), 
133-153. 
55  Google, 2021, Ad Manager. 
56  AdNow, 2021, Website.  
57  Criteo, 2021, Website. 
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providing useful information, which is economically characterised as informative advertising in the 
sense of Grossman & Shapiro (1984)58. In this case, advertisements can help consumers to make 
purchasing decisions, which better reflect their preferences and are therefore welfare enhancing59. 
However, if adverts are perceived as rather intrusive instead, consumers experience nuisance costs that 
limit their browsing experience60. This effect led to an increase in the use of ad avoidance technologies 
in recent years.  
In addition to their role as recipients of advertisements, consumers which participate in deploying user-
generated content, may also enter the advertising value chain themselves as publishers selling their 
inventory from blogs or online tools. Unless they reach a very large audience group, consumers as 
publishers tend individually to have very limited bargaining power in relation to other actors in the 
value chain  
1.4. Evolution of the market and implications of COVID-19 
The first ever online advertisement was placed in 1994 by AT&T; it was a banner ad displayed on the 
website of HotWired61. Since then, the relevance of online advertising has continued to grow, as has 
the amount spent by companies on digital advertising. During the last decade, the sector has grown at 
a compound annual growth rate of about 18%62. According to a study conducted in 2017, digital 
advertising contributes EUR 526 billion to the EU economy every year and supports about 6 million 
jobs63. 
As for all branches of the economy, the outbreak of the pandemic has also left its mark on the online 
advertising industry. Global digital ad spending in 2020 was lower than previously expected. Prior to 
the outbreak of the pandemic, the global online advertising spend forecasted by Statista for 2020 was 
in the range of USD 374 billion64, but it only amounted to about USD 356 billion65, a difference of 
approximately 5%66. 
                                                             
58  Grossman, G. M., & Shapiro, C., 1984, ‘Informative advertising with differentiated products’, The Review of Economic Studies, 51(1), 63-81. 
59  Meurer, M., & Stahl II, D. O., 1994,’ Informative advertising and product match’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 12(1), 1-19. 
60  Johnson, J. P., 2013,’ Targeted advertising and advertising avoidance’. The RAND Journal of Economics, 44(1), 128-144. 
61  Kaye, B. K., & Medoff, N., 2001, Just a Click Away: Advertising on the Internet. Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon as cited in Evans, D. S., 2009, 
‘The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Privacy’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 23:3, 37–60. Bundeskartellamt, 2018, 
Online advertising. Series of papers on “Competition and Consumer Protection in the Digital Economy”.  
62  Own calculation based on data provided by Zenith, 2020, Internet advertising spending worldwide from 2007 to 2022, by format, Statista. 
63  IAB Europe, 2017, Research report: The economic contribution of online advertising in Europe. 
64  This corresponds roughly to EUR 295 billion [exchange rate 31.12.2020]. 
65  This corresponds roughly to EUR 292 billion [exchange rate 31.12.2020]. 
66  Statista, 2020, Digital Advertising Report 2020. 
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Figure 3:  Global ad spending forecast in million USD in 2020 
 
Source:  Statista, 2020, Digital Advertising Report 2020. 
This underspend may be due to the fact that companies have faced uncertainties in their operating 
businesses and, therefore, scaled back on ad spending. Especially in the first month of the pandemic, 
both publishers and intermediaries experienced a decline in the value of their inventory and service67. 
The pandemic had particularly negative consequences for news publishers, who regularly reported on 
the pandemic. Since advertisers generally avoid displaying their ad alongside information about 
natural disasters or tragedies, many advertisers refrain from placing ads on news publishers’ websites68.  
However, the pandemic had a far more dramatic effect on traditional advertising segments than on the 
digital advertising industry in 202069. According to an article posted by the World Economic Forum 
(2020), “out-of-home and cinema advertising shrank almost instantly”, as did spending on TV and print 
advertising. On the other hand, spending on online advertising still grew in 2020, albeit less than 
expected and lower than in previous years. Compared to 2019, global online advertising spending 
increased by around 7% and is expected to rise again by 12% in 2021, while in Europe online ad 
spending increased by about 4% in 2020 compared to the previous year. In 2021, expenditure is 
expected to increase again by 13%70. This development is also reflected in the rising costs per 1,000 
impressions. Figure 4 shows the development of the global CPM in USD for ads on Facebook and 
Instagram. The dip in prices from February to April of 2020 is clearly visible. With many pulling out of 
the advertising business, the availability of programmatic inventory skyrocketed during this time. 
Those companies that were in a position to keep investing in advertising faced less competition in the 
auctions, which resulted in greater efficiency and a decrease in CPMs71. Nevertheless, Figure 4 also 
illustrates that prices rose again from around April onwards, and by the end of 2020 had already 
surpassed the price level recorded in the previous year.  
                                                             
67  Widawska, I., 2021, One Year With COVID-19: Programmatic’s Performance Prior To And During The Course Of The Pandemic. 
68  IAB Europe, 2020, IAB Europe Backs ‘Don’t Block Quality European Journalism’. 
69  Statista, 2020, Digital Advertising Report 2020. 
70  Statista, 2021, Digital Markets, Digitale Werbung, Weltweit; Statista, 2021, Digital Markets, Digitale Werbung, Europa. 
71  Comstock, M., 2020, COVID-19 and Programmatic Advertising, PMG.  
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Figure 4:  Global CPM in USD – Metrics on Facebook & Instagram 
 
Source:  GuptaMedia, 2021, Understanding the effects of COVID-19 on the Facebook Ads Marketplace. 
Although many companies worked and are still working with tighter budgets, completely pulling away 
from advertising would do more harm than good, as it could lead to a significant drop in total brand 
communication awareness and, thus, even fewer sales72. Therefore, the goal of advertisers is to improve 
the allocation of available resources, leading them to adapt to changing consumer behaviour as a result 
of the COVID-19 crisis. The pandemic has forced citizens to spend most of their time at home73. 
Consequently, digital consumption has increased significantly. According to an article written by 
Fernandez et al. (2020), digital adoption in Europe jumped from 81% to 94%74. Social media and 
messaging services saw the most growth. ECommerce has also gained in importance75. These 
developments are reflected in the current as well as the future marketing strategies of various 
companies which prioritise digital advertising. In a survey of marketing executives from various 
industries worldwide by Criteo (2021), a significant share of marketers confirmed that they plan to 
spend the same or even more in digital advertising in 2021, despite the impact of the pandemic76. More 
than 40% of the respondents indicated that their budgets for social media advertising, website and 
content marketing as well as advertising on retail websites and apps is likely to increase in 2021. Video 
ads will also account for an increasing share of marketing budgets. However, marketers also 
emphasised that they face some challenges related to digital advertising campaigns. For instance, 
marketers complain that “campaigns do not always target the right people”, “campaigns are too 
dependent on Facebook / Google / Amazon”, and “it is difficult to measure the Return on Investment 
(ROI) of campaigns”. There are also many marketers who plan to diversify their budgets and cover 
multiple channels77. While larger companies and brands have been taking a multi-channel approach 
for years, smaller enterprises rely more on or tend to use channels that reach a large audience and, 
                                                             
72  Roberts, K., & Southgate, D., 2020, Impact Of COVID-19 On Consumer Behaviour, Attitudes and Expectations, Kantar, iabEurope.  
73  Ford, G. S., 2020, ‘COVID-19 and Broadband Speeds: A Multi-Country Analysis’, Phoenix Centre Policy Bulletin 49. 
74  Fernandez, S., Jenkins, P., & Vieira, B., 2020, Europe’s digital migration during COVID-19: Getting past the broad trends and averages. 
75  Roberts, K., & Southgate, D., 2020, Impact Of COVID-19 On Consumer Behaviour, Attitudes and Expectations, Kantar, iabEurope. 
76  Most insights presented in this paragraph are based on Criteo, 2021, State of Digital Advertising 2021: i budget e le priorità del marketing in 
un mondo nuovo. 
77  Criteo, 2021, State of Digital Advertising 2021: i budget e le priorità del marketing in un mondo nuovo.  
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thereby, enable engagement on a large scale78. These companies may become more dependent than 
ever on large players like Facebook, Google, and Amazon in order to reach their audience. 
Publishers are also looking for new ways to improve and adapt their business models. A study found 
that around 71% of publishers are seeking to diversify their revenue in the future79. As a result, they will 
become less reliant on advertising revenue. Brazzoni (2020) features three potential strategies for 
publishers. One approach could be to switch to a subscription model, as this offers an additional source 
of revenue as well as extensive audience data. Publishers could also consider investing in eCommerce. 
This could include selling products and services online through, for instance, newsletters and ads. 
Virtual events could also prove successful80.  
  
                                                             
78  CMA, 2020, Online platforms and digital advertising: Market study final report; Li, C. & Hall, S., 2020, This is how COVID-19 is affecting the 
advertising industry, World Economic Forum. 
79  Brazzoni, A., 2020, 71% of Publishers Seeking to Diversify Revenue After COVID: Here Are the Models They're Considering. lineup.  
80  Ibid. 
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 CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES CONCERNING DIGITAL 
ADVERTISING  
2.1. Practices and their impacts 
In this chapter, we discuss how different stakeholders including consumers, SMEs and suppliers of 
advertising services are affected by trends and practices in the online advertising sector. In this context, 
we identify, with reference to relevant literature and recent competition and consumer protection 
cases, current issues and practices that are prevalent in the online advertising landscape, distinguishing 
between practices affecting consumers, purchasers and suppliers of online advertising. 
2.1.1. Practices affecting consumers and SMEs as consumers/viewers of advertisement 
Online Behavioural Advertising enables the delivery of messages tailored to the interests of individual 
consumers. As such, it typically provides more useful and relevant information, and prevents 
consumers from being presented with random ads81. This is considered to be one of the main benefits 
of behavioural advertising for consumers82. However, the application of behavioural advertisement 
typically requires the extensive use of user data, which raises significant privacy concerns. Research 
shows that consumers’ awareness and understanding of how personal behaviour is tracked online is 
limited. A study for the European Commission which examined consumers’ awareness and perception 
of online personalisation practices showed that around two-third of surveyed participants reported 
that they have some understanding of how personalisation practices work. However, the results 
gathered by a complementary behavioural experiment showed that the proportion of respondents 
who correctly identified targeted adverts or personalised rankings was considerably lower83. Another 
study by Dehling et al. (2019) used semi-structured interviews to examine consumer awareness and 
perceptions of online behavioural advertising84. They document large differences in knowledge about 
online advertising among consumers. Whereas some interviewees called online behavioural 
advertising a magic trick of the Internet, others were able to identify an existing connection between 
different websites or to differentiate between different targeting techniques. While there may be some 
awareness of personalisation practices, consumers are largely unaware of the volume and granularity 
of the data that is being collected and used to deliver personalised advertisements. In this regard, 
Which? (2019) found that consumers in general perceive data collection as a series of single bounded 
transactions, where individual pieces of data are “given” to an organisation in exchange for a specific 
service85. Furthermore, new techniques and technologies are constantly being applied to track 
behaviour that ordinary consumers are not aware of, making tracking more difficult to block86. As such, 
Kingaby (2020) notes that consumers have little agency within the current online ecosystem and have 
limited ways to stop or control data exploitation87. When consumers are asked directly how they assess 
                                                             
81  Ham, C., 2017, ‘Exploring how consumers cope with online behavioral advertising’, International Journal of Advertising, 36 (4):632-658. 
82  Strycharz, J.; van Noort, G.; Smit, E. & Helberger, N., 2019, Consumer View on Personalized Advertising: Overview of Self-Reported Benefits and 
Concerns, In: Advances in Advertising Research X: Multiple Touchpoints in Brand Communication, edited by E. Bigne & S. Rosengren, 53-
66. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. 
83  Ipsos, London Economics & Deloitte, 2018, Consumer market study on online market segmentation through personalised pricing/offers in the 
European Union – Request for Specific Services 2016 85 02 for the implementation of Framework Contract EAHC/2013/CP/04. Study prepared 
for the European Commission. 
84  Dehling, T., Zhang, Y. & Sunyaev, A., 2019, ‘Consumer Perceptions of Online Behavioral Advertising’, Proceedings of the 21st IEEE Conference 
on Business Informatics. 
85  Which?, 2019, Control, Alt or Delete? The future of consumer data.  
86  Ham, C., 2017, ‘Exploring how consumers cope with online behavioral advertising’, International Journal of Advertising, 36 (4):632-658. 
87  Kingaby, H., 2020, AI and Advertising: A Consumer Perspective. 
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behavioural advertising, they recognise the benefits of more relevant ads, but the concerns about 
privacy and data protection seem to outweigh these advantages. In interviews, terms like manipulative, 
creepy, intrusive and privacy-invasive are often provided as answers in relation to such marketing 
techniques88. Some even wish not to be targeted at all89. However, a recent study by IAB Europe (2021) 
revealed that most consumers, faced with a choice between a version of the Internet without targeted 
advertising but with a financial fee for most content, and today's Internet with mostly free content and 
targeted advertising, would choose the latter90. 
Protecting user’s privacy often implies restricting the potential for behavioural targeting methods. 
Examples include technical solutions such as those employed by alternative web-browsers based on 
the Tor routing network91 or disabling the use of cookies92. These possibilities indeed prevent the 
tracking of users. However, they also prevent any (potentially desired) personalisation based on a 
derived user profile93. Thus, current research has focused on investigating options for a middle ground 
which offers privacy enhancement compared to the status-quo while also allowing for some kind of 
imperfect user profiling on the other. One potential solution is so-called private ad ecosystems. These 
methods employ locally derived user profiles in that they download a wide range of advertisements 
from an ad-network and store them on an individual user’s device94. These pre-loaded advertisements 
are not based on any available user data but rely on random samples drawn from the available 
advertisements distributed by an ad-network. If a user visits a website that includes advertisements, 
the targeting method then chooses the most suitable candidate among the pre-loaded ads. In this case, 
the final display of advertising is only based on the locally derived user profile (and pre-loaded ads) on 
the end-user device and does not reflect all the available data or the entire user profile. However, an 
advantage of conducting targeting entirely on the user’s device is that it does not require personal data 
to leave the closed system. 
Another privacy enhancing remedy that limits behavioural targeting to some degree but does not 
prevent the formation of a user profile in general, is the anonymisation of quasi-identifying variables 
(QIDs). These data variables include information on a user’s gender, zip-code or IP-address which can 
be later used to uniquely identify individuals. If these variables are not gathered at all or are at least 
aggregated to a higher hierarchical level (e.g., GPS location into a postal code), behavioural targeting 
based on interests or shopping patterns will remain feasible while an individual user’s privacy is 
simultaneously preserved95. 
                                                             
88  Moore, R., Moore, M., Shanahan, K, Horky, A. & B. Mack, 2015, ‘Creepy Marketing: Three Dimensions of Perceived Excessive Online Privacy 
Violation’, Marketing Management Journal, 25:42-53.; Strycharz, J., van Noort, G., Smit, E. & Helberger, N., 2019, Consumer View on 
Personalized Advertising: Overview of Self-Reported Benefits and Concerns, In: Advances in Advertising Research X: Multiple Touchpoints in 
Brand Communication, edited by E. Bigne & S. Rosengren, 53-66. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. 
89  Turow, J., King, J., Hoofnagle, C., Bleakley, A., & M. Hennessy, 2009, ‘Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities That Enable 
It’, SSRN Electronic Journal; Global Witness, 2021, Do people really want personalised ads online?. 
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91  Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., & Syverson, P., 2004, ‘Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router’, Proceedings of the13th USENIX Security 
Symposium. 
92  Aggarwal, G., Bursztein, E., Jackson, C., & Boneh, D., 2010, ‘An Analysis of Private Browsing Modes in Modern Browsers’, Proceedings of 19th 
USENIX Security Symposium (p. 79-93). 
93  Ullah, I., Boreli, R., & Kanhere, S. S., 2020, Privacy in targeted advertising: A survey, arXiv preprint arXiv:2009.06861.  
94  Toubiana, V., Narayanan, A., Boneh, D., Nissenbaum, H., & Barocas, S., 2010, ‘Adnostic: Privacy preserving targeted advertising’, Proceedings 
Network and Distributed System Symposium; Guha, S., Cheng, B., & Francis, P, 2011, ‘Privad: Practical privacy in online advertising’, 
Proceedings of the 8th USENIX Conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (pp. 169-182). 
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Box 1:  Behavioural targeting and privacy concerns 
• Behavioural advertising provides more useful and relevant information for consumers and more 
locally targeted information, thereby improving user experience. 
• The higher relevance of behaviourally targeted ads is realised by gathering and analysing 
personal user data. This data is regularly shared across various players, often without the users’ 
knowledge resulting in significant privacy concerns. 
• The extent to which visible ads are delivered based on behavioural targeting methods is widely 
underestimated and cannot be easily assessed by consumers. 
• Technical remedies that protect privacy while providing sufficient potential for behavioural 
targeting methods are available (e.g., private ad ecosystems, anonymisation of QIDs) 
Perceived benefits of more relevant ads due to behavioural advertising:  
 
Perceived costs due to consumers’ privacy infringement:  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
In addition to not understanding how and who collects data about them, consumers may also not 
recognise when they are being targeted by advertising. For instance, the use of paid personalised 
rankings could be viewed as a form of nudging to encourage consumers to view and purchase certain 
offers, which can be especially misleading when platforms present themselves as providing a “neutral” 
comparison service. Such practices subtly divert consumer attention, thereby negatively impacting 
consumer choice.  
Another case where invisible targeting may limit choice relates to location-based targeting. Location-
based targeting can help companies with a more limited geographic footprint to advertise more 
efficiently and effectively. However, location-based advertising also enables companies to restrict their 
advertising of services or products, discounts and promotions so that they only reach a certain group 
of consumers, while others would not even be aware of these offers. Depending on the extent of the 
application of geo-tracking, it could be a barrier to the EU Single Market. Recent examples from a 
closely related context are the geo-blocking efforts of some providers. They avoid actively advertising 
certain products or services outside a predefined geographical area. Duch-Brown and Martens (2016) 
examined the welfare effects of removing geo-blocking restrictions on cross-border eCommerce based 
on a dataset of consumer electronics across several European countries for the period 2012-201596. 
Reviewing different scenarios, the authors conclude that lifting geo-blocking restrictions would be 
positive and would benefit both consumers and producers. Another more recent study by Procee et al. 
(2020) assessed the impact of the extension of the scope of the Geo-blocking Regulation with regard 
to audio-visual and non-audio-visual services, which are currently excluded97. The authors considered 
different industries, and found, at least in some cases, that the removal of geo-blocking could have 
positive welfare effects. 
                                                             
96  Duch-Brown, N. & B. Martens, 2016, The Economic Impact of Removing Geo-blocking Restrictions in the EU Digital Single Market. Institute for 
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Furthermore, there has been a lively debate on whether IP addresses and geolocation information 
should be categorised as personal data98. According to Article 4 of the GDPR (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) 
personal data “means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person […]; an 
identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference 
to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier […]”. Recital 
30 of the GDPR even explicitly mentions IP addresses as personal data in certain cases. These cases 
occur when the IP address in combination with other information can serve to identify a person99.  
Box 2:  Obfuscation and location based targeting of advertisements reduce consumer choice 
• Advertisements are regularly concealed by presenting them as seemingly neutral product 
review product comparison sites. These sites effectively narrow consumers’ set of options. 
• Location based targeting enables advertisers to display more relevant products or services to 
consumers in their proximity. However, consumers may be excluded from offers which are 
made available in other jurisdictions (a form of geo-targeting).  
Perceived benefits of more relevant ads due to location targeting:  
 
Perceived costs due to reduced consumer choice due to obfuscation and location targeting:  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
In addition to concerns around privacy and restrictions on choice, online advertising can also raise 
concerns around the exploitation of consumers’ behavioural biases. By targeting behavioural biases, 
consumers can be subconsciously influenced in the decision-making process. Major biases that impact 
consumers’ decisions in an online context are: inclination to stick with the default settings (status-quo 
bias), tendency to focus on short-term implications of decisions by disregarding the long-term 
implications (present bias or myopia). There are numerous design elements available that can serve to 
nudge consumers towards behaviours that advantage advertisers, ad intermediaries or other data 
collection organisations rather themselves100. These design practices are also called dark 
patterns101.The objective of dark patterns is to confuse users, make it difficult to express actual 
preferences or manipulate users into taking certain actions that are not always in their best interest102. 
Different from traditional marketing efforts, which are designed to alter consumer preferences, dark 
patterns attempt to manipulate consumers into doing something that is inconsistent with their true 
preferences103. The use of dark patterns has been documented by academic research in the fields of 
social networks, especially in the form of log-ins and consents to data sharing between services104.  
                                                             
98  Clifford, D., 2014, ‘EU Data Protection Law and Targeted Advertising: Consent and the Cookie Monster - Tracking the crumbs of online 
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103  Ibid. 
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In 2018, the Norwegian Consumer Council (Forbrukerrådet) conducted a study on the prevalence of 
dark pattern techniques in services of Facebook, Google and Windows 10105. They found that privacy 
intrusive default options increase the effort for consumers to opt-out of the gathering of their user data 
(e.g., cookie consent screens). Additionally, they found that providers of online advertising presented 
consent to targeted advertising as exclusively beneficial while also suggesting that consumers would 
experience a loss of functionality if they decline to give consent. In addition, dark patterns, if 
recognised, generated backlash and negative feelings among users/consumers106. They are also 
particularly problematic for minors, who use the same interfaces as adults but do not necessarily have 
the same cognitive abilities to recognise persuasive design techniques. 
Box 3:  Advertisement designs can exploit consumers’ behavioural biases and include dark pattern 
elements 
• Design features within advertisements may aim to exploit consumers’ behavioural biases.  
• The design elements of interfaces or targeting practices can “nudge” consumers towards certain 
choices which are contrary to their best interests and preferences. These so-called “dark 
patterns” are especially prominent in consent forms concerning permissions relating to the 
provision of personal data.  
Perceived benefits of advertising design/dark patterns that exploit behavioural biases: 
None 
Perceived costs of advertising designs/dark patterns that exploit behavioural biases:  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
The allocation of advertising space is dependent on the design of the Real-Time-Bidding (RTB) 
processes employed by large intermediary ad-networks. These procedures take large amounts of 
consumer data into account to identify and segment the consumer base into very precise groups, 
which results in ads being shown to some consumers and not to others. Thus, RTB designs could result 
in unintentional, yet structural discrimination. Privacy International argues that RTB enables companies 
to reach out to vulnerable consumers in ways that are difficult to audit107. When combined with 
techniques to exploit behavioural biases, this could contribute to exacerbating bad habits or emotional 
weaknesses. For instance, based on past behaviour someone might be shown fast-food ads which may 
be counterproductive when trying to overcome a poor diet. Adults with earlier gambling problems 
may be shown gambling ads based on their past online behaviour, making it more difficult to overcome 
addiction108. Moreover, data that predicts when consumers are in particular emotional states is already 
in use and can be used to target consumers when they are particularly vulnerable or otherwise 
receptive to certain messages. Research has also shown that social media can influence the mood of its 
users. In a controversial study, Facebook tweaked the newsfeed of hundreds of thousands of users, 
skewing the feed to more positive or negative content in an attempt to manipulate their mood. It was 
found that this technique does have an influence on users109.  
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However, the very same data-driven targeting methods can also be put to good use as vulnerable 
groups can be identified and avoided by specific advertised content. In an interview conducted for this 
study it was highlighted that these methods are already used to protect consumers, e.g., minors are 
reliably identified and as a result see less advertisements for alcoholic beverages110. Hence, while the 
amount of data that feeds into behavioural targeting methods bears risks for vulnerable consumers, it 
can be also used to protect them. 
Moreover, due to the large amounts of personal data that is transferred between different actors, there 
is little control about how the data is shared or whether it is used against consumers in contexts other 
than advertising. In this vein, EDRi argues that RTB poses challenges to the rights recognised in the 
GDPR111. Similarly, the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office published a report highlighting the risks 
with RTB including profiling, combining and matching data from multiple sources, tracking of 
behaviour and geolocation as well as invisible processing112. This is one of the most pertinent 
challenges as regards online advertising. 
Box 4:  Potential for discrimination and harmful targeting of vulnerable consumers through Real-Time-
Bidding (RTB) 
• The data-driven ad distribution through RTB processes could result in structural discrimination 
or harmful targeting of vulnerable consumers. 
• Past browsing behaviour that indicates e.g. bad eating habits or a potential addiction to 
drinking or gambling, could induce increased exposure to advertisement in these fields. This 
could pose a serious risk to consumers’ wellbeing. 
• The data-driven identification of consumer groups can, however, also be beneficial for 
vulnerable consumers since the advertisements can be specifically filtered for them (e.g., no 
advertisements for alcoholic beverages to minors).  
Perceived benefits of more relevant and secure ads for vulnerable consumers:  
 
Perceived costs of discrimination and harmful advertising for vulnerable consumers:  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
Alongside the potential for nudging and malicious targeting, concerns may also arise around 
‘malvertising’ which refers to online ads that spread malware, or illegitimately collect personal data 
about the consumers’ activities online. If a consumer clicks on an advertisement that has been 
distributed by a hacker or other cybercriminal, the user is usually transferred to a landing page which 
automatically downloads a malicious executable or binary file113. The increasingly automated 
distribution of ads plays into hackers’ hands since they only have to submit their malicious ads to a 
regular ad-network to spread it to an entire ecosystem114.  
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Recent malware that was widely spread through malvertising are for instance AdGholas115 and 
Ramnit116 which infested thousands of computers of consumers and SMEs. Although ad-network and 
ad-exchanges have an incentive to tackle their security issues and have done so already in the past, 
attackers still have many options to bypass them117. Hence, end users such as consumers and SMEs 
alike must keep their system’s anti-virus protection up to date to reduce their risk of exploitation.  
Similar issues persist with email advertising, which is still a common marketing channel118. Phishing 
and spam emails continue to present a challenge as roughly 50% of worldwide email traffic in Q2 2020 
was spam119. The prevalence of spam promotes the spreading of malicious software that harms 
consumers and ransomware that is targeted at SMEs. With both legitimate advertising and spam 
becoming more personalised and targeted, some users struggle to correctly identify spam and 
fraudulent messages120. Spear-phishing is a form of spam that targets carefully selected user groups in 
order to gain access to important information. For this purpose, email messages are usually more 
personalised121. Bullee et al. (2017) conducted an experiment among several hundred employees. The 
authors sent out two types of phishing emails – general phishing emails and personalised spear-
phishing emails – and requested the provision of personally identifiable information (PII). While 19% of 
the employees provided personal information after receiving a general phishing email, 29 % shared 
information in the spear phishing condition. One can assume that less technologically savvy users, like 
elderly and people with language difficulties might be more vulnerable to such practices. Research also 
indicates that internet users with lower educational attainment are less likely to be able to spot more 
sophisticated practices than their well-educated counterparts.  
More generally, online practices that involve misleading or harmful content can be considered 
problematic from the perspective that they contribute to undermining consumer trust in digital 
markets. Trust is a necessary precondition for well-functioning markets. However, as harmful practices 
continue to evolve, they may work to impede some of the growth potential of the digital economy. In 
this vein, tacking unfair and problematic online practices has become a focal point in the new EU 
Consumer Agenda122. 
                                                             
115  Constantin, L., 2016, The AdGholas malvertising campaign infected thousands of computers per day. 
116  Segura, J, 2017, Canada and the U.K. hit by Ramnit Trojan in new malvertising campaign.  
117  Cai, Y., Yee, G. O., Gu, Y. X., & Lung, C. H., 2020, ‘Threats to online advertising and countermeasures: A technical survey’, Digital Threats: 
Research and Practice, 1, 2, Article 11. 
118  Statista, 2020, Digital Advertising Report 2020, p. 29; Econsultancy, & Upland Adestra, 2019, 2019 Email Marketing Industry Census , p. 23. 
119  Kaspersky, 2020, Spam and Phishing in Q2 2020. 
120  For example, online and email spam attempts try to appear credible through stating location, IP or browser information.  
121  Truyens, M., Van Eecke, P., 2009, EU study on the legal analysis of a single market for the information society, European Commission. 
122  European Commission, 2020, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, New Consumer Agenda 
Strengthening consumer resilience for sustainable recovery. 
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Box 5:  The prevalence gives rise to threats to cybersecurity in the form of malvertising and spear-
phishing 
• Widespread online advertising and the increased level of personalisation of email messages 
makes it difficult for users to detect malvertising and phishing or spam emails. 
• The automated distribution of ads through ad-networks/ad-exchanges enables malware to be 
widely distributed. 
• Less technologically savvy people are expected to have their personal or their employers’ 
systems compromised. This can cause significant damage to consumers, companies and reduce 
trust in legitimate marketing services. 
Perceived benefits of prevalence advertisements and automated widespread distribution of ads:  
 




Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
2.1.2. Practices affecting purchasers of advertising including SMEs 
Behavioural advertising in general offers new opportunities for advertisers, especially for the 
implementation of marketing campaigns. According to the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) (2019) “digital platforms have provided a new advertising avenue for small to 
medium sized businesses that may not have been able to afford advertising on the high-reach of 
traditional newspapers or commercial television and radio networks. For some small to medium 
businesses, online advertising has become a significant part of their business models, and many have 
become successful through an online only focused strategy, building a brand and community of 
customers entirely through social media”123. An advantage for SMEs is that online advertising is usually 
cheaper than placing traditional/offline ads. According to Top Draw Inc. (2020), “[t]he average cost to 
reach 1,000 people with online advertising [r]anges from $3-$10, while the average cost to reach 1,000 
people with traditional/offline advertising is $22 and up”124. 
However, online advertising markets are increasingly concentrated amongst a few key players. Google 
and Facebook dominate the two most commercially important markets, namely the search and the 
display advertising market, and generate the greatest shares of revenue in the entire advertising 
sector125.  
                                                             
123  ACCC, 2019, Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report. 
124  Top Draw Inc., 2020, Online Advertising Costs in 2021. 
125  Datanyze, 2020, Advertising Networks; Statista, 2020, Digital Advertising report 2020; Autorité de la concurrence, 2018, Sector-specific 
investigation into online advertising. 
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The competitive advantage of these companies stems primarily from the following factors: reach126, 
large scale of advertising inventories127 and vertical integration128. Each of these aspects can be positive 
for advertisers in their own right, as they can enable both strong targeting and the ability to reach a 
large number of people. In addition, integration can lead to efficiency gains. However, the quasi-
duopoly situation raises serious competition concerns, which have been addressed by a number of 
competition authorities in recent reports129.  
CMA's market study (2020) on digital advertising devoted some sections to Google’s and Facebook’s 
abilities and incentives to exploit market power. Google and Facebook are, in theory, able to 
manipulate market outcomes such as the price for advertising, even within an auction framework, by 
determining the quantity and presentation of ads, by controlling the trade-off between price and 
quality of adverts or certain auction parameters. All this can affect advertisers, for example, in the form 
of higher costs or lower returns on investment. CMA (2020) noted that several advertisers reported 
changes in Google’s policies on ad load and the presentation of search advertising, which “had the 
effect of increasing the propensity for users to click on ads rather than organic links”130. As a result, 
businesses that rely primarily on general search may have to bear higher costs for advertising, for 
example by paying (more) for ads, to maintain the same amount of traffic. Changes in ad-load and 
presentation of ads are also observable for Facebook131. Such practices can also harm consumers by 
directly affecting the user experience of the platforms. Consumers can receive a poor quality of service, 
seeing too much advertising or having to disclose too much personal data. In addition, consumer harm 
can arise indirectly. If businesses have to bear higher costs, these costs will presumably be passed on 
to consumers, who would have to pay higher prices for goods and services132. 
                                                             
126  Both Google and Facebook operate services that are popular among a vast majority of Internet users and have high audience numbers. 
This enables these companies to collect constantly updated, very large and diversified volumes of data. Large data sets combined with 
great data mining capabilities result in Facebook and Google having great targeting abilities. (Autorité de la concurrence, 2018, Sector-
specific investigation into online advertising.) 
127  Both Google and Facebook companies are able to sell ad space of their own services but also advertising inventories of many third-party 
websites. (Autorité de la concurrence, 2018, Sector-specific investigation into online advertising.) 
128  Facebook and Google are vertically integrated along the advertising value chain. (Autorité de la concurrence, 2018, Sector-specific 
investigation into online advertising.) 
129  Autorité de la concurrence, 2018, Sector-specific investigation into online advertising; Bundeskartellamt, 2018, Online advertising. Series of 
papers on “Competition and Consumer Protection in the Digital Economy”; ACCC, 2019, Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report; CMA, 2020, 
Online platforms and digital advertising: Market study final report. 
130  CMA, 2020, Online platforms and digital advertising: Market study final report, p. 237.  
131  CMA, 2020, Online platforms and digital advertising: Market study final report. 
132  Ibid. 
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Box 6:  Factors that constitute large advertising providers can both harm and benefit advertisers 
• Major providers like Facebook and Google benefit from great reach, large scale of advertising 
inventory and from being vertically integrated. These aspects provide an opportunity for 
advertisers to advertise more efficiently and effectively and reach a large audience. Small 
business that operate on a limited budget and might not be able to diversify their advertising 
effort across different advertising service providers may particularly benefit from the service 
provided by large players.  
• The very same factors may enable those players to manipulate market outcomes, thereby 
harming advertisers, publishers, and consumers. 
Perceived benefits of greater targeting power and reach as well as efficiency gains:  
 
Perceived costs due to exploitation of market power:  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
Furthermore, the design of advertising auctions itself as well as the entire structure of the advertising 
value chain has the potential to disadvantage advertisers and publishers. Two of the main problems 
are lack of transparency and hidden fees. Both ACCC (2019) and CMA (2020) refer explicitly to these 
issues133. In digital behavioral advertising, advertising slots are usually allocated within milliseconds 
with the help of sophisticated auction systems and algorithms. The functioning of the algorithms in 
particular remains poorly understood by outsiders. As a result, most advertisers and publishers simply 
accept the results of the auctions. As noted by the ACCC (2019) “it is often difficult for advertisers and 
websites to understand how ad tech platforms determine what advertising inventory to buy or sell, 
how winners in auctions are determined, or how advertising bid requests are passed along the ad tech 
supply chain”134. In some processes, the success of an auction is also determined by various scores that 
might be beyond the strategic control of the individual market participant. Success in an auction 
depends on the automatically calculated quality of the ad, quality of the website and the demand for 
specific keywords or the value of specific target groups. The method of calculating these scores is often 
a “black-box” for bidders. Although less transparency means that market participants cannot outplay 
the algorithm, this also makes it very difficult for them to observe whether they are making the right 
decisions and investments or being exploited135. The value chain itself is also a factor in the lack of 
transparency. We have already described the multitude of players operating along the value chain and 
their functions in value creation in Chapter 1. Advertisers and publishers are often unable to monitor 
who is involved and what the intermediaries are doing. This also applies to the so-called “ad tech” fees, 
which are fees charged by various intermediaries along the advertising value chain136. Market 
participants are kept in the dark when it comes to the calculation of these fees. The lack of transparency 
leads to businesses making uniformed decisions or being lured into certain actions that can be 
                                                             
133  ACCC, 2019, Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report; CMA, 2020, Online platforms and digital advertising: Market study final report. 
134  ACCC, 2019, Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report, p. 151. 
135  CMA, 2020, Online platforms and digital advertising: Market study final report. 
136  Geradin, D. and D. Katsifis, 2019, ‘An EU competition law analysis of online display advertising in the programmatic age’, European 
Competition Journal, 15 (1):55-96. 
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harmful137. Morton & Dinielli (2020) argue further that additional costs which advertisers might face 
could result in companies investing less in brands and products.  
After all, if companies expect a lower return on a particular innovation or investment because reaching 
consumers is more expensive, they are less likely to invest and innovate in the first place138.  
These problems are highlighted in a paper published by the World Federation of Advertisers (WFA) in 
April139. According to a survey, 65% of global advertisers stated that they had “difficulties accessing 
data related to the way actions are carried out and prices determined on large online advertising 
platforms”140. Such information is rarely shared. According to WFA, advertisers also have difficulties 
accessing ad performance data. Access to raw data on impression, viewability, reach, conversion, 
engagement is rare to non-existent. The possibility of having data validated by independent auditors 
is also usually restricted. 
Less transparency can also be a loophole for fraud. Fraud in digital advertising or ad fraud refers to any 
practice that involves manipulating views, clicks, pages and other metrics for the purpose of deception. 
These conducts aim to increase the costs for companies buying advertising space without them getting 
any real value in return141. This direct harm to advertising companies is difficult to quantify but some 
estimate the annual losses/damage from ad fraud to be in the billions142. Ad fraud is a major potential 
threat to the whole advertising ecosystem143. SMEs, often on a tight marketing budget, may be hit 
particularly hard by these practices. Aside from direct monetary self-interests, ad fraud has also been 
reported to be used in an anti-competitive way144. Fake clicks on competitors’ ads not only waste their 
overall marketing budget, but can also impact their daily ad auction budgets, thereby capping the 
competitor’s potential market reach and brand awareness. Thus, small businesses and large companies 
alike are struggling with ad fraud and some high-profile examples like Uber and P&G have drastically 
cut their online advertising budgets in response145.  
  
                                                             
137  ACCC, 2019, Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report. 
138  Morton , F. M. S., & Dinielli, D. C., 2020, Roadmap for Digital Advertising Monopolization Case Against Google. Omidyar Network. 
139  WFA, 2021, WFA global position on advertiser access to data in the digital advertising market. 
140  WFA, 2021, WFA global position on advertiser access to data in the digital advertising market, p 5.  
141  Zhu, X., Tao, H., Wu, Z. Cao, J., Kalish, K. & J. Kayne, 2017, Ad Fraud Taxonomy and Prevention Mechanisms, in: Fraud Prevention in Online 
Digital Advertising, SpringerBriefs in Computer Science 19-23. 
142  Juniper Research, 2017, Ad Fraud to Cost Advertisers $19 billion in 2018, Representing 9% of Total Digital Advertising Spend; WFA, 2016, WFA 
issues first advice for combatting ad fraud.  
143  Cf. Haider et al., 2018, ‘An ensemble learning based approach for impression fraud detection in mobile advertising’, Journal of Network 
and Computer Applications, 112, 126-141. 
144  Cf. Gordon et al., 2020, ‘Inefficiencies in Digital Advertising Markets’, Journal of Marketing, 85(1), 7-25. 
145  Fou, A., 2020, Out Of The Darkness (Of Ad Fraud) And Into The Light. Forbes.  
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Box 7:  Lack of transparency may lead to increased costs and fraud 
• Online advertising auctions are highly opaque. Although less transparency means that market 
participants cannot outplay the algorithm, this also makes it very difficult for them to observe 
whether they are being exploited. 
• Lack of transparency can lead to exploitation of market participants and fraud, raising costs for 
purchasers of advertising  
Perceived benefits of lack of transparency:  
None 
Perceived costs due to lack of transparency, potential exploitation and fraud :  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
2.1.3. Practices affecting suppliers of digital advertising services (publishers and smaller 
SMEs functioning as Ad-Networks) 
Although a large number of companies are active in the online advertising industry, Facebook and 
Google account for most of the market share. These two companies have a significant market share in 
both the display and search advertising markets. For instance, Google’s share in video- and search 
advertising market is close to 80%, respectively146. The company has a particular advantage in these 
two segments due to their vertical integration; they operate their own consumer-centric platforms, 
which allow them to provide their own inventory and collect rich data on their users, as well as selling 
advertising services. Google operates as a DSP and SSP, as well as being engaged in ad networks/ad 
exchanges147. Although Google’s but also Facebook’s market position have remained stable over the 
past few years, Amazon in particular seems to be gaining some momentum recently, mainly by 
providing advertising on their own website, thereby benefiting from vertical integration as well148. 
Small suppliers of digital advertising services which are not vertically integrated may be at a 
disadvantage compared with larger players due to the current market conditions and the high barriers 
for entry and expansion. The dependence on behavioural data is one of the main barriers for smaller 
competing advertising networks. Larger platforms benefit from extensive volumes of data, which they 
can gather in the context of their proprietary user-facing services and from third parties using their 
advertising and data analytics services and tools149. This superior access to a combination of first- and 
third-party data attracts advertisers. Although large advertisers tend to use more than one supplier of 
digital advertising services to reach consumers, smaller advertisers are more likely to use just one.  
                                                             
146  Sunderland,J., Herrera, F., Esteves, S., Godlovitch, I., Wiewiorra, L., Taş, S., Kroon, P., Stronzik, M., Baischew, D., Nett, L., Tenbrock, S., Strube 
Martins, S., de Streel, A., Kalliala, J., Huerta Bravo, J., Maxwell, W., & Renda, A., 2021, Digital Markets Act: Impact assessment support study: 
annexes. 
147  Statista, 2020, Digital Advertising Report 2020. Some sources covering the market for adexchanges/adnetworks indicate Google as the 
clear market leader. According to these sources, Google has the largest market share, followed by other companies such as AppNexus, 
OpenX and Amazon, which have less than 10% market share. European companies operating in these markets are: Axonix, Netric, and 
PubNativ. W3Tech, 2021, Market share yearly trends for advertising networks; Datanyze, 2021, Market Share Category – Ad Exchanges Market 
Share. 
148  Sunderland,J., Herrera, F., Esteves, S., Godlovitch, I., Wiewiorra, L., Taş, S., Kroon, P., Stronzik, M., Baischew, D., Nett, L., Tenbrock, S., Strube 
Martins, S., de Streel, A., Kalliala, J., Huerta Bravo, J., Maxwell, W., & Renda, A., 2021, Digital Markets Act: Impact assessment support study: 
annexes. 
149  Autorité de la concurrence, 2018, Sector-specific investigation into online advertising. 
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As Google and Facebook have the ability to reach a wide audience, smaller advertisers usually opt for 
these providers150. 
In this context, bundling or tied sales can have negative consequences for small suppliers of digital 
advertising services151. Concerns in this regard have been raised with the competition authority in 
France. Stakeholders noted that some companies only provide access to targeting data if it is 
purchased together with their advertising solutions and services. In addition, suppliers may prohibit 
purchasers of the data from using it on competitors' advertising services152. Even if the option were to 
exist theoretically, it would likely be very cumbersome to realise. Srinivasan (2020) attributes this to the 
fact that buying tools employ different user IDs153. Therefore, “[a]n advertiser that uses Google’s 
DoubleClick ad server […] has a harder time using a non-Google buying tool because the two tools 
operate on different user IDs”154. According to Srinivasan (2020), even Google itself uses different IDs 
for the same user when sharing data with various companies using different IDs, which makes it difficult 
or impossible for companies to compile records. This practice provides Google with an informational 
and thus a competitive advantage155. 
The information disparity between Google and its rivals may widen in the future. In 2020, Google 
announced that it would withdraw from allowing third-party cookies altogether by 2022. Other 
browsers like Mozilla's Firefox and Apple's Safari browsers already block third-party cookies by 
default156. These are also likely to be blocked on Google’s Chrome, one of the most used browser 
worldwide, in the future as well157. As far as users' privacy is concerned, this development may certainly 
be welcomed. However it should be noted that, Google recently acknowledged that the current 
implementation of their Privacy Sandbox technology FLoC “might not be compatible with European 
privacy law”158. Moreover, some experts believe that such a step is likely to harm advertisers, competing 
exchanges and buying tools more than it will Google159. According to Morton & Dinielli (2020) the 
former will not be able to bid efficiently or deliver payments for effective ads without knowing 
consumers and how they behave160. Publishers’ might also lose a substantial share of ad revenue 
without third-party cookies161. 
That said, it has become apparent that publishers are taking a proactive approach to the problem and 
preparing for a future without third-party cookies. A key strategy involves strengthening and 
improving the collection of first-party data. One popular tool used by individual publishers is the 
                                                             
150  CMA, 2020, Online platforms and digital advertising: Market study final report. 
151  ACCC (2019) identified four different types of bundling and sales practices prevailed in the online advertising market, namely bundling 
of advertising services, or ad tech services, with a) access to website inventory, b) with access to advertiser demand, c) with data or general 
bundling of multiple services. Some of these practices are discussed in subsequent paragraphs of this subsection. (ACCC, 2019, Digital 
Platforms Inquiry: Final Report.) 
152  Autorité de la concurrence, 2018, Sector-specific investigation into online advertising. 
153  Srinivasan, D., 2020, ‘Why Google Dominates Advertising Markets – Competition Policy Should Lean on the Principles of Financial Market 
Regulation’, Standford Technology Law Review 24 (1): 55-175. 
154  Ibid. 
155  Ibid. 
156  DEUS Marketing GmbH, 2020, Welche Auswirkungen hat die Abschaffung von Third Party Cookies auf die Werbebranche?, 
OnlineMarketing.de 
157  Chrome holds a market share of about 65% on the global browser market. Statcounter.com, 2021, Browser Market Share Worldwide – 
Statistic.  
158  Schiff, A., 2021, Google Will Not Run FLoC Origin Tests In Europe Due To GDPR Concerns (At Least For Now). Adexchanger. 
159  Srinivasan, D., 2020, ‘Why Google Dominates Advertising Markets – Competition Policy Should Lean on the Principles of Financial Market 
Regulation’. Standford Technology Law Review 24 (1): 55-175; Morton, F. M. S., & Dinielli D.C., 2020, Roadmap for Digital Avertising 
Monopolization Case Against Google. Omidyar Network. 
160  F. M. S., & Dinielli D.C., 2020, Roadmap for Digital Avertising Monopolization Case Against Google. Omidyar Network. 
161  Rybnik, R., 2020, How can publishers prepare for the end of the third-party cookies?; Sluis, S., 2020, Google Chrome Will Drop Third-Party 
Cookies In 2 Years, Adexchanger; Thorpe, E. K., 2020, RIP third-party cookies: What Google’s ‘pivot to privacy’ means for publishers. 
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implementation of registration walls. Publishers benefit from such methods both through a more 
direct relationship with their audience and the ability to process valuable data themselves162. In 
addition, publishers have been forming new alliances around first-party data and collaborating with 
each other163.  
Box 8:  Asymmetric access to information and data 
• Players like Facebook and Google have a data and information advantage over other players 
in the market, which naturally makes them more attractive to advertisers. Therefore, certain 
practices and behaviours, such as tying the sale of data and advertising services or 
prohibiting/preventing buyers from using data for competitors' advertising services, will 
weaken the market position of other players (SSPs, DSPs, and ad networks/ad exchanges). 
• Prohibiting third-party cookies in Chrome will, at least in the short term, do more harm to 
other companies in the value chain than to Google and widen the information gap. However, 
there is potential for the market to develop without relying on third-party cookies.  
Perceived benefits of banning third-party cookies :  
 
Perceived costs due to asymmetric access to information and data :  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
Another kind of bundling and tied sales occurs in relation to Google's approach to YouTube’s ad space. 
According to Morton & Dinielli (2020), YouTube inventory is only available to advertisers via Google’s 
own demand side service. Considering the reach and impact of YouTube ads, advertisers might 
naturally opt to use Google’s services even when they would otherwise choose a competing demand 
side service. This practice increases entry barriers for new demand side services, as services that are not 
able to place ads on YouTube would be less useful for advertisers in general. Morton & Dinielli (2020) 
also provided a real life example of Google’s conduct to foreclose rival services from inventory. 
AppNexus was an expanding service provider signing a major deal with the largest advertising agency 
worldwide, when Google suddenly cut off AppNexus’s ability to place ads on YouTube and other 
supply that was available through real-time bidding. AppNexus’s ad buyers had to set up a contract 
directly with Google before they were allowed to access Google’s inventory again164.  
                                                             
162  Thorpe, E. K., 2020, RIP third-party cookies: What Google’s ‘pivot to privacy’ means for publishers. 
163  Thorpe, E. K., 2020, First-party data has empowered publishers to experiment with personalisation and better advertising. 
164  Kafka, P., 2010, Google Cuts Off AppNexus, and the Ad Tech World Shudders. AllThingsD.com; Kincaid, J., 2010, Google (Temporarily) Blocks 
AppNexus From Its Ad Exchange. 
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Large players, which are mostly vertically integrated, often face accusations of impeding 
interoperability and self-preferencing. One concern expressed by some stakeholders is that Google 
could potentially be favouring its own SSP when its DSPs decides where to submit its bids165. Another 
concern relates to SA360166. Some stakeholders claimed that Google benefits from greater 
interoperability between SA360 and Google Search compared to other search engines. According to 
CMA (2020), Microsoft claimed, among others, that new features from Google Ads are adopted on 
SA360 much faster than the innovations developed by Bing167.  
Exclusivity clauses, like agreements requiring third-party websites to source their ads largely or even 
exclusively from the respective contracting party, can also restrict competition. The inclusion of such 
clauses in contracts with third party websites was subject to an antitrust proceeding by the European 
Commission against Google, which was closed in 2019. The European Commission considered 
Google’s practice to be harmful to competition168. Another example that shows that Google takes 
action that strengthens its competitive position is “Project Bernanke”. According to an article written 
by Lyons (2021) the company used its ability “to access historical data about bids made through Google 
Ads, to change bids by its clients and boost the clients’ chances of winning auctions for ad impressions, 
putting rival ad tools at a disadvantage”169. 
Box 9:  Conducts like exclusive clauses, self-preferencing, bundling and tied sales as well as 
impediments to interoperability are associated with large players 
• Google has been accused of exploiting their market power through various types of practices.  
• Several Authorities have taken a closer look at the individual conducts, while some are 
confirmed, for others it can only be assumed that the companies in question may have 
incentives to engage in such activities. It is clear, however, that if exercised those conducts 
would harm competitors and other companies in the value chain. 
Perceived benefits of such practices: 
None 
Perceived costs due to these practices :  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
                                                             
165  CMA, 2020, Online platforms and digital advertising: Market study final report. Appendix M: intermediation in open display advertising, p. M108.  
166  SA360 is a Google-owned search management platform used by agencies and marketers to manage and optimise campaign across 
multiple search networks and media channels (see CMA, 2020, Online platforms and digital advertising: Market study final report; Google, 
2021, Search Ads 360 overview - What’s Search Ads 360). 
167  CMA, 2020, Online platforms and digital advertising: Market study final report. 
168  European Commission, 2019, Antitrust: Commission fines Google €1.49 billion for abusive practices in online advertising. 
169  Lyons, K., 2021, Google reportedly ran secret ‘Project Bernanke’ that boosted its own ad-buying system over competitors. The information was 
revealed in unredacted court documents. The Verge.  
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2.2. Steps taken by consumers and commercial providers to address 
perceived challenges 
Consumers who are weary of online advertising and perceive the adverts they see as rather intrusive 
have the option to improve their browsing experience through the use of ad-avoidance technologies 
(AAT). Ad-blockers mitigate the nuisance costs from advertisements and promise advertisement-free 
visits of websites. Approximately 25% of all internet users in the US used such software in 2019170. 
Malloy et al. (2016)171 analysed a large scale data set consisting of over 2 million users in the US and 
other key countries that records over a trillion website interactions. They find that ad-block usage 
amounts to approximately 18% in the US and up to 49% in Germany. They estimate that the 
effectiveness of ad-blocking software is limited to the extent that they only block roughly half the ads 
seen by users without ad-blocking software. The consequential losses in monthly ad revenue for the 
largest 10 scraped publisher websites are estimated to be approximately USD 120,000 to USD 3.9 
million172 (given an assumed average CPM of USD 1)173. 
However, ad-blocking users might be short-sighted with respect to their own interests. While their 
behaviour may indeed improve their online browsing experience in the short-run, it might decrease 
the availability of free, advertising financed content in the long-run. Cutting off the advertising revenue 
stream constitutes a severe threat to the business models of numerous content providers (publishers) 
on the Internet. Publishers which employ technologies to exclude ad-blocking users or ask for the AAT 
to be disabled on their site face commercial challenges as well: 61% of consumers would not return to 
such a site again and only 38% of polled online users in the US would turn off their ad-blocker if asked 
to by a website174. But, AATs also offer an edge for publisher. Since it is possible to detect whether a 
visitor uses AAT, it can be interpreted as a signal. Those who use AAT are relatively more sensitive to 
adverts; while those who do not are not. Aseri et al. (2020)175 and Despotakis et al. (2020)176 show that 
this identification enables publishers to differentiate the advertisement intensity between these 
different user groups on their site in the form of ad-light website designs and raise aggregate 
advertising revenues accordingly. Consequently, this also leads to increased ad intensity on websites 
and online services for non-ad blocking users177. 
At the same time, developers of ad-blocking tools and privacy enhancing technologies may be doing 
so to benefit from ad avoidance activities by consumers. So-called “whitelisting” business models 
rely on passing through some advertisements in return for a revenue share of the regained ad revenues 
of large publishers. These AATs could therefore constitute a new form of gatekeeping role in the open 
Internet. The recent dispute between Apple and Facebook about new privacy enhancing technologies 
that restrict ad tracking in Apple’s upcoming operating system update (iOS 14.5) underpins this 
conclusion178. 
                                                             
170  eMarketer.com, 2020, Ad Blocking Is Slowing Down, but Not Going Away. 
171  Malloy, M., McNamara, M., Cahn, A., & Barford, P., 2016, ‘Ad blockers: Global prevalence and impact’, Proceedings of the 2016 Internet 
Measurement Conference (pp. 119-125). 
172  This corresponds roughly to EUR 113.841 to EUR 3,7 million [exchange rate 31.12.2016]. 
173  This corresponds roughly to EUR 0.95 [exchange rate 31.12.2016]. 
174  eyeo.com, 2020, Ad-blocking usage report 2019. 
175  Aseri, M., Dawande, M., Janakiraman, G., & Mookerjee, V. S., 2020, ’Ad-Blockers: A Blessing or a Curse?’, Information Systems Research, 31 
(2) 627-646. 
176  Despotakis, S., Ravi, R., & Srinivasan, K., 2020, ’The beneficial effects of ad blockers’, Management Science. 
177  Anderson, S. P., & Gans, J. S., 2011,’ Platform siphoning: Ad-avoidance and media content’, American Economic Journal: 
Microeconomics, 3(4), 1-34. 
178  Warren, T., 2020, Facebook hits back at Apple with second critical newspaper ad. The Verge. 
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The conflicting interests on advertising companies and publishers on one hand and developers of AATs 
on the other has led to a cycle of technological developments to circumvent the technologies of the 
respective opposing party. This is often referred to as the ad-blocking “arms race” in scientific 
research179. Traditional ad-blocking browser extensions maintain so-called filter lists which are run 
through with every website visit. If a visited website contains advertisements, they are filtered out if 
their respective script is detected through an entry in the filter list. Hence, ad-blocking filter lists are per 
definition a lagging tool in that they contain only known ad scripts. Ad-blocking detection, however, 
evolved quickly over the recent years and works in two ways. Either the detection tool checks whether 
ads are not downloaded upon a user’s visit or a potential ad blocking extension is detected because it 
greatly reduces the loading time of the visited website180 181. While the academic consensus is that this 
arms race between ad-block developers and consumers on the one side and advertisers and publishers 
on the other side will be won finally by the latter party, recent research by Storey et al. (2017) proposes 
new technological approaches to ad-blocking that employ elements of rootkits to prevent detection 
by anti-ad blocking scripts and could potentially challenge this view182.  
Box 10:  Widespread advertising facilitates the adoption of ad-blocking software (AAT) by users which 
threatens the business models of publishers and advertisers 
• Ad-blocking usage is increasing worldwide as a means to limit ad exposure while browsing. 
• Ad-blocking creates opportunities for publishers to strategically differentiate between ad 
blocking and non-ad-blocking users and offer different website experiences (e.g. ad-light 
versions).  
• Ad blocking signifies a desire by consumers for greater privacy and can motivate the 
development of new business models; however 
• The short-term relief from intrusive advertisements could undermine advertising based 
business models and the availability of “free” content in the long-term.  
• Developers of AAT could act as a new bottleneck in reaching consumers and capture a fraction 
of publishers’ advertising revenue. 
Perceived benefits of ATT and the reduced ad exposure and increased privacy for consumers:  
 
Perceived costs due to increased adoption levels of ATT for non-users and advertisers/publishers:  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
                                                             
179  Storey, G., Reisman, D., Mayer, J., & Narayanan, A., 2017, The future of ad blocking: An analytical framework and new techniques, arXiv 
preprint arXiv:1705.08568. 
180  Mughees, M. H., & Qian, Z., 2017, ‘Detecting anti ad-blockers in the wild’, Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2017 (3):127–
142. 
181  Nithyanand, R., Khattak, S., Javed, M., Vallina-Rodriguez, N., Falahrastegar, M., Powles, J. E., De Cristofaro, E., Haddadi, H., Murdoch, S.J., 
2016, ‘Adblocking and counter blocking: A slice of the arms race’, Proceedings of the 6th USENIX Workshop on Free and Open 
Communications on the Internet (FOCI '16). 
182  Storey, G., Reisman, D., Mayer, J., & Narayanan, A., 2017, The future of ad blocking: An analytical framework and new techniques. arXiv 
preprint arXiv:1705.08568.  
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2.3. Analysis of costs and benefits of different practices 
In the above Sections 2.1 and 2.2 we identified practices and issues that are either inherent to the online 
advertising value chain or stem from countermeasures that have already been undertaken as a 
response. However, the potential harm that might result for one or multiple involved parties does not 
paint the complete picture. Practices or issues that arose over the last decade have done so because 
they offer also a range of benefits and advantages in the form of higher efficacy, a reduction in costs or 
create new revenue streams that enable the provision of content and innovative services. 
For this reason, a holistic approach is needed when evaluating specific practices and considering 
whether a remedial intervention is required. The evaluation of benefits and harms cannot be based on 
quantitative metrics (i.e. in term of monetary costs or gains), since the plethora of issues is not readily 
quantifiable without access to proprietary data. However, the concluding boxes in the previous two 
sections seek to provide a qualitative assessment of the potential harms and benefits associated with 
each identified issue. The assessment is based on extensive research of the academic and non-
academic literature and is also informed by insights from interviews conducted with different 
stakeholders for this study. This assessment could provide a first indication of the severity of one 
practice in relation to the other practices identified and, thus, offer guidance as to which should receive 
priority when considering regulatory intervention. 
In Table 2, we summarise the benefits and potential harms associated with each practice and problem. 
The order in which the practices and issues are listed reflects the sequence in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. Thus, 
the order of practices shown in the table should not be interpreted as a ranking of potentially harmful 
practices. 
We visualise the severity of associated costs or the potential for harm that originates from an issue in 
red from moderate (1), somewhat harmful (2) to very harmful (3). Similarly, the associated benefits are 
visualised in green and classified from moderate (1), somewhat beneficial (2) to very beneficial (3). 
Please note that these ratings should only be interpreted in an ordinal manner and not as a cardinal 
scale. Hence, a practice that is classified as being harmful should be more problematic compared to 
another one whose harms are considered only moderate but it is not twice as harmful as the latter. 
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Practices affecting consumers (and SMEs as viewers of advertising) 
Behavioural 
targeting gives rise 
to privacy concerns 
Behavioural targeting relies on the analysis of 
profound user data. It offers more relevant 
advertisement that aligns more with an individual’s 
interests. 
 
In the targeting process personal user data (e.g., IP-
address, browsing history, age, gender, etc.) is gathered 
and analysed. This data is potentially also shared across 
various market players without the consumers’ 
knowledge or consent. Behavioural targeting methods, 






Product reviews on comparison sites are often 
sponsored content to cover the most popular 
products. Further, advertisements are often also 
targeted based on a consumers’ location or are not 
purchasable in specific areas/countries (geo-
blocking). This provides the consumer with 
potentially more relevant offers in their proximity.   
The obfuscation of advertisement as neutral product 
reviews narrows the consumers’ focus on the covered 
products. Location based targeting of advertisement 
may implicitly foreclose specific products to some 








Behavioural biases of consumers are used to increase 
the likelihood that an advertisement is clicked on. 
Dark pattern elements are employed to nudge 
consumers to give their consent to share their 
personal data. 
None Design elements of advertising (dark patterns) that aim 
at exploiting consumers’ behavioural biases lead to 
consumers behaving in a way that is contrary to their 
own preferences (e.g., consent to data sharing, clicking 
on non-avoidable ads).  
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targeting with RTB 
The data-driven targeting implemented in the RTB 
processes provides more relevant advertisements to 
users. The effectiveness of behavioural targeting 
relies on personal data such as the analysis of the 
browsing history. Based on this, vulnerable groups 
can also be protected (in not seeing certain ads, e.g., 
minors and alcoholic beverages).  
The data-driven targeting may target vulnerable 
consumers in a harmful way. Due to their past browsing 
behaviour, consumers with, e.g., a bad eating habit or 
gambling problem may be especially exposed to 
advertisements in these fields. This poses an increased risk 




Automated distribution of advertising through Ad-
Networks and RTB reduces costs and increases the 
reach of advertising campaigns. 
 
The automated distribution of advertisements makes it 
easy for cybercriminals to spread malware in the form of 
malvertising or spear-phishing. This can cause significant 
damages to affected consumers and SMEs.  
 




Large advertising intermediaries like Facebook and 
Google offer a great variety of ad inventory and thus a 
wide reach to advertisers. Due to their extensively 
gathered data, they can provide profound targeting of 
ads to increase the ROI for the advertisers. Especially 
smaller advertisers benefit from the large scale of these 
intermediaries since they regularly do not have the 
funds to distribute their marketing efforts across many 
intermediaries. 
 
The large concentration implies only a marginal 
competitive pressure among these two large 
intermediaries. This bears the potential for higher prices 
towards advertisers and buyer power towards publishers 
which would in the long run lead to market inefficiencies. 
Non-transparent price setting in RTB, as well as 
performance and conversion data of distributed ads is 
difficult to challenge by rivals.  
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& Ad-fraud.  
Details of the inner workings of the ad auctions (RTB) 
are not disclosed in order to prevent other market 
participants to game the algorithm. 
None The outcomes of the ad-auctions are non-transparent. 
Advertisers receive no data on how their bid and ad 
performed during the auction. Access to performance 
data of the distributed ads is also not provided to 
advertisers making it impossible to audit their ad 
spending and calculate reliable ROI estimates. This 
foreclosure of data also opens the door for ad-fraud as 
fraudulent and artificial conversion cannot be detected 
easily. 
 
Practices affecting suppliers of advertising space (publishers) and SMEs functioning as Ad-networks 
Asymmetric access 
to information and 
data 
Large intermediaries such as Facebook and Google 
have an information advantage over competing ad-
networks and publishers. Trends that facilitate this 
information gap are the phasing out of third-party 
cookies by Google. This creates new potential for the 
market to develop without relying on cookies and 
also improves consumers’ privacy.  
The information advantage of these large intermediaries 
makes their services more attractive to advertisers. Their 
data sets may act as an entry barrier for smaller ad-
networks or increase costs for other publishers. The 
phasing out of third-party cookies by Google may weaken 
competitor’s positions in the long run as the knowledge 






 None Large intermediaries such as Google and Facebook are 
known to strengthen their market positions through 
practices of bundling and self-preferencing. The vertical 
integration of these players leads to bundling practices. 
Exemplarily, advertising space on YouTube (Google), 
Facebook (Facebook) are only accessible for advertisers 
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through the respective intermediaries at highly non-
transparent costs. This puts other publishers at an 
disadvantage as they do not have access to this 
exclusively marketed ad-inventory. Competitive concerns 
usually associated with these conducts should also apply 
here. 





Ad-blocking software reduces the exposure to 
advertisements while browsing. Regularly, these tools 
also the tracking of users and hence increase privacy. 
With the adoption consumers can express their 
demand for less intrusive ads. 
 
The adoption of ad-blockers may threaten advertising 
based business models of publishers. The provision of 
content ‘for free’ in the internet could be in jeopardy. 
Adopters of ad-blocking exert a negative externality on 
non-adopters since they are less sensitive to ads and 
their exposure may increase. Whitelisting practices of ad-
block developers could constitute a new gatekeeping 
role in the internet.   
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
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 HOW FAR DOES EXISTING LEGISLATION GO IN ADDRESSING 
THE PROBLEM?  
3.1. Legal framework 
3.1.1. Overview of the legal framework 
Although there is no overarching legislative framework covering online targeted advertising at the EU 
level, different legislative measures apply to advertising (including targeted advertising) and provide 
certain rights to recipients. The current legislative framework is complex and only addresses certain 
aspects of online targeted advertising and sometimes in an indirect manner.  
These instruments do not include a definition of “targeted advertising” or “behavioural advertising” 
but usually refer to the more general concepts of “commercial communication”, “commercial practice” 
or “advertising”, which should be interpreted widely according to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU)183. It is therefore commonly understood that targeted advertising falls under the scope of 
these legal instruments. 
The main relevant instruments are listed below. Some are specific and their scope is limited to the 
digital environment, although they may not cover all types of platforms: 
• eCommerce Directive184 (the Services Directive185 and the Proportionality Test Directive for 
regulated professions)186; 
• P2B Regulation187; 
• ePrivacy Directive188 (incl. a new proposal of ePrivacy Regulation)189; and 
• Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMS), as amended in 2018190. 
                                                             
183  CJEU, 11 July 2013, C-657/11, BEST, EU:C:2013:516, pt. 35. 
184  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2000, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ L 178 
of 17.07.2000 (hereafter the “eCommerce Directive”). 
185  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2006, Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, OJ L 376 of 27.12.2006. 
186  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2018, Directive (EU) 2018/958 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 28 June 2018 on a proportionality test before adoption of new regulation of professions, OJ L 173 of 9.7.2018. 
187  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2019, Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services, OJ L 186 of 
11.7.2019. 
188  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2002, Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, OJ L 
201 of 31.7.2002 (Directive on privacy and electronic communications). 
189  European Commission, 2017, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private 
life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC, COM(2017) 10 final - 
2017/0003 (COD). 
190  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2010, Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (codified version), OJ L 095 of 15.4.2010. 
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Others are general and apply to all kinds of advertising, irrespective of the means used to display the 
message: 
• Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD)191; 
• Directive on misleading and comparative advertising192; 
• Consumer Rights Directive (CRD)193; and 
• General Data Protection Regulation194 (GDPR).  
EU legislation also bans the advertising of certain types of products such as tobacco products, which 
are not covered in this study195. 
Moreover, competition law applies to all digital platforms and may have far reaching implications for 
the provision of online advertising. Several national competition authorities including authorities in 
France, Germany and the Netherlands have concluded or launched sector enquiries or general 
investigations into online advertising, while authorities in France196, Italy197, and the UK198  have opened 
or decided individual cases. The European Commission has also opened a case against Google 
concerning online advertising199. Potential competition concerns in the online advertising market 
include: tying, bundling, exclusivity, leveraging, discrimination, interoperability issues and access to 
data. 
This legal framework is set to be complemented shortly, by the Digital Services Act (DSA)200 and Digital 
Markets Act (DMA)201, which were proposed by the European Commission on 15 December 2020. These 
proposals are currently being adopted under the co-decision procedure and as such may be amended. 
Annex 1 of the report contains an overview of these legislative measures (including the DSA and DMA 
proposals), especially with regard to their (i) nature and scope, (ii) substantial measures (relevant for 
targeted advertising), and (iii) enforcement.  
 
                                                             
191  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2005, Directive 2005/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, OJ L 149 of 11.06.2005.  
192  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2006, Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2006 concerning misleading and comparative advertising (codified version), OJ L 376 of 27.12.2006. 
193  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2011, Directive 2011/83 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 October 2011 on consumer rights, OJ L 304 of 22.11.2011. 
194  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2016, Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, OJ L 119 of 04.05.2016. 
195  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2003, Directive 2003/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 May 2003 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the 
advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products, OJ L 152, 20.6.2003, p. 16-19. 
196  The NCA fined Google €150m for having abused its dominance in search advertising and reiterated Google’s obligation to “define the 
operating Rules of its advertising platform in an objective, transparent and non-discriminatory manner”. Autorité de la concurrence, 2019, 
Decision 19-D-26 of 20 December 2019 regarding practices employed in the online search advertising sector.  
197  The NCA investigates whether Google is engaged in an exclusionary abuse of dominance in the online display advertising market, where 
its ad intermediation services rely on “non-replicable” user data that Google collects within its ecosystem. 
198  The NCA investigates Google's proposals to disable third-party cookies in its Chrome browser and replace them with new tools for 
targeted advertising (see CMA, 2021, Investigation into Google’s ‘Privacy Sandbox’ browser changes.  
199  Cases AT.40660 and AT.40670. 
200  European Commission, 2020, Proposal of the Commission of 15 December 2020 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, COM(2020) 825 final, 2020/0361 
(COD). 
201  European Commission, 2020, Proposal of the Commission of 15 December 2020 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act), COM(2020) 842 final, 2020/0374 (COD). 
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3.1.2. Soft Law instruments 
Soft law instruments have an important influence in this sector. Obviously, the binding force of these 
instruments is less than legal provisions202 but they have the advantage of being more flexible while 
also reflecting the latest market developments.  
In particular, the ICC Advertising and Marketing Communications Code (2018) adopted by the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) contains rules which are particularly well adapted to digital 
advertising such as rules on the identification, transparency and identity of the marketer, as well as a 
prohibition on harassment, and the need to respect the consumer’s choice not to receive direct 
marketing communication, including giving the consumer a right of withdrawal203. All parties involved 
should also be bound by the principle of responsibility (not only the marketer, but also in particular 
tech companies, platforms, market influencers or the persons preparing the algorithms used in the 
marketing campaigns)204. The ICC Code also contains principles applicable to so-called Interest-
Based Advertising (IBA), or online behavioural advertising. According to these principles, data 
collection and use should be transparent (with clear and visible notice), and  users should be able 
to exercise their choice in this respect (user control). Companies should also refrain from 
creating IBA based on sensitive data except with prior consent and in accordance with the 
applicable legal framework. 
3.1.3. Complexity of the legal framework 
The legal framework applicable to advertising in general, and to digital targeted advertising in 
particular, is very complex. Depending on the parties involved (consumers, traders, minors, etc.), the 
content of the advertising or the means used to display the message, some legislative measures will be 
applicable, while other measures will not.  
The legal framework is also fragmented within the 27 Member States, since the older directives – 
eCommerce Directive, for instance – are minimal harmonisation instruments (which means that some 
Member States have introduced more far-reaching rules, thereby threatening the achievement of the 
Digital Single Market).  
  
                                                             
202  The violation, by a trader, of the commitments set forth by a Code of conduct could however be considered as a misleading commercial 
practice, under Article 6(2)(b) of the UCPD (subject to the requirements prescribed by this provision).   
203  This Code is available online at: ICC, 2018, ICC Advertising and Marketing Communications Code.  
204  Article C21 of the ICC Code. 
IPOL | Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
 
PE 662.913 56  
Table 3 below highlights for each of the legal instruments their nature and (personal and material) 
scope of application. 
Table 3: Nature and scope of the legal measures 









B2B and B2C 
(Information society service 
provided to the recipient of a 
service) 
Commercial communications which are 




Regulation Platform to Business (only when 
business users target consumers) 
Practices such as ranking, differentiated 
treatment and access to data 
DSA Proposal Regulation Technical intermediaries (ISPs) 
Hosting service providers 
Online platforms 
Very large online platforms 
(information to be made publicly 
available) 
(in their relationship with users) 
Information duties 
DMA Proposal Regulation Gatekeepers 8 types of digital services, including 
online advertising when provided in 
combination with intermediation 
services, search engines, social 
networks, video-sharing, 
communication services, cloud 





Video sharing platforms – end 
users 
Advertising (content rules) 
Information duties 






UCPD Directive (full 
harmonisation) 
B2C Commercial practices (incl. marketing 






Directive B2C and B2B (depending on 
provisions) 
Misleading and Comparative 
Advertising 
CRD Directive (full 
harmonisation) 
B2C Conclusion of B2C contracts (incl. 
obligations of information before 
conclusion of B2C contracts) - broad 
GDPR Regulation Relationships between data 
controllers/processor and data 
subjects 
Processing of personal data (both 
broad concepts) 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
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3.2. How far do existing substantial rules address the problems and 
what are the gaps? 
3.2.1. Processing of personal data and privacy 
Targeted advertising is only possible when the online activities of users205 can be traced and when their 
personal data can be processed, for instance to build profiles relating to the targeted audience206. The 
ePrivacy Directive and the GDPR are the two main instruments that frame how this can take place.  
The ePrivacy Directive mainly applies to the processing of personal data in the electronic 
communication sector but the directive also contains rules on “cookies” which have a broader scope 
since they protect the terminal equipment of end users. Accordingly, storing information and gaining 
access to information already stored in terminal equipment of a subscriber/user (e.g. a phone, 
computer, connected vehicle or smart speaker) requires the prior informed consent of subscribers 
irrespective of any qualification of personal data of these information207. Prior consent of the 
subscriber/user is not required when gaining access is necessary (i) for the purpose of carrying 
transmission of a communication or (ii) to provide an information society service requested by the 
user/subscriber. With regard to this second exception, the EDPB has recently stated that profiling for 
the purpose of advertising will not be considered as a service expressly requested by the 
user/subscriber208. Hence, this provision creates de facto an opt-in mechanism for the use of 
tracking cookies209 or tracking pixels210 for the purpose of targeted advertising.  
A new ePrivacy Regulation211 is currently being negotiated between the European Parliament and the 
Council. The Commission adopted its proposal in 2017, the European Parliament adopted the report of 
the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs in October 2017 and the EU Council adopted 
its general approach on 10 February 2021. In these three versions of the text, prior consent of the user 
is required to (i) collect of information on the terminal equipment and (ii) use processing and storage 
capabilities of terminal equipment212. This wording has the effect of ensuring that all tracking 
mechanisms (such as device fingerprinting) requires the users’ prior consent213. Contrary to the 
Commission’s proposal and the European Parliament’s position of 2017, the Council’s general 
approach allows further processing for compatible purposes, provided that, inter alia the information 
is not used to determine user characteristics or to build profiles214.  
                                                             
205  Clifford, D., 2014, ‘EU Data Protection Law and Targeted Advertising: Consent and the Cookie Monster - Tracking the crumbs of online 
user behaviour’, JIPITEC, pp. 194 – 195.  
206  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2010, Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising, 22 June 2010, WP171, p. 4; Wachter, 
S., 2020, ‘Affinity Profiling and Discrimination by Association in Online Behavioural Advertising’, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 35, 
No. 2, 2020.  
207  CJEU, judgement Planet49 GmbH, 1st October 2019, C-673/17, EU:C:2019:801, points 70 and 71. 
208  European Data Protection Board, 2021, Guidelines 02/2021 on Virtual Voices Assistants, 9 March 2021, p. 23. 
209  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2010, Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising, 22 June 2010, WP171, p. 25. 
210  European Data Protection Board, 2020, Guidelines 8/2020 on the targeting of social media users, 2 September 2020, pp. 19-21. 
211  European Commission, 2017, roposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private 
life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC, COM/2017/010 final - 
2017/0003 (COD). 
212  Commission ePrivacy Regulation proposal, Article 8(1)(b); General approach of the Council, Article 8(1)(b); European Parliament report of 
the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Article 8(1)(b). 
213  See BEUC, 2017, Proposal for a regulation on Privacy and electronic communication (ePrivacy) – BEUC position paper, BEUC-X-2017-059, 
09/06/2017, p. 9; Commission ePrivacy Regulation proposals, Recital 20.  
214  General approach of the Council, Article 8(1)(h)(iii). 
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The proposed ePrivacy Regulation also creates the possibility for users to exert their opt-in through 
software technical settings215. 
In addition to the ePrivacy Directive, which relates to placing and accessing to cookies on terminal 
equipment, the subsequent processing operation on personal data will trigger application of the GDPR 
rules.  
The GDPR requires that data processing operations rely on one of the limitative legal grounds provided 
in Article 6. With regard to targeted advertising, interpretative guidelines adopted at the EU level 
tend to emphasise the need to obtain the consent of the data subject.  
The Article 29 Working Party216 had already stated that the legitimate interest is not a suitable legal 
ground for advertising purposes involving tracking data subjects across websites/devices/services, 
involving data brokers and implying intrusive profiling217. The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) 
has also excluded performance of a contract as a legal ground for behavioural advertising218. In its 
recent guidelines on targeting of social media users, the EDPB tends to consider legitimate interest as 
a valid legal ground only in relation to targeting on the basis of data directly provided by the data 
subjects. For targeting based on inferred and observed data, consent is generally considered to be 
more suitable.  
Finally, when part of the processing requires consent under the ePrivacy Directive (e.g. accessing 
cookies stored in the end users’ terminal equipment), the EDPB considers that consent under the GDPR 
is an adequate legal ground for the subsequent processing operations. This aims to avoid use of the 
legitimate interest ground as a way to lower the level of protection granted by the consent requirement 
under the ePrivacy Directive219.  
a. Opt-in or opt-out? 
When data processing is based on consent, which is typically the case for targeted advertising as seen 
above, this in practice means that consumers need to opt-in220 to targeted advertising (i.e. as consent 
implies a real choice from the data subject)221. In addition, as part of a valid consent, the data subject 
must be able to withdraw consent and in which case, the data controller must stop the processing222. 
This creates the possibility to opt-out for the data subject to processing operations linked to targeted 
advertising.  
                                                             
215  Commission ePrivacy Regulation proposal, Article 9 and Article 10(2); European Parliament report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs, Article 9 and Article 10; General approach of the Council, Article 4a(2). 
216  The Article 29 Working Party was established under Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) as an independent EU advisory 
body on data protection. The GDPR replaced the Working Party by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB). 
217  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2018, Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of 
Regulation 2016/679, 3 October 2018, WP251rev.01, p. 15.  
218  European Data Protection Board, 2019, Guidelines 2/2019 on the processing of personal data under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR in the context of 
the provision of online services to data subjects, 8 October 2019, p. 14. 
219  See European Data protection Board, 2019, Opinion 5/2019 on the interplay between the ePrivacy Directive and the GDPR, in particular 
regarding the competence, tasks and powers of data protection authorities, 12 March 2019, p. 14, and especially footnote 29; European 
Data Protection Board, 2020, Guidelines 8/2020 on the targeting of social media users, 2 September 2020, p. 22; European Data Protection 
Board, 2021, Guidelines 02/2021 on Virtual Voices Assistants, 9 march 2021, p. 11; European Data protection Board, 2021, Guidelines 
01/2020 on processing personal data in the context of connected vehicles and mobility related applications, adopted on 9 March 2021, 
pp. 7-8. 
220  GDPR, Article 4(11).  
221  European Data Protection Board, 2020, Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679, 4 May 2020, p. 7. 
222  European Data Protection Board, 2020, Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679, 4 May 2020, p. 24.  
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Even where processing is based on the “legitimate interests of the controller”, the data subject always 
enjoys a right to object to processing of its personal data for direct marketing purposes (including any 
related profiling). The right to object may therefore also be used as an opt-out mechanism by data 
subjects facing targeted advertising.  
In any event, when a data subject (i) withdraws consent for data processing and no other legal ground 
can be invoked by the data controller or (ii) objects to the processing for direct marketing purposes, 
this person can also request erasure of personal data223. In such cases, the data controller must, in 
principle, communicate to each recipient of the personal data the erasure request of the data subject224. 
Lastly, under the GDPR, data processing for the purpose of displaying targeted advertising will always 
necessitate prior opt-in in three specific cases: 
• First, when an information society service is offered directly to children between the age of 
13 and 16 (depending on what age the Member States decide children can validly give their 
consent), consent of the holder of the parental responsibility is required in order to process 
their data225. Recital 38 highlights the need for specific protection when children data are used 
for marketing purposes.  
• Second, because data subjects have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on 
automated processing, including profiling, which may significantly affect them, prior explicit 
consent of the data subject may also be required under Article 22 GDPR226. In that case 
targeted advertising would be subject to an opt-in of the targeted person.  
• Third, the same requirement applies to processing of special categories of data such as 
health related data, which require prior explicit consent of the data subject unless the data 
have been manifestly made public by the data subject227.  
b. Access to data under the P2B Regulation 
As recognised by the P2B Regulation, the data (whether personal or not) provided or generated 
through “online intermediation services” can be of crucial importance. For instance, the data 
concerned could be ratings or reviews accumulated by business users on the intermediation 
services228. The ability to access these data or to use them can lead to important value creation, not 
only from a wider economic perspective, but also for the intermediation services and their business 
users229. Such data might be used, directly or indirectly, for targeted advertising purposes in particular 
to provide data on the effect of the digital advertising campaign. The P2B Regulation does not 
constrain the use of the personal data or other data that can be gathered through the online 
intermediation services (there is no specific prohibition for instance). However, it requires the online 
intermediation service provider to be transparent towards its business users regarding the use of 
personal data or other data by the intermediation service. The terms and conditions of the provider 
must contain a description of technical and contractual access, if any, to personal data and/or other 
                                                             
223  GDPR, Article 17(1)(b) and (c). Also see Politou, E., Alepis, E., & Patsakis,C., 2018, Forgetting personal data and revoking consent under the 
GDPR: Challenges and proposed solutions, Journal of cybersecurity, vol.4, p. 12.  
224  GDPR, Article 19. This requirement suffers exception if it proves to be impossible or involves disproportionate efforts.  
225  GDPR, Article 8. 
226  GDPR, Article 22(2). 
227  GDPR, Articles 9(2)(a) and 9(2)(e). 
228  P2B Regulation, Recital 33. 
229  P2B Regulation, Recital 33. 
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data provided by users when using the service or generated through the use of the services230. That 
description shall adequately inform the business user on the following:  
(i) whether the provider has access to the data provided by the business user or the consumers 
through their use of the intermediation service or generated through the provision of the 
intermediation service; regarding such data, the provider must also indicate whether they are 
provided to third parties, and if such a provision is not necessary for the functioning of the 
intermediation service, the purpose of such data sharing and the possibility for the business 
user to opt-out from such a data sharing; 
(ii) whether the business user has access to those data; and  
(iii) whether the business user has access to data, including in aggregated form, provided by or 
generated through the provision of the online intermediation services to all of the business 
users and consumers.  
The terms and conditions must indicate, when applicable, the categories of the data concerned by such 
accesses and the conditions under which such accesses are proposed. 
Box 11: Main issues and gaps: Processing of personal data and privacy 
• Although placing tracking devices on terminal equipment and accessing the information 
contained on it requires consent under ePrivacy Directive, data controllers remain free to 
choose the legal ground under Article 6 GDPR for further processing operations.  
• Some tracking mechanisms such as device fingerprinting which may not require storing or 
accessing information in the end user equipment are not clearly covered by the rules of user 
consent under the ePrivacy Directive. This gap may be closed by the adoption of the new 
ePrivacy Regulation.  
• Depending on the legal basis used by the data controller, data subjects will usually enjoy an 
opt-in-based consent or (less frequently) as a minimum, an opt-out-based right to object when 
facing targeted advertising. However, this opt-out right to object is not defined in the legislation 
and this right may be difficult to exercise in practice, especially for targeted advertising. 
• The GDPR recognises children as vulnerable data subjects and contains rules on child consent 
with regard to information society services offered directly towards them231. Conversely, neither 
the ePrivacy Directive nor the proposed ePrivacy Regulation contain specific rules on the 
tracking children’s devices232. However, the revised AVMS Directive does protect children from 
having their data collected and processed for targeted advertising purposes (see below). 
• The P2B Regulation enshrines transparency requirements in the terms and conditions of the 
online intermediation services on the sharing of personal and non-personal data to business 
users but this requirement does not extend to end users. 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
                                                             
230  P2B Regulation, Article 9. 
231  GDPR, Article 8. 
232  Verdoodt, V. & Feci, N., 2017, Children and targeted advertising in the proposed ePrivacy (Regulation) colouring book: Time to use the 
whole box of crayons’. BEUC, 2017, Proposal for a regulation on Privacy and electronic communication (ePrivacy) – BEUC position paper, 
BEUC-X-2017-059, 09/06/2017, p. 15. 
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3.2.2. Transparency obligations  
c. Specific transparency obligations on ranking  
Information duties related to the ranking of products are now contained in the UCPD, the CRD 
(through amendments introduced by the Directive on Better enforcement and modernisation of Union 
consumer protection rules) and in the P2B Regulation. These rules are relevant since targeted 
advertising can in certain settings be seen as a form of ranking.  
Ranking is defined in the UCPD as “the relative prominence given to products, as presented, organised 
or communicated by the trader, irrespective of the technological means used for such presentation, 
organisation or communication”233. Through ranking parameters, some elements (for instance 
personal data, purchasing history, web surfing patterns, etc.) could be used to propose a personalised 
ranking.  
Under new Article 7(4a) of the UCPD, the main parameters used for ranking a product and their 
importance (compared to other parameters) are considered as material information  if the consumers 
have the possibility to search products offered by different traders or consumers on the basis of a query 
(with a keyword or a phrase for instance). It means that, subject to other requirements of Article 7 of 
the UCPD, the violation of this information duty may be regarded as a misleading omission (and an 
unfair, and prohibited, commercial practice) under the Directive.  
Furthermore, the new Article 6a(1)(a) of the CRD states that online marketplaces are obliged to provide 
consumers with additional information, such as the main parameters determining ranking of offers 
presented to the consumer as a result of search queries. Where (part of) the offers presented to 
consumers after search queries are based on targeted advertising, consumers must be given 
information on the criteria used for ranking, and hence on the criteria for targeting the advertisements 
themselves. 
These online marketplaces are not expected to disclose the detailed functioning of the ranking 
mechanism but they should provide a general description of the main parameters they use234. 
Information needs to be made available in a specific section of the online interface that is directly and easily 
accessible from the page where the query results or the offers are presented. 
The P2B Regulation also lays down some requirements of transparency regarding the presentation 
and ranking of the goods and services offered on a platform or by the search results appearing on a 
search engine. Article 2(8) of the P2B Regulation defines ‘ranking’ as the “relative prominence given to 
the goods or services offered through online intermediation services, or the relevance given to search 
results by online search engines, as presented, organised or communicated by the providers of online 
intermediation services or by providers of online search engines, respectively, irrespective of the 
technological means used for such presentation, organisation or communication”. Pursuant to that 
definition, ranking “can essentially be thought of as a form of data-driven, algorithmic decision-
making”235 and, as result, could lead to targeted advertising.  
                                                             
233  UCPD, Article 2(m) (as introduced by Directive on Better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules).  
234  Directive on Better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules, Recital 23. 
235  European Commission, 2020, Guidelines of 7 December 2020 on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ C 424/1 of 8.12.2020, paragraph 11. 
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With regard to ranking mechanisms, the P2B Regulation requires providers of online intermediation 
services and providers of online search engines to be transparent regarding the ranking of the goods 
or services offered on the intermediation platform, or the relevance given to search results on search 
engines.  
Providers of intermediation services must present, in their terms and conditions, the main parameters 
determining ranking and the reasons for the relative importance of those main parameters as opposed 
to other parameters236.  
Through a publicly available description, search engine providers, must indicate the main parameters, 
which individually or collectively, are the most significant in determining ranking and the relative 
importance of those main parameters237. These descriptions must enable professional users of the 
intermediation services or of the search engines to adequately understand whether the characteristics 
of the goods and services offered through those services or search engines, and their relevance for the 
consumers, are taken into account in the ranking mechanism, how and to what extent.  
If the provider includes, in its ranking parameters, possibilities to influence ranking against any direct 
or indirect remuneration paid by the professional users, the description mentioned above must 
integrate those possibilities and the effects of such remuneration on ranking238. 
Whilst the P2B Regulation does not require the disclosure of the detailed functioning of ranking 
mechanisms, including algorithms239, it states that “providers should give meaningful explanations of 
their ranking mechanisms and, in particular, the main parameters used”240. However, providers must 
not provide excess information (or lengthy or complicated descriptions) that would render the given 
explanation not meaningful in the end241. In addition, according to the European Commission, “not 
providing excessive details should also help avoid the risk of enabling the deception of consumers or 
consumer harm”242. As a way to provide such explanations to the professional users of their platforms, 
providers should identify the main parameters determining ranking proposed on their platforms. To 
that end, providers should accomplish first an assessment of all relevant features of ranking taken into 
account for their specific service243. Such an assessment must be specific to the service concerned and 
the ranking presented on it; for instance, some platforms may use a large number of ranking 
parameters and others very few244. 
The European Commission has listed examples of types of ranking parameters the providers may 
use245, including the personalisation of the ranking, the consumer search behaviour and intent and the 
default settings, sorting and filtering mechanisms chosen by the consumer. The European Commission 
considers that the requirement to describe the main parameters used in personalised ranking “could 
                                                             
236  P2B Regulation, Article 5, paragraph 3. 
237  P2B Regulation, Article 5, paragraph 2. 
238  P2B Regulation, Article 5, paragraph 3. 
239  P2B Regulation, Article 5, paragraph 6. 
240  European Commission, 2020, Guidelines of 7 December 2020 on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ C 424/1 of 8.12.2020, paragraph 17. 
241  European Commission, 2020, Guidelines of 7 December 2020 on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ C 424/1 of 8.12.2020, paragraph 25. 
242  Ibid. 
243  European Commission, 2020, Guidelines of 7 December 2020 on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ C 424/1 of 8.12.2020, paragraph 38. 
244  European Commission, 2020, Guidelines of 7 December 2020 on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ C 424/1 of 8.12.2020, paragraph 38 to 40. 
245  See European Commission, 2020, Guidelines of 7 December 2020 on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ C 424/1 of 8.12.2020, Annex A. 
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require that providers analyse the potentially very long list of factors that are used for this 
personalisation, such as consumers’ personal profiles, interests, search behaviour, their actual 
geographic location, the time of day the search takes place, their use of cookie blockers or other 
technical tools and more generally, the wealth of data held on the specific consumer as well as their 
use of default settings”246. Consumer search behaviour can also affect the ranking247. Finally, the 
Commission adds that personalised ranking can also be impacted by “default settings which can be 
rearranged, undone, or ‘overridden’ by consumers using sorting or filtering tools”248. 
The P2B Regulation requires that the provider describes the main parameters that determine 
ranking on its platform to the direct benefit of the professional users. However, it does not 
require the provider (or the professional user) to also provide such information directly to the 
consumer. Therefore, it is not clear how, to what extent and by which player, the consumer should be 
informed of such ranking parameters (except for search engines that are required to give a public 
access to the ranking information).  
Nevertheless, the P2B Regulation must be read together with the new Articles 7(4a) of the UCPD and 
6a(1)(a), of the CRD. Those directives render compulsory the provision of the information regarding 
ranking parameters directly to the consumer by the online marketplaces. Such an obligation applies 
also to online intermediation services referred to in the P2B Regulation, since such services include the 
notion of online marketplaces referred to in UCPD and CRD249. 
With regard to personalised pricing (that may be incorporated in targeted advertising), reference 
must be made to the new Article 6(1)(ea) of the CRD. This provision states that, where applicable, 
traders must provide consumers with information on the fact that prices are personalised based on 
automated decision-making, before consumers are bound by distance contracts. Where targeted 
advertising includes price personalisation (e.g. an advertising offering a discount to a consumer, based 
on his previous buying history), this article provides consumers with transparency on (part of) the 
content of the advertising.  
d. General rules  
Article 6 of the eCommerce Directive creates various identification and transparency requirements for 
commercial communications which are part of, or constitute, an information society service. The 
commercial communication must be clearly identifiable as such250. The person on whose behalf the 
commercial communication is made must be clearly identifiable251. Furthermore, the eCommerce 
Directive requires promotional offers, such as rebates, and promotional competitions or games, to be 
clearly identifiable and the associated conditions easily accessible and presented clearly and 
                                                             
246  European Commission, 2020, Guidelines of 7 December 2020 on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ C 424/1 of 8.12.2020, paragraph 51. 
247  European Commission, 2020, Guidelines of 7 December 2020 on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ C 424/1 of 8.12.2020, paragraph 54. 
248  European Commission, 2020, Guidelines of 7 December 2020 on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ C 424/1 of 8.12.2020, paragraph 56. 
249  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2019, Directive 2019/2161 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 November 2019 amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directives 98/6/EC, 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards the better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules, OJ L 328 of 
18.12.2019, Recital 21. 
250  eCommerce Directive, Article 6(a). 
251  eCommerce Directive, Article 6(b). 
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unambiguously252 253. This Article 6 therefore also applies to targeted advertising but does not 
explicitly oblige the platform to inform users that they are receiving targeted advertising. 
Several provisions of the CRD can also be relied on to increase consumers’ awareness of (targeted) 
advertising. For instance, Article 6 requires traders to provide consumers, before they are bound by any 
distance contract, with information on the identity of the traders, the main characteristics of the goods 
or services, their total prices, etc. Where these obligations apply, this provision indirectly provides 
consumers with transparency on (part of) the content of the advertising. 
Furthermore, under the UCPD, any lack of transparency with regard to targeted advertising may also 
be seen as a misleading action or omission under the semi-general rules of Articles 6 and 7 or under 
the general rule of Article 5(2). These provisions are open norms and the claimant needs to 
demonstrate that the requirements are fulfilled in the particular case at hand (which could be difficult, 
especially with regard to the relationship between the information and the transactional decision – 
potentially – taken by the average consumer). Some differences could also be observed in the case law 
of the Member States. 
In addition to the general transparency requirement (see above), the GDPR is interpreted as containing 
more specific information requirements. First, when the data controller uses profiling techniques, the 
Article 29 Working Party considers that the data subject must be informed about this profiling. When 
the data subject exercises the right of access, the data subject must be able to obtain details concerning 
segments the data subject has been placed into254. This transparency requirement may help data 
subjects to understand why they are the recipient of some advertising. Second, Article 22 of the GDPR 
relates to decision making processes based solely on automated processing. Under GDPR, the sole 
decision to display a targeted advertising based on profiling is not, in principle, considered as a fully 
automated decision with far reaching effect unless it takes advantage of data subject vulnerabilities for 
instance255. In such cases, the data controller must provide meaningful information about the logic 
involved by the processing256. According to the Article 29 Working Party this requirement means, among 
others, providing information on criteria used during the decision process and the rationale behind the 
processing257. In addition, the right of access258 of the data subject enable him to obtain information on 
the parameters used and on their weight on an aggregate level259. Hence, when the decision to display 
advertising falls under the scope of Article 22, the data subject may obtain information on parameters 
used to determine the content of an advertising.  
 
                                                             
252  eCommerce Directive, Article 6(c) and (d). 
253  Article 7 contains additional requirements regarding unsolicited commercial communications sent by electronic mails. The commercial 
communication shall be clearly and unambiguously identifiable as such as soon as it is received by the recipient. Nevertheless, the 
requirements stated in Article 7 of eCommerce Directive are no longer relevant in most cases since ePrivacy Directive now lays down 
stricter requirements as regards unsolicited commercial communications (the only hypothesis where Article 7 would still be relevant is 
“the (limited) cases where natural persons would not be protected by Directive 2002/58/EC (e.g. natural persons who are not 
subscribers)”;  see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on unsolicited commercial communications or 'spam', COM/2004/0028 final, paragraph22. 
254  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2018, Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of 
Regulation 2016/679, 3 October 2018, WP251rev.01, pp. 16-17.  
255  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2018, Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of 
Regulation 2016/679, 3 October 2018, WP251rev.01, p. 22.  
256  GDPR, Article 13 (2)(f) and Article 14(2)(g).  
257  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2018, Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of 
Regulation 2016/679, 3 October 2018, WP251rev.01, p. 25.  
258  GDPR, Article 15. 
259  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2018, Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of 
Regulation 2016/679, 3 October 2018, WP251rev.01, p. 27. 
Online advertising: the impact of targeted advertising on advertisers, market access and consumer choice 
 
 65 PE 662.913 
Box 12: Main issues and gaps: Transparency obligations 
• Under consumer protection rules, there is no specific obligation to inform consumers in a clear 
and comprehensible manner that they are facing targeted advertising, or regarding the 
parameters used to determine the recipient or the content of the advertising (rules are currently 
limited to ranking and personalised pricing). 
• Under consumer protection rules, regarding the information on ranking, discussions may be 
expected with regard to the interpretation of “main parameters”. The Guidelines issued by the 
European Commission on ranking transparency pursuant the P2B Regulation260 can serve as a 
source of interpretation. However, the use of these guidelines for interpreting the consumer 
rules are limited since (i) in terms of scope, the guidelines expressly concern the P2B Regulation 
and do not cover the consumer rules; (ii) some differences of interpretation are possible since 
the recipients of the information regarding ranking parameters are not the same in the P2B 
regulation and in the consumer protection rules (the professional user for the first and the 
consumer for the second) and they do not have the same levels of knowledge, which may result 
in different levels of information to be provided. 
• Under the GDPR, there is no obligation to provide information on the parameters used to display 
advertising unless Article 22 applies. Consequently, this is likely to apply exceptionally. 
Additionally, this requirement is not mentioned in the GDPR but rather in Article 29 Working 
Party guidelines.  
• Under the GDPR, obtaining information on the main criteria used for displaying advertising 
and/or on details of which segment the data subject is placed when using profiling requires a 
specific action of the data subject (i.e. exercising its right of access). 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
3.2.3. Internal market  
To ensure free movement of services and to avoid barriers to trade, the European legislator enacted 
several legal instruments where, in line with consistent case-law, restrictions to advertising could be 
acceptable only if they are necessary and proportionate. 
In the eCommerce Directive, there is a very specific mechanism called the internal market clause 
(Article 3). With that clause, instead of trying to harmonise all the areas concerned linked to online 
activities261, the European legislator opted for a mechanism based on the principles of the country of 
origin and mutual trust between Member States.  
Pursuant to the clause, information society service providers are subject to the law of the Member State 
in which they are established and they are supervised by the competent authority of that Member 
State262.  
                                                             
260  See European Commission, 2020, Guidelines of 7 December 2020 on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ C 424/1 of 8.12.2020. 
261  It must be noted also that the Directive (EU) 2015/1535 (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2015, Directive (EU) 
2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information 
in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services, OJ L 241, 17.9.2015), p. 1–1 sets up a procedure whereby 
Member States must notify to the European Commission all draft technical regulations on products and information society services 
before they are adopted in national law. Since these measures can lead to trade barriers, Member States must ensure that they act in a 
transparent manner, by giving the Commission and the other Member States the possibility to examine the drafts and to comment on 
these drafts or to issue detailed opinions. The notification triggers a three month standstill period to allow the Member States and/or the 
Commission to react 
262  eCommerce Directive, Article 3, paragraph 1. 
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On the other hand, the other Member States cannot take measures to prevent such service providers 
from offering their services on their territory263. The clause only applies to the national requirements 
that are in the “coordinated field’. The “coordinated field” covers requirements with which the service 
provider must comply in respect of “the pursuit of the activity of an information society service, such 
as requirements […] regarding the quality or content of the service including those applicable to 
advertising […]”264.  
Consequently, the national requirements regulating advertising are covered by the coordinated field 
and are within the scope of the internal market clause.  
The CJEU confirmed this analysis in a recent decision of 1st October 2020 (C-649/18) regarding national 
rules restricting the possibility for online pharmacists to conduct advertising including online 
advertising265.   
By way of derogation, however, Member States may impose national measures on providers offering 
services in their jurisdiction provided those measures are: (i) necessary to the protection of public 
interest objectives (such as the protection of public order or public health), (ii) taken against an 
information society service, which prejudices such objectives or presents a serious and grave risk of 
prejudice to those objectives and (iii) proportionate to that objective266. In addition, before being 
authorised to impose such measures on the service provider, the Member State must ask the Member 
State of establishment to comply with its national measures and must notify the European Commission 
of its intention to enforce the so-called measure267.  
If that second condition is not fulfilled (i.e. the measure restricting the freedom to provide an 
information society service has not been notified to the Member State of establishment and to the 
European Commission), the measure is considered unenforceable against the provider268.To analyse if 
the first condition of Article 3, paragraph 4(a) is fulfilled as regards necessity and proportionality, the 
Member State must take into account “the case-law relating to Articles 49 and 56 TFEU […], in so far as 
those conditions largely overlap with the requirements that must be fulfilled by any obstacle to the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed in those articles of the TFEU”269. Although the internal market 
clause is a powerful mechanism to ensure the free circulation of information society services within the 
European Union, the possibility given to Member States to derogate still allows for barriers, under the 
condition that they are justified, non-discriminatory and proportionate. It also creates legal uncertainty 
for the service providers (and even more for SMEs) since it is complicated for providers which are active 
in several national markets, to be able to anticipate if they will be subject to the national measures in 
each Members States where they provide their service, or not.  
The C-649/18 case provides an interesting illustration of the risk that the derogation mechanism entails. 
In that case, four French measures were cited, before the French Courts, to restrict an online pharmacy 
established in the Netherlands from targeting among others French consumers and patients270.  
                                                             
263  eCommerce Directive, Article 3, paragraph 2. 
264  eCommerce Directive, Article 2(h). 
265  CJEU, case A contre Daniel B e.a., 1 October 2020, C-649/18, EU:C:2020:764. 
266  eCommerce Directive, Article 3, paragraph 4(a). 
267  eCommerce Directive, Article 3, paragraph 4(b). 
268  CJEU (GC), case Airbnb, 19 December 2019, C-390/18, EU:C:2019:1112, point 96; Ledger, M.  2020, CJEU ruling on legal qualification of 
Airbnb services, R.D.T.I., 2020/3, p. 123, paragraph15. 
269 CJEU, case A contre Daniel B e.a., 1 October 2020, C-649/18, point 64. 
270  CJEU case A contre Daniel B e.a., 1 October 2020, C-649/18. 
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Among those measures, three aimed to restrict the possibility for pharmacists to promote their online 
services271. The CJEU had to analyse, for each measure, whether it could fulfil the condition laid down 
in Article 3, paragraph 4a, or not. For each measure, the CJEU carried out a case-by-case analysis.  
This clearly deprives market players of legal certainty272. The eCommerce Directive also aims “to 
remove the barriers to the development of cross-border services […] which members of the regulated 
professions might offer on the Internet”273. In order to reach that objective, Article 8 creates a positive 
obligation for the Member States to authorise regulated professions to use commercial 
communications which are part of, or constitute, an information society service. However, commercial 
communications need to comply with the professional rules regarding, in particular the independence, 
dignity and honour of the profession, professional secrecy and fairness towards clients and other 
members of the profession274. On its decision Vanderborght275, the CJEU stated that a prohibition of 
advertising for a certain activity is liable to restrict the possibility, for the persons carrying on an activity, 
of making themselves known to their potential clientele and of promoting the services which they 
propose to offer to that clientele. Such a prohibition therefore constitutes a restriction on the freedom 
to provide services. The CJEU concluded that the professional rules can never result in a total prohibition 
of the use of online advertising by the member of a regulated profession. Therefore, the Member States 
must ensure that no total prohibition of the use of online advertising by the member of a regulated 
profession remains or is adopted.  
Under Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Services Directive, the same principle applies regardless of 
whether the commercial communication is made online or not. It provides that Member States must 
remove total prohibitions on commercial communications by the regulated professions.  However, the 
second paragraph of Article 24 goes on to recall that such commercial communications must 
nevertheless comply with the professional rules that apply to each regulated profession which relate, 
in particular, to the independence, dignity and integrity of the profession, as well as to professional 
secrecy. Article 24, paragraph 2 explains how to achieve the balance between the right to make 
commercial communications and the need to comply with these professional rules. It specifies that 
professional rules that would restrict the use of commercial communications by the regulated 
professions, are admitted provided that they are non-discriminatory, justified by an overriding reason 
relating to the public interest and proportionate. 
In addition, the Proportionality Test Directive was adopted not to remove the existing restrictive 
professional rules, but to prevent new ones from being adopted276.  
                                                             
271  The first forbidded the use of paid referencing services, the other restricted the possibility of proposing price reductions and the last 
prohibited the pharmacist from sending advertising through paper flyers. 
272  On that point, in the field of the online sale of medicinal products, see Bourguignon, C., 2020, La vente en ligne transfrontalière de 
médicaments au sein de l’Union européenne, D.C.C.R., 2020/2, n° 127, p. 127. 
273  eCommerce Directive, Recital 32. 
274  eCommerce Directive, Article 8(1). 
275  CJEU, case Procédure pénale contre Luc Vanderborght, 4 May 2017, C-339/15, EU:C:2017:335, point 44; Regarding that decision: Ghislain, S., 
2018, ‘Publicité et professions libérales : questions actuelles au regard de l’arrêt Vanderborght du 4 mai 2017 de la Cour de Justice’, 
D.C.C.R., 2018/3-4, nos 120-121, p. 19-43; Bourguignon, C., 2019, ‘Les réglementations des professionnels de la santé revues à l’aune des 
libertés de circulation économiques : l’exemple de la publicité à l’ère du numérique’, R.D.T.I., 2019/1, n° 74, p. 25-54. 
276  It completes the requirement imposed on Member States in Article 59, paragraph 3, of the Directive 2005/36/CE (European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union, 2005, Directive 2005/36/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 
on the recognition of professional qualifications, OJ L 255 of 30.9.2005). Under that Article, the Member States shall examine “whether 
requirements under their legal system restricting the access to a profession or its pursuit to the holders of a specific professional 
qualification, including the use of professional titles and the professional activities allowed under such title, referred to in this Article as 
‘requirements’ are compatible with the following principles: (a) requirements must be neither directly nor indirectly discriminatory on 
the basis of nationality or residence; (b) requirements must be justified by overriding reasons of general interest; (c) requirements must 
be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective”. The 
Members States had to communicate to the European Commission the results of such an examination by 18 January 2016.  
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Pursuant to that Directive, before introducing new (or amending existing) legislative, regulatory or 
administrative provisions restricting access to, or the pursuit of, regulated professions, the Member 
States are required to undertake an assessment of proportionality in accordance with the rules laid 
down in the Directive. Those rules are the following: the new provision must be neither directly nor 
indirectly discriminatory on the basis of nationality or residence277; it must be justified on grounds of 
public interest objectives278; it must be proportionate, i.e. “suitable for securing the attainment of the 
objective pursued and not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective”279. These assessments 
must be notified by the Member State to the European Commission which makes it publicly 
available280. Under Article 7 of that Directive, the compliance of national restrictions to advertising with 
the principle of proportionality should be examined by the Member State before being adopted and 
such an assessment shall be notified to the European Commission281. The Directive had to be 
transposed into national law by 30 July 2020.  
Box 13:  Main issues and gaps: Internal market principles 
• The internal market clause of the eCommerce Directive clearly applies to online advertising.  The 
host Member State could apply its national restrictions only if they are non-discriminatory, 
justified and proportionate. This may lead to legal uncertainty for market players especially for 
SMEs. 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
3.2.4. Prohibition of certain practices 
The applicable legal framework may prohibit some practices currently carried out in the context of 
targeted advertising. Such prohibitions must therefore be taken into account while assessing the 
compliance of any advertising with the legal framework. 
The revised AVMS Directive introduces qualitative rules for advertising that need to be complied with 
by video sharing platforms for the commercial communications that are marketed, sold or arranged by 
them. These rules282 mirror exactly those that need to be complied with by audiovisual media service 
providers (linear and non-linear) and will have an impact on users in particular because platforms will 
need to make sure that their advertising is recognisable as such and does not discriminate on the basis 
of sex, racial or ethnic origin, nationality, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Also, 
their advertising cannot cause any detriment to minors. Targeted advertising campaigns will therefore 
need to take these factors into consideration and users will benefit from these protections. The video 
sharing platforms in scope will need to take “appropriate measures” to make sure that advertising not 
arranged by them also complies with these rules.  
                                                             
Such requirements were inserted in 2013 with the Directive 2013/55/EU (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 
2013, Directive 2013/55/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 amending Directive 2005/36/EC on the 
recognition of professional qualifications and Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market 
Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’), OJ L 354 of 28.12.2013). 
277  Proportionality Test Directive, Article 5. 
278  Proportionality Test Directive, Article 6. 
279  Proportionality Test Directive, Article 7. 
280  Proportionality Test Directive, Article 11. 
281  On that point: Bourguignon, C., op. cit., p. 50, paragraph 37. 
282  Article 9(1) of AVMS Directive. 
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Also of interest, the revised AVMS Directive specifies that that data collected by video sharing platforms 
to protect children may not be processed for commercial purposes, such as for direct marketing, 
profiling and behaviourally targeted advertising283. This rule mirrors the one which is already in 
place for (linear and non-linear) audiovisual media service providers and which provides that they 
cannot process the personal data of minors they collect (or otherwise process) for commercial 
purposes, such as direct marketing, profiling and behaviourally targeted advertising284. 
The non-discrimination principle is also enshrined in different EU legislative instruments. These 
instruments are the “Race Directive”285, the “Employment discrimination Directive”286, the “Gender 
equality Directive”287, the “Gender Directive”288 and the “Geo-blocking Regulation”289.  
These instruments prohibit direct discrimination (i.e. situations where a person is treated less 
favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on the basis of a 
protected ground) and indirect discriminations, unless objectively justified (i.e. situations where an 
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons characterised by a protected 
ground at a particular disadvantage), on the basis of different protected grounds. These instruments 
also have different scopes of application. On the basis of these instruments targeted advertising may 
be prohibited if the targeting is directly based on areas under protection or if it is based on neutral 
criteria which nonetheless have discriminatory effects on a group of people subject to protections.  
The Race Directive applies, among others, within the field of employment, social security, education 
and access to goods and services (including housing) and prohibits direct and indirect discrimination 
based on racial or ethnic origin. The Employment discrimination Directive applies only within the 
context of employment and prohibits direct and indirect discrimination based on the grounds of 
religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. The Gender equality Directive applies in the 
context of social security and employment and prohibits direct and indirect discrimination based on 
sex. Within the field of access to and supply of goods and services, advertising and media content is 
explicitly excluded from the scope of the Gender Directive.  
Finally, the Geo-blocking Regulation prohibits direct and indirect discrimination based on nationality 
and place of residence in the internal market. In particular, traders cannot apply different general 
conditions of access to their goods and services on the basis of these criteria. This Regulation does 
however allow traders to apply different general conditions of access between Member States or 
specific customers groups on a non-discriminatory basis290.  
                                                             
283  Article 28b (3) of AVMS Directive. 
284  Article 6a of AVMS Directive. 
285  Council of the European Union, 2000, Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180 of 19.7.2000. 
286  Council of the European Union, 2000, Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303 of 02.12.2000. 
287  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2006,  Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation (recast), OJ L 204 of 26.7.2006. 
288  Council of the European Union, 2004, Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ L 373 of 21.12.2004. 
289  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2018, Regulation (EU) 2018/302 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 28 February 2018 on addressing unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers' nationality, 
place of residence or place of establishment within the internal market and amending Regulations (EC) No 2006/2004 and (EU) 2017/2394 
and Directive 2009/22/EC, OJ L 60I of 02.03.2018. 
290  Geo-Blocking Regulation, Article 4 (2).  
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The UCPD may also be relevant on a stand-alone basis or in combination with one of the legal 
instruments mentioned above. Indeed, three kinds of commercial practices are considered to be unfair 
under the UCPD and, therefore, prohibited291: (i) misleading or aggressive practices listed in Annex I 
that must in all circumstances be regarded as unfair; (ii) misleading or aggressive practices prohibited 
under semi-general clauses of Articles 6 to 9; and (iii) practices prohibited under the general clause of 
Article 5(2). Various practices related to advertising and, in particular, targeted advertising may 
therefore fall under the scope of the UCPD and should be assessed under this three step test. Once 
again, it must be stressed that the practice of targeted advertising is not prohibited as such. A new 
practice prohibited in all circumstances, relevant for advertising (and, targeted advertising), is however 
added by the Directive on Better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules 
(cf. new point 11a of the Annex): consumers should be informed of “any paid advertisement or 
payment specifically for achieving higher ranking of products within the search results”.  
Furthermore, with regard to minors or children, there is no general prohibition of advertising (nor 
targeted advertising). One exception to this is that there is a specific aggressive practice which is 
prohibited in all circumstances and listed in Annex I: “including in an advertisement a direct exhortation 
to children to buy advertised products or persuade their parents or other adults to buy advertised 
products for them”. It is however very specific and, as a result, not very useful with regard to current 
market practices. Reference must also be made to the average consumer test, applicable to commercial 
practices aimed at specific groups of vulnerable consumers (such as children).  In accordance with 
Article 5(3) of the UCPD, the assessment must be carried out by the competent authorities from the 
perspective of the average member of that group. The lack of specific rules protecting minors or 
children under the UCPD may also be an issue within the Member States: since the UCPD is a full 
harmonisation directive, Member States are not allowed to prohibit commercial practices addressed to 
minors or children (as otherwise, they would not be compliant with the directive). 
The European Commission also presented on 21 April 2021 its proposal to regulate the use of artificial 
intelligence (AI) in Europe292. Once adopted, this new Regulation could also contain rules which will 
affect online advertising to the extent that advertising is based on AI in scope. In particular, Article 5 of 
the proposal foresees that the following practices should be prohibited: 
• the placing on the market, putting into service or use of an AI system that deploys subliminal 
techniques beyond a person’s consciousness in order to materially distort a person’s behaviour 
in a manner that causes or is likely to cause that person or another person physical or 
psychological harm; 
• the placing on the market, putting into service or use of an AI system that exploits any of the 
vulnerabilities of a specific group of persons due to their age, physical or mental disability, in 
order to materially distort the behaviour of a person pertaining to that group in a manner that 
causes or is likely to cause that person or another person physical or psychological harm. 
 
                                                             
291  UCPD, Article 5. 
292  European Commission, 2021, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on 
artificial intelligence (artificial intelligence act) and amending certain Union legislative acts,  21.4.2021 COM(2021) 206 final 2021/0106 
(COD).  
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Box 14: Main issues and gaps: Prohibition of some practices 
• Under the UCPD, there are no general rules prohibiting some marketing or advertising practices 
targeting or directed to minors (or children). 
• Under the AVMS, the new rules only apply to video sharing platforms in scope and therefore 
platforms that do not have as their principle or essential functionality the provision of 
programmes, user-generated video or both to inform, entertain or educate the general public 
will not be covered. The video sharing platforms in scope are prevented from using data 
collected to protect children from processing it for commercial purposes, such as for direct 
marketing, profiling and behaviourally targeted advertising. 
• The scopes of non-discrimination Directives are different and advertisements with direct or 
indirect discriminatory effects may be prohibited depending on the area. If applicable, the AVMS 
Directive however requires that audiovisual commercial communications offered directly by 
video sharing platforms shall not include or promote discrimination based on sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, nationality, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation293. 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
3.2.5. Many players involved and key role played by the platforms 
Since the modification of the CRD in 2019 by the Better Enforcement Directive, some platforms (i.e. 
online marketplaces) are also subject to information obligations under consumer protection law. Under 
this body of law, the obligations of platforms remain limited, as they mainly need to provide 
information on the main parameters used for ranking of offers presented to consumers after a search 
query (new Article 6a(1)(a) of the CRD).  
As highlighted in the EDBP guidelines, targeting Internet users in general may involve many actors such 
as targeters294, social media platforms, data brokers, data management providers, data analytics 
companies…295. The main actors under GDPR are data controllers (i.e. entities defining alone or jointly 
with other the purpose and the means of the processing) and the data processor (i.e. entities 
processing data on behalf of a controller)296. Furthermore, data processing involves “joint controllers” 
which requires a case by case analysis of the processing and the roles of the involved entities297.  
Qualification of (joint) controller/processor is important to determine the stakeholder’s duties under 
the GDPR. The data controller bears the majority of the obligations enshrined in the GDPR. The data 
controller is for instance in charge of ensuring transparency requirements and must enable the data 
subjects to exercise their rights. When processing is partly/wholly subject to joint control, Article 26 
GDPR requires that the joint controllers determine their respective responsibilities for compliance with 
the obligations under the GDPR (including transparency requirement and exercise of the data subject 
rights) by means of an arrangement.  
                                                             
293  Revised AVMS Directive, Article 9(1)(c)(ii). 
294  The EDPB uses the term targeter to designate natural or legal persons that use social media services in order to direct specific messages 
at a set of social media users on the basis of specific parameters or criteria. See following footnote. 
295  European Data Protection Board, 2020, Guidelines 8/2020 on the targeting of social media users, 2 September 2020, p. 9. 
296  GDPR, Article 4(7) and Article (8).  
297  European Data protection board, 2020, Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, 02 September 2020. 
p. 22. 
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Finally, when a data controller/processor relationship exists, it must be governed by a contract298. This 
requirement ensures, among others, respect of data security requirements and control of the data 
controller when sub-processors are involved.  
When many actors intervene at different stages of the processing, joint control may exist only with 
regard to part of the processing operations necessary during the process of displaying targeted 
content. The CJEU has, for instance considered that joint control exists between a website operator and 
a social network for the personal data collection and transmission through use of a social media plugin 
for advertising purpose299. A joint controller relationship exists however only for processing for which 
both entities effectively determine the purposes and the means300. In its guidelines on targeting on 
social media, the EDPB has stated that a joint control exists between the targeter and social media 
platforms for some processing operations related to targeting of social media users, among others on 
the basis of (i) data provided by the data subject to social media by means of criterions selected by the 
targeter, (ii) observed personal data by means of tracking pixels or GPS location, (iii) inferred personal 
data by means of interests on social media301. Additionally, when targeting is done through displaying 
advertising on websites, the Article 29 Working Party has stated that joint control may exists between 
the publisher and the ad network provider302.  
Box 15: Main issues and gaps: Many players involved and key role played by the platforms 
• The qualification of data (joint) controllers/data processor can be complex in an ecosystem 
where many actors may intervene at different stages of the processing.  
• Targeters, publishers and ad network providers may not necessarily be aware of their joint 
controller status under the GDPR when using web services in order to promote their goods and 
services by means of targeted advertising. They may however be liable for any damage resulting 
from an infringement to the Regulation303. 
• In the absence of adequate qualification, joint controllers may not conclude arrangements 
framing their respective responsibilities. Consequently, the essence of this arrangement cannot 
be made public304 which can impair the ability of the data subject to be informed and exercise 
their rights.  
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
                                                             
298  GDPR, Article 28.  
299  CJEU, judgement Fashion ID ,29 July 2019, C-40/17, EU:C:2019:629, point 78 and 80.  
300  CJEU, judgement Fashion ID ,29 July 2019, C-40/17, EU:C:2019:629, point 85.  
301  European Data Protection Board, 2020, Guidelines 8/2020 on the targeting of social media users, 2 September 2020, pp. 13-14, 17-18 and 
20.  
302  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2010, Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising, 22 June 2010, WP171, p. 11. 
303  GDPR, Article 82. 
304  See, for this requirement, GDPR, Article 26(2). 
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3.2.6. Summary 
Table 4: Summary table on gaps 
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Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
3.3. How far do existing enforcement measures address the problems 
and what are the gaps? 
3.3.1. Overview of the main enforcement measures 
Existing legislation applicable to targeted advertising mostly relies on Member States to ensure the 
enforcement of substantial provisions. This is the case in particular for the eCommerce Directive, the 
P2B Regulation, the ePrivacy Directive, the UCPD, the CRD, the GDPR, and the AVMS Directive. 
The eCommerce Directive305, the P2B Regulation306, the UPCD307, the Directive on misleading and 
comparative advertising308, and the CRD309 merely provide that Member States shall ensure the 
enforcement of substantial provisions by using effective, proportionate and dissuasive measures 
and/or sanctions. Depending on the Member State, there may be criminal, civil and/or administrative 
sanctions. Since the penalties are not usually harmonised at the EU level, there may be differences 
between the Member States. It must however be stressed that, following the Better enforcement 
Directive companies that breach UPCD and the CRD in three or more EU countries will face maximum 
fines of at least 4% of their annual turnover in the concerned countries or at least EUR 2m, when 
information about the trader’s annual turnover is unavailable. 
                                                             
305  See notably Article 20, eCommerce Directive. 
306  See notably Article 15(1) and (2), P2B Regulation. 
307  See notably Article 13, UPCD. In the Better Enforcement Directive, some further guidance on enforcement was provided (e.g. on criteria 
to impose penalties). 
308  See notably Article 5, Directive on misleading and comparative advertising. 
309  See notably Article 24, CRD. In the Better Enforcement Directive, some further guidance on enforcement was provided (e.g. on criteria to 
impose penalties). 
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The DSA proposal310, the ePrivacy Directive (and proposed Regulation)311, the GDPR312, and the AVMS 
Directive313 contain more detailed rules on enforcement measures, as they require Member States to 
grant national competent authorities with powers to investigate, and enforce the substantive rules  
provided for in the texts (notably through fines and other sanctions). 
In relation to the DMA proposal, enforcement would however be ensured by the Commission, which 
would be granted the powers to adopt implementing acts, investigate cases, impose interim measures 
and fines, etc.314. 
Some additional enforcement mechanisms are in place at EU level. The Directive on representative 
actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers was adopted on 25 November 2020 
and needs to be implemented by 25 June 2023315. It puts in place a procedural mechanism to allow so-
called qualified entities to bring representative actions before national courts or administrative 
authorities on behalf of consumers where the infringer harms the collective interest of consumers. The 
collective interest of a consumer refers to the general interest of consumers and, in particular for the 
purposes of redress measures, the interests of a group of consumers. 
Out of court dispute settlement is also very much encouraged and the Directive on Consumer ADR316 
and a Regulation on consumer ODR317 aim to ensure that disputes between consumers and traders can 
be submitted to entities offering impartial, transparent, effective and fair alternative dispute resolution 
procedures. The consumer protection cooperation regulation318 which applies when traders and 
consumers are not established in the same country, may also be relevant, as it involves the 
establishment of a cooperation network which may be useful in addressing cross-border 
infringements.  
3.3.2. Main issues and gaps 
A key issue is that most consumers will not seek redress before competent courts when targeted 
advertising infringes their rights as consumers, citizens or data subjects. Among the reasons for not 
seeking judicial redress, are the complexity of the legal framework, the lack of knowledge about their 
rights or the identity of the person responsible for the advertising, the low value of the case, the length 
and the cost of the procedure, the symbolic outcome that may be expected (injunction deciding the 
stopping of an advertising campaign, already finished many months before the judgement…), the lack 
of evidence, etc. 
                                                             
310  See notably Articles 38 and 41, proposed DSA. 
311  See notably Article 15, ePrivacy Directive. 
312  See notably Article 58, GDPR. 
313  See notably Article 28b, AVMS Directive. 
314  See notably Articles 18, 26 and 37 of the proposed DMA. 
315  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2020, Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of 25 November 2020 on representative 
actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC, OJ L 409 of 4.12.2020. 
316  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2013, Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 
2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR), OJ L 165 of 18.6.2013. 
317  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2013, Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 
2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR), OJ L 165 of 18.6.2013. 
318  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2017, Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws 
and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004, OJ L 345 of 27.12.2017. 
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In most cases, when court decisions are handed down in the context of advertising, the claim is not 
introduced by a consumer but by another trader, because of unfair market practices (and relying on 
the violation of consumer protection rights).  
Some of these gaps are already taken into account – partially at least – by the current legal framework, 
with the Injunction Directive, the new Representative Action Directive or the Directive on Consumer 
ADR. This is however not specific to targeted advertising and a continuous assessment needs to be 
made to ensure that access to justice is improved. The existence of specific enforcement bodies (such 
as those under the GDPR, ePrivacy Directive or AVMS) could also help fill some gaps, provided they 
have sufficient funding and investigation and enforcement powers. A particular challenge will certainly 
be the coordination between these authorities when cases fall under the scope of several legal texts 
(and, therefore, several enforcement bodies). 
3.3.3. Summary on enforcement 
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Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
3.4. What are the new measures proposed by the Commission in DSA 
and DMA proposals? 
3.4.1. DSA Proposal 
The rules on advertising contained in the proposed DSA are aimed at providing more transparency 
surrounding advertising which in turn may help users to oppose targeted advertising by refusing to 
be profiled on data protection grounds. This transparency also aims to enable scrutiny by authorities 
and vetted researchers as to how advertisements are displayed and how they are targeted.  
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All online platforms (i.e. hosting service providers that communicate content to the public) would be 
required319 to ensure that the recipients of the service receive individualised information to enable 
them to identify, for each specific advertisement displayed to each individual recipient, in a clear and 
unambiguous manner and in real time that the information displayed is an advertisement; the (natural 
or legal) person on whose behalf the advertisement is displayed; and meaningful information about 
the main parameters used to determine the recipient to whom the advertisement is displayed (for 
targeted advertising).  
Although these transparency obligations are already present in EU leglislation, the current rules are 
spread across different legal instruments and do not apply to all platforms. This is therefore a welcome 
new element. However it may be useful to clarify the links between the DSA and the GDPR and the 
ePrivacy Directive (and future Regulation), in particular whether and how data subjects need to provide 
consent before being exposed to behavioural advertising. At the very least also, since data subjects are 
always allowed to withdraw their consent, the DSA could also specify that the information should also 
include information on how users can object to the further processing of their data for advertising 
purposes. There are also no rules in the DSA on the collection and use of chidren’s personal data for 
behavioural/targeted advertising purposes whereas a prohibition is included for video sharing 
platforms in the recently revised AVMS Directive. For sake of coherence, this rule should also be 
included in the future DSA. Also in terms of shortcomings, the DSA does not contain any rule on non-
discrimination whereas such rules are contained in various EU legal instruments, creating a patchwork 
of rules, applying to different situations. 
The very large online platforms (VLOPs) would also need to compile and make publicly available 
through application programming interfaces (APIs) a repository containing certain information, while 
also making sure that the repository does not contain any personal data. In particular, the repository 
would have to specify whether the advertisement was intended to be displayed specifically to one or 
more particular groups of recipients of the service and if so, the main parameters used; the total 
number of recipients reached and, where applicable, aggregate numbers for the group or groups of 
recipients to whom the advertisement was targeted specifically320. The Commission would have to 
support and promote the development of voluntary industry standards to ensure the interoperability 
of these repositories321.  
This also addresses some of the concerns highlighted above and is particularly interesting because this 
data will need to be made publicly available, meaning that end-users and business users (on top of 
researchers and enforcers) will have access to this data. It must however be noted that only the very 
large online platforms will be subject to these requirements. Of course, the ‘readilbillity’ of the data 
may not be obvious to the layman, but the future European Board for Digital Services could play a role 
in making this information more accessible to users. 
The Commission would have to encourage and facilitate the development of codes of conduct at EU 
level to support and complement the transparency obligations relating to advertisements with 
transparency obligations that would go beyond the imposed rules322. 
Although not specific to advertising, it is also interesting to recall that the rules on the liability of hosting 
service providers would remain broadly the same as under the eCommerce Directive. For the purpose 
of this study, we note the new addition to the rules on the liability of hosting service providers.  
                                                             
319  Article 24 of the proposed DSA. 
320  Article 30 of the proposed DSA. 
321  Article 34 of the proposed DSA. 
322  Article 36 of the proposed DSA. 
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Article 5.3 of the proposed DSA states that the exemption of Article 5.1 would not apply “with respect 
to liability under consumer protection law of online platforms allowing consumers to conclude 
distance contracts with traders, where such an online platform presents the specific item of information 
or otherwise enables the specific transaction at issue in a way that would lead an average and 
reasonably well-informed consumer to believe that the information, or the product or service that is 
the object of the transaction, is provided either by the online platform itself or by a recipient of the 
service who is acting under its authority or control”. Although this paragraph does not directly mention 
advertising, it would not be unreasonable to consider to what extent it may be used in cases where the 
platform leads the consumer to believe that the advertisement is arranged by the platform direcly and 
not by a third party intermediary.  
The proposal also introduces mechanisms for users to flag illegal content in Article 14, rules on internal 
complaints handling in Article 17 and rules on out-of-court dispute settlment in Article 18. However, it 
is not clear how these rules will apply in case of advertising that is in breach of EU or national legislation. 
3.4.2. DMA Proposal 
The DMA proposal applies to the gatekeeper of advertising services which also provides one of the 
following digital services, the so-called Core Platforms Services: B2C intermediation services (including 
marketplaces and app stores), search engines, social networks, video-sharing platforms, number-
independent interpersonal communication services, cloud computing or operating systems323. 
A gatekeeper is defined on the basis of a cumulative three criteria test, namely: (i) significant impact on 
the EU internal market; (ii) control of an important gateway for business users to reach end-users; and 
(iii) entrenched and durable position324. The DMA proposal introduces a rebuttable presumption, for 
each of the three criteria, in the form of a threshold. The first criterion (significant impact) will be 
deemed fulfilled if the Core Platforms Services provider achieved an annual EEA turnover equal to or 
above 6.5 billion EUR or a market capitalisation of at least 65 billion EUR and that Core Platforms 
Services provider is currently active in at least three Member States. The second criterion (important 
gateway) will be deemed met if the Core Platforms Services provider reached more than 45 million 
monthly active end-users in the EU (around 10% of the EU population) as well as more than 10,000 
active business users on an annualised basis. As for the third criterion (entrenched and durable 
position), it will be fulfilled if the turnover and user thresholds set above are met for the last 3 financial 
years325.  
A digital platform which has been designated as gatekeeper for one or several Core Platforms Services 
is subject to several obligations and prohibitions amongst which some are related to online advertising.  
Two obligations aim to complement competition law and to improve the functioning of the Adtech 
value chain: 
• Provide advertisers and publishers with information concerning the price paid by the advertiser 
and publisher and remuneration paid to the publisher326; and 
                                                             
323  DMA proposal, Article 2(2h). 
324  DMA proposal, Article 3(1). 
325  DMA proposal, Article 3(2). 
326  DMA proposal, Article 5 (Article 5.g). Such lack of transparency is currently investigated in the Google AdTech case, Cases AT. 40 660 and 
40 670. 
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• Provide advertisers and publishers, free of charge, access to the performance measuring tools 
of the gatekeeper and the information necessary to carry out their own independent 
verification of the ad inventory327. 
One obligation aims to allow more privacy competition between substitute digital services and, in turn, 
to prevent deep consumer profiling from becoming the industry standard: 
• Submit to the Commission an independently audited description of consumer profiling 
techniques used328. 
  
                                                             
327  DMA proposal, Article 6(1)(g). 
328  DMA proposal, Article 13 and recital 61. 
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 WHAT SOLUTIONS HAVE BEEN APPLIED?  
4.1. Comparison of national context 
The main issues emerging in each country case study are quite homogenous. All country systems 
generally tackle trademarks and copyright protection, market manipulation, unfair competition, youth 
protection, consumer protection, data protection and protection of personal rights. These can 
therefore be seen as global challenges that are the result of misleading and/or aggressive practices. In 
all case studies, consumer protection laws apply equally to online advertising and are therefore the 
main elements of consumer protection legislation, complemented in all cases by specific laws relating 
to the online space, data, markets or vulnerable consumer groups. This is evidence that, first and 
foremost, all countries see consumer protection as the key issue when it comes to regulating 
online advertising. The major differences are in how each country tries to address these challenges, 
with a similar set-up across the EU (and former EU) countries and some highly relevant practices in the 
non-EU case studies.  
As a consequence of the focus on consumer protection, the key legislation, outlined in Table 6, aims to 
prohibit advertising that unduly constrains consumers’ freedom of choice. In addition to the legislation 
in this table, the GDPR is the regulatory response to data protection concerns in the EU case studies 
and the United Kingdom, where EU legislation still applies following the UK’s departure from the EU. 
Unlike the EU, the US does not have a separate data protection authority or a single comprehensive 
privacy law at the federal level, like the GDPR. However, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which 
implements the relevant United States (US) legislation, has Section 5 which deals with unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, including data protection. Section 5 also is 
complemented by privacy-related statutes to protect consumer privacy, including for example the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection statute. This approach makes up a mosaic of regulation that 
mirrors many issues addressed by the GDPR329. 
Table 6:  Main piece of legislation in case study countries 
Country Key legislation Year Revisions  
Australia Competition and Consumer Act  2010 N/A 





Germany Law against unfair competition 2004 2008, 2015 
Ireland Consumer Protection Act (CPA) and the 
Electronic Communications Networks and 






United Kingdom Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 2014, 2015 
United States The Federal Trade Commission Act 1914 Numerous  
(latest 2018) 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
                                                             
329  Federal Trade Commission, Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule ("COPPA"), Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. 
6501–6505. 
IPOL | Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
 
PE 662.913 80  
The review of the legal framework of the case study countries shows that the issues faced are similar. 
Perhaps the only exception is in Ireland, which has a far higher volume of claims passing to the 
Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC), Ireland’s statutory body implementing the 
main legislation applying to consumer protection. This has to do with the fact that a large number of 
online platforms are based in Ireland. The Irish law under which most claims have been made is the 
2011 Electronic Communications Networks and Services, Privacy and Electronic Communications 
Regulations, outlined in the above table and expanded on in the annex case study330.  
What can be seen when looking at the overall value of online advertising spending in the case study 
countries is that the United States accounts for more than all the other case study countries combined, 
and indeed is the largest market globally for online advertising spending. The EU country with the 
largest spending in terms of total value is Germany. The picture when broken down per capita is more 
nuanced. The United States is still the largest spender. However, Australia, despite spending 93% less 
overall than the United States, appears second, with USD 396331 per capita in 2020. In the EU, Ireland is 
the highest by far in terms of per capita spending, partly reflecting the fact that this is where the 
platforms are based. In terms of the breakdown by activity, Ireland shows the largest percentage of 
total spending on social media spend in the EU, Germany in display advertising and France in search 
spending. However, all case studies show quite similar percentages in this respect, roughly half of the 
spend going on search, then 20-30% going on display and social media, respectively.  
Table 7: Breakdown of online advertising spending in 2020 (USD) 
Country Search 
value  
Display value  Social media 
advertising 
value  
Total value  Per capita 
spending  
Australia 4.5 bn (44%) 3.7 bn (36%) 2.1 bn (20%) 10.3 bn 396 
France 3.1 bn (54%) 1.1 bn (20%) 1.5 bn (26%) 5.7 bn 85 
Germany 4.7 bn (52%) 2.6 bn (29%) 1.7 bn (19%) 9 bn 107 
Ireland 427 mn 
(51%) 
183 bn (22%) 229 mn (27%) 839 mn 168 
United Kingdom 10.8 bn 
(53%) 
3.7 bn (18%) 5.8 bn (29%) 20.3 bn 299 
United States 60.9 bn 
(44%) 
38 bn (27%) 39.7 bn (29%)  138.6 bn 419 
Source:  Table compiled by authors with data from Statista, available at: www.statista.com.  
In terms of growth, all countries have seen significant increases in the costs of digital advertising, with 
COVID-19 representing a small deviation in the general trend (see Table 7 for more details). For 
example, Ireland saw the digital advertising spend in the Irish market for 2019 rise by 17% to reach EUR 
673 million332. In France, 2018 saw digital becoming the leading medium for advertising sales (40%), 
compared with 27% for television333.  
                                                             
330  Irish Statute Books, 2011, European Communities (Electronic Communications Networks and Services) (Privacy and Electronic 
Communications) Regulations. 
331  This corresponds roughly EUR 323 per capita [exchange rate 31.12.2020]. 
332  RTE, 2020, Irish digital advertising spend grew by 17% last year.  
333  Report commissioned by the French Minister of Culture and the Secretary of State in charge of digital, 2020, Online advertising: A level 
playing field. 
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The Syndicat des Régies Internet (SRI) provided an estimate of the growth of the digital advertising 
market in France at +7% for the whole of 2021334. The advertising market share of online advertising in 
Germany has increased from 12% in 2019 to 40% in 2020335. From a consumer perspective, this growth 
is reflected in the prices of goods and services, particularly those which make heavy use of digital 
advertising (for example consumer electronics, hotels, and flights). As elsewhere, market manipulation 
and the costs of misleading actions and aggressive commercial practices are a concern in the UK. In 
2009, Consumer Focus estimated that misleading and aggressive practices cost EUR 3.8 billion (GBP 3.3 
billion)336.  
Box 16: Effect of COVID-19 on online advertising in France and Australia 
The COVID-19 pandemic is having a large impact on various industries, and digital advertising is no 
exception. Businesses have been assessing their marketing efforts, which includes online 
advertising. According to a recent report by the Interactive Advertising Bureau, almost 24% of media 
buyers, planners, and brands paused ad spending until Q2 2020337. In France, Digital advertising 
revenues were down by 8% in the first half of 2020338. Display, banners, video, special operations and 
audio all experienced a 17% decline in revenue and search was down by 9%, however retail search 
digital advertising has continued to grow at a rapid pace, especially due to the success of 
eCommerce during the lockdown. The Australian Digital Advertising market experienced double-
digit decline in Q2 2020 due to the Impact of COVID-19. All online advertising categories showed 
declines compared to quarter ending June 2019 with Search down 9% and Display 11%. Video has 
outperformed the overall general display market, with no change in expenditure year on year, 
increasing its share of the general display market by to 53%339. However, recent research from the 
Consumer Policy Research Centre (CPRC) has also found that, after the adjustment in 2020, the 
COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in consumers relying on digital markets at much higher levels340. 
The market is therefore expected to recover fully in the long-term and continue growing 
exponentially. 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
4.2. Design and implementation of responses 
All case study countries except Australia have chosen to implement self-regulatory principles, to 
support consumer protection legislation, when it comes to online advertising. As can be seen in 
Table 8 below, whether a system is self-regulatory or implements mandatory regulation affects the 
actors in the system. Most EU Members States, and many non-European Union countries, have a self-
regulatory organisation that is a member of the European Advertising Standards Alliance (EASA). EASA 
co-ordinates the cross-border complaints system for its members (which include the Advertising 
Standards Agency (UK))341. 
                                                             
334  Oliver Wyman, 2020 Report, Syndicat des Régies Internet (SRI).  
335  Giersberg, F., 2020, Advertising market 2020 with clear corona effect.  
336  Department for Business, Energy & industrial Strategy, 2018, Misleading and aggressive commercial practices: new private rights for 
consumers.  
337  Mordor Intelligence, 2021, Online advertising market – growth, trends, covid-19 impact and forcasts (2021 - 2026)  
338  Amiot, E., 2020, Digital Advertising in France Weakened by the Pandemic, Syndicat des Régies Internet (SRI).  
339  Le Roy, G., 2020, Australian Digital Advertising Market Experiences Double Digit Decline In Q2 2020 Due To Impact Of COVID-19. 
340  Consumer Policy Research Centre, 2020, Unfair trading practices in digital markets – evidence and regulatory gaps, Research and policy 
briefing.  
341  Advertising Standards Agency, 2014, Scope of the Code: CAP Code. 
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There are two other notable points from Table 8 below. The first is that Germany has no dedicated 
national authority. This is because the main legislation is enforced by the market participants in 
the district court (Landgericht) via injunctions which can prohibit online advertising activities. This a 
specific legal instrument in German civil law, which has legal effects for both process participants and 
third parties. For example, through this instrument a ‘blacklist’ of unfair business actions, which impact 
entrepreneurs and include both misleading and aggressive commercial practices, has been created342. 
The rationale of this ‘blacklist’ is to protect consumers’ freedom of choice and consumers’ right to make 
informed decisions.  
The other notable example is the UK system which involves the Committee of Advertising Practice 
(CAP), rather than one single industry body. This Committee develops and implements the UK Code of 
Non-Broadcast Advertising and Direct Promotional Marketing (CAP Code) and is mainly supported by 
the Advertising Standards Agency. However, it also includes member organisations who, through 
contractual agreements with media publishers and carriers, agree to comply with the Code on behalf 
of other businesses who may not be a member of the Advertising Standards Agency. In that sense, the 
CAP is not just one ‘catch all’ industry body, but a mixture. 





National authority(-ies)  
Australia N None Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) and the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA) 
France Y Regulatory authority for 
advertising (ARPP) 
The National Competition Authority (NCA), 
National Commission for Informatics and 
Freedoms (NCIF), and the Audiovisual Council 
(AC) 
Germany Y German Advertising 
Association (GAA) 
None  
Ireland Y Advertising Standards 
Agency (ASAI) 




Y Committee of 
Advertising Practice 
(CAP) 
National Trading Standards (NTS) 
United States Y BBB National Programs 
(BBBNP) 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
Source:   Authors’ own elaboration. 
In contrast to the other case studies, in Australia there is no single designated industry body mirroring 
the national authorities mandated to regulate online advertising in the country. This is because many 
of the mandatory regulations, such as the ‘News Media Bargaining Code’, overseen by the ACCC and 
the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), were only introduced in early 2021. 
Furthermore, the lack of a self-regulatory system negates the demand for a designated industry 
interlocutor for the national authorities. It is important to note that, in terms of impact, despite the 
‘News Media Bargaining Code’ being less than one year old, it has already led to both Google and 
Facebook negotiating voluntary commercial agreements with a number of large and small Australian 
                                                             
342  German Law, 2004, Act against Unfair Competition (UWG), Annex (to Section 3 Paragraph 3). 
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news businesses. A short description of the general context of mandatory regulation in Australia, 
including from the origins of the code, is outlined in the box below. 
Box 17: The path of online advertising regulation in Australia 
To tackle the issues arising from online advertising in both business-to-business (B2B) and business-
to-consumer (B2C) relations, the ACCC made a number of recommendations to the Australian 
Government as part of the Final Report of the Digital Platforms Inquiry343. A number of these 
recommendations have already been implemented by the Australian Government. 
The Digital Platforms Inquiry which ran between December 2017 and July 2019 looked at the 
effect that digital search engines, social media platforms and other digital content aggregation 
platforms have on competition in media and advertising services markets344. The final report 
published in 2019 contains recommendations reflecting the issues arising from the growth of digital 
platforms345. The recommendation to address the imbalance in the bargaining relationship 
between these platforms and news media businesses was a key driver behind the adoption of the 
News Media Bargaining Code. 
Another noteworthy inquiry is the inquiry into markets for the supply of digital platform 
services, which commenced in February 2020 and will continue until March 2025. The first report 
of this inquiry was released in September 2020 and provides an in-depth focus on online private 
messaging services in Australia. The second report, which considers mobile app marketplaces, is to 
be publicly released by the end of April 2021346. A separate ACCC inquiry into markets for the 
supply digital advertising technology services and digital advertising agency services 
released an interim report earlier this year, with a final report due to be publicly released in 
September347.  
Overall, many different regulatory measures have been adopted in Australia, some of which have 
not become law yet, as there is typically a significant consultation period, and the results of inquiries 
are carefully considered and often reflected in legislative proposals. 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
In terms of self-regulation, all the case study countries using a system of self-regulation have some 
form of code or guidelines for online advertising. In France for example, the French self-regulatory 
authority’s (ARPP) code of conduct on online advertising is the main set of principles and includes 
recommendations applicable to some digital format/techniques, such as social media. In the UK, the 
12th edition of the CAP Code came into force in September 2010 and was released because the digital 
remit of the Advertising Standards Agency (ASAI) was extended to cover online marketing 
communications. In Ireland, the Advertising Standards Authority is the independent self-regulatory 
body set up and financed by the advertising industry, and it publishes a Code of Standards348, which 
includes rules on online behavioural advertising, which are binding for its members. More information 
can be found in Box 18 below. In Germany, the Advertising Standards Council has a set of operating 
principles, last updated in 2009349. 
                                                             
343  ACCC, 2019, Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report. 
344  Ibid. 
345  Ibid. 
346  ACCC, 2021, Digital platform services inquiry 2020-2025.  
347  ACCC, 2021, Digital advertising services inquiry.  
348  Advertising Standards Authority for Ireland, 2016, Code, 7th edition.  
349  German Advertising Standards Council, 2009, Working Principles.  
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Box 18: Ireland, an example of mixed regulatory systems 
In Ireland, similar to France, Germany the United Kingdom and to some extent, the United States, a 
designated industry body (the ASAI) and a national authority (CCPC) both enforce regulations on 
online advertising. Both authorities use codified principles to seek action against traders and 
advertisers. The ASAI Code more specifically targets marketing and also includes distinct rules for 
online behavioural advertising. While consumers who have experienced damages can choose to 
follow either the CCPC or the ASAI procedures, the self-regulatory procedure under the ASAI 
Code provides quicker relief than the procedure under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), with the 
CCPC. Indeed, while a certain level of severity has to be reached for the CCPC to seek action against 
a trader, the ASAI takes action as soon as an advertiser has breached their code. This implies any 
consumer can start a procedure with the ASAI. The decisions by the ASAI are also made public, which 
may cause negative publicity to advertisers and thus, create a dissuasive effect350. 
The CCPC is a member of the EU Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Network, which is 
responsible for enforcing EU consumer protection laws in EU and EEA countries. Under the CPC 
framework, any authority in a country where consumer protection law may have been breached can 
ask its counterpart, in the country where the trader is based, to take action to stop this breach of law. 
Authorities can also alert each other to possible breaches that could spread to other countries and, 
with the European Commission’s support, authorities can also coordinate their approaches to 
applying consumer protection law to tackle widespread infringements351. 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
In the United States, the system can be seen as self-regulatory but underpinned by a strong regulator 
with the ability to make case law (its role outlined in the box below). In this case, the FTC itself, in 
consultation with industry, provides advice to online companies and commercial websites. In February 
2009, the FTC released a revised set of principles for the self-regulation of online behavioural 
advertising352. These guidelines are also currently under review and the role of the FTC more generally 
is interesting from a best practice point of view.  
                                                             
350  Advertising Standards Agency for Ireland, 2020, Complaints Bulletins.  
351  Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, 2019, Annual Report 2019.  
352  Federal Trade Commission, 2009, Self-Regulation Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising.  
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Box 19: The regulatory practice on online advertising in the United States 
In the United States, the FTC’s role conducting investigations and contributions to case law differs 
from the other national authorities’ roles and allows the FTC to react quickly to emerging market 
practices. The American system differs from the other systems examined as the role of case law is 
more prominent in upholding the consumer protection and privacy principles set in Section 5 of 
the FTC Act. For example, the FTC was recently able to propose an order353 on the use of online facial 
recognition by companies which includes a new algorithmic remedy. To complement its 
investigation activities, the FTC actively liaises with stakeholders, through guidelines and 
workshops. The FTC is currently organising a workshop on dark commercial patterns, for which 
stakeholders can share their comments ahead of time and which will result in the publication of a 
report. In elaborating their guidelines, the FTC also adopts a collaborative approach with 
stakeholders. The Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (known as the Endorsement 
Guides) were last updated in 2009 and are currently under review354. As a part of the review, the FTC 
initiated a notice and a consultation period during which stakeholders can address their comments 
to the FTC, all of which are available online, on the ‘regulations.gov’ website. The procedure typically 
takes a few years. The Commission will vote on whether to adopt the recommended changes. 
The FTC has created the Consumer Sentinel Network, which provides a knowledge sharing 
platform for its members on issues that relate to consumer protection through reports355. 
Internationally, the FTC consults regularly with DG JUST about developments in consumer law and 
enforcement cooperation. Although the US laws and legal system differs significantly from the EU, 
the FTC and the EU share many of the same high-level goals in the area of consumer protection 
including in relation to digital advertising. To that end, the FTC is very active in international 
engagement in the OECD, the International Consumer Protection Enforcement Network (ICPEN), 
and other international organisations, and engages at EU level or bilaterally with Member States356. 
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
4.3. Evaluation of EU Member State and third country experiences 
Overall, there are several lessons concerning the institutional framework and enforcement that can be 
learned at the EU-level from experiences at national level within and outside Europe.  
The FTC as an authority shows many positive attributes. Although the research the FTC leads (including, 
for example, the creation of the Consumer Sentinel Network), as well as the cases it deals with, are 
specific to the US, its statutes can be much broader and higher level than EU laws. The FTC’s activity on 
specific cases allows quick responses to a rapidly growing industry in which new issues arise quickly, 
and its review process for guidelines is directed yet participatory, as evidenced by the review of the 
Endorsement Guides. 
In Ireland, the activity led by the industry body, the ASAI, does appear to complement the national 
authority, CCPC, which deals predominantly with more severe breaches which have already caused 
harm to consumers. The self-regulatory procedure under the ASAI Code provides quicker relief than 
the procedure under the CPA, with the CCPC, and this dual system could be considered a best practice. 
The UK industry body, the ASA, is also quite advanced with regards to self-regulation and dealing with 
                                                             
353  Federal Trade Commission, 2021, California Company Settles FTC Allegations It Deceived Consumers about use of Facial Recognition in Photo 
Storage App, Press Release.  
354  United States Federal Trade Commission, 2020, FTC Seeks Public Comment on its Endorsement Guides, Press Release.  
355  United States Federal Trade Commission, Enforcement page: Consumer Sentinel Network. 
356  United States Federal Trade Commission, About the FTC: Office of International Affairs. 
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specific cases. In 2019, the ASA issued 62 sanctions leading to compliance, and only 9 advertisers 
needed to be referred to Trading Standards for further action to be taken357. In France, there is a self-
regulatory system with strong engagement from national authorities. Moreover, the competition 
authority publishes opinions on online advertising, such as the one of 6 March 2018 on data 
exploitation in the online advertising sector358. This quasi-regulatory activity by the French national 
authorities could be seen as a form of ‘pro-active self-regulation’, which may be considered an EU best 
practice most similar to the US model. In Germany, consumers have a positive view of the development 
of the main legislation. This is perhaps due to a greater awareness of the debate around data and 
privacy than in other countries. Consumers still perceive the current regulatory framework as a mixture 
of paradoxical advantages, disadvantages and neutral or ambivalent elements359. This perception taps 
into general consumer feelings in all the case study countries regarding what is known as the 
‘personalisation-privacy’ paradox. However, it appears German consumers are perhaps more aware of 
what this involves in terms of online advertising and ‘free’ online services. 
In Australia, the adoption of a framework to curtail the market power of digital platform giants, such as 
Google and Facebook, has attracted a strong interest from other policy makers and competition 
regulators, including the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)360. According to a recent 
statement by the UK government, the UK’s Digital Secretary asked the new Digital Markets Unit to ‘look 
specifically at how a [mandatory] code would govern the relationships between platforms and content 
providers such as news publishers, including to ensure they are as fair and reasonable as possible361. It 
is worth noting that this regulatory measure is comparable to Article 15 of the EU Copyright Directive, 
which also aims to require payments from digital platforms to publishers362. 
 
                                                             
357  UK Advertising Standards Agency, 2019, Using technology for good – Annual Report 2019. 
358  Autorité de la concurrence, 2018, Opinion n° 18-A-03 of 6 March 2018 on the use of data in the internet advertising sector advertising sector. 
2018.  
359  Dehling, T., Zhang, Y. & Sunyaev, A., 2019, ‘Consumer Perceptions of Online Behavioral Advertising’, Proceedings of the 21st IEEE Conference 
on Business Informatics. 
360  Lomas, N., 2021, After Facebook’s news flex, Australia passes bargaining code for platforms and publishers, Tech Crunch. 
361  Ibid. 
362  European Parliament and European Council, 2019, Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC (Text with EEA relevance.).  
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 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
In this section, we synthesise the insights from the previous sections to provide recommendations that 
may address the gaps identified. We distinguish between recommendations to address challenges for 
consumers and recommendations to address challenges for SMEs as publishers and advertisers, and to 
support the development of a single market in online advertising.  
5.1. Recommendations to better protect consumers 
5.1.1. Ensuring that data use and sharing in digital advertising conforms with privacy 
rules 
The delivery of behavioural advertising typically involves the extensive use of consumer data that may 
be collected without consumers’ knowledge. Consumers have little understanding of who is collecting 
data and how or what data is being collected and processed. The use of dark patterns to leverage 
consent for data collection and processing can further exacerbate this issue (see below). In addition, 
advertising auctions are often based on the transfer of large amounts of personal data between a 
variety of different actors. Usually there is little awareness and control of who the data is shared with 
or whether it is used in contexts other than advertising. Both practices run counter to the rights 
recognised in the GDPR and highlight the need for an improvement in the rules and enforcement.  
The findings of this study and the interviews conducted suggest that while the GDPR has provided the 
legal framework to address these issues, the fundamental problem with the GDPR is that the measures 
are often only selectively enforced by National Data Protection Authorities. There is a need for more 
consistent and adequate enforcement of the legal framework, to achieve the underlying objectives of 
the regulation. However, National Data Protection Authorities are not always well equipped to 
effectively and efficiently enforce the GDPR due to a lack of necessary resources. The European 
Parliament Resolution on GDPR implementation363 points to the lack and uneven enforcement of the 
GDPR by National Data Protection Authorities across the EU which is due, in part, to lack of human, 
technical and financial resources. According to the Resolution, weak enforcement is particularly 
evident in cross-border complaints and the European Parliament has expressed concerns over the 
functioning of the one-stop-shop mechanism regarding the role of the Irish and Luxembourg DPAs 
which are responsible for dealing with issues relating to the largest tech companies which tend to be 
registered in those two Member States. 
A short term solution would be to improve the working of the coordination mechanism foreseen by 
the GDPR. A more robust, but longer term, solution may be: 
• To insert provisions in the GDPR that allow for the intervention of the European Commission as 
a complement to the intervention of the authority of the country where the platform is 
established when it comes to large digital companies operating across multiple countries, 
similar to what is provided for in the current DSA proposal364.  
                                                             
363  European Parliament resolution of 25 March 2021 on the Commission evaluation report on the implementation of the General Data 
Protection Regulation two years after its application, paras. 12-22. See also Brave (2020): Europe’s governments are failing the GDPR – 
Brave’s 2020 report on the enforcement capacity of data protection authorities, which shows that as the number of complaints increases, 
it becomes more difficult for the authority to act quickly and efficiently to address them. In addition, Brave shows that alongside a low 
headcount, budget increases are also decelerating, which is equally problematic when acting against such financially strong companies 
364  European Commission, 2020, Proposal of the Commission of 15 December 2020 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, COM(2020) 825 final, 2020/0361 
(COD),arts. 50-66. 
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5.1.2. Informing consumers about the fact that they are being targeted and improved 
consent mechanisms 
Consumers are often not aware that they are being targeted and thus influenced by online advertising. 
In addition to affecting purchasing decisions, the ability to target messages to specific consumer 
groups provides the potential for the manipulation of public opinion by certain players365. Therefore, 
additional information requirements should be imposed on online platforms (and websites in general) 
that display advertising, enabling the recipient to recognise advertising, to verify the sender of the 
advertising and the parameters used to determine the recipient. Various existing legal instruments 
cover aspects of these problems including the eCommerce and AVMS Directives, the amended CDS 
and UCPD, and the GDPR. However, the rules are complex and may be subject to inconsistent 
application and enforcement. 
The current DSA proposal is a step in the right direction since it will strengthen the level of awareness 
of consumers about online advertising. The proposed DSA could be further strengthened by ensuring 
that the requirements apply to all intermediary services in scope (including search engines). It must be 
noted however that the proposed DSA does not apply to all ‘information society services’ covered by 
the eCommerce Directive, which means that many online websites/publishers will not be covered (see 
Dealing with multiple actors below). In terms of the information to be conveyed to consumers it seems 
debatable whether they should be informed about the value of their provided data in monetary terms. 
Any individual consumer would most likely evaluate monetary amounts towards their own disposable 
income or their wealth in general. Hence, consumers' impression of the "monetary" value of their data 
would be mainly driven by their own financial status and not by their privacy preferences. The latter, 
however, should be the crucial factor in the consent decision.  
More promising could be to provide information on what data is specifically used in which targeting 
method. In this way, consumers would be able to know how for instance their address, age, sex, 
influences the displayed advertisements. Based on this information, consumers will be able to perform 
a self-assessment of their individual privacy risk rather than relying on a pre-calculated monetary value. 
How (format and location) to display mandatory information requirements could be specified in codes of 
conduct. 
Article 24 of the DSA proposal aims to address to some extent the need for clarity around the 
parameters used for targeting, but further steps could be taken to ensure that all the challenges listed 
are addressed. Specifically, the DSA could contain: 
• A requirement to ensure that there is transparency concerning the fact that the consumer is 
exposed to targeted advertising and on the main parameters used therefore (but not how they 
are specifically processed in the targeting algorithm);  
• A requirement that information about targeted advertising should be conveyed in a manner 
that takes into account consumer biases and limitations in dealing with information overload. 
To apply this principle in practice, different options could be tested by the platforms (A/B 
testing) and those which are the most effective could be included in the codes of conduct 
foreseen by Article 36 of the DSA proposal; 
• A requirement to provide at least one option which is not based on targeting (similar to what 
Article 29 of the proposed DSA foresees for the recommender systems used by the very large 
online platforms); and 
                                                             
365  A concern expressed during an interview.  
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• Moreover, the DSA should encourage opt-in setting to targeted advertising via the tools 
available to support self- and co-regulation such as codes of conduct (Article 36 of the DSA 
proposal).  
5.1.3. Addressing “dark patterns” through GDPR guidelines  
Dark patterns refer to designs and wording (e.g. in the context of consent forms) which aim to lead 
consumers to take decisions which may not be in their best interests. 
Some EU authorities have used the GDPR to sanction the use of dark patterns. For example, the French 
Data Protection Authority fined Google for a “lack of transparency, inadequate information and lack of 
valid consent in its ads personalisation tool366”. Some EDPB Guidelines also cover this issue to some 
extent. 
Further action may be appropriate to ensure the issue is addressed Europe wide. Potential solutions 
could include: 
•  Defining design guidelines, among others, for cookie banners and consent forms; and 
potentially as a longer-term solution (noting that EDPB guidelines are not binding); 
• Establishing a higher legal standing for the EDPB guidelines in future revision of the GPPR, for 
instance by explicitly providing that the DPA and national court should take the guidelines into 
utmost account; and 
• Providing a user-friendly tool to report websites that may not comply with the proposed design 
guidelines367. 
5.1.4. Clarifying that digital targeted advertising must not breach rules on discrimination 
and improving algorithmic transparency 
The availability of data is useful in displaying relevant ads. However, it can also enable advertisers to 
intentionally engage in discrimination against certain customer groups e.g. based on age, race, gender 
or disability. In addition, wherever a lot of data is evaluated by algorithms, unintentional discrimination 
can occur in ad delivery if the training datasets for the ad algorithms are systematically biased with 
respect to specific subgroups of the population. 
Algorithmic systems are the cornerstone of platforms' content moderation, data analysis and 
recommender as well as ranking systems. Incorporating an access obligation that refers to not only the 
working algorithm but also grants access to data which was used to build and test the algorithm (so 
called “training data”) is crucial for evaluating the compliance of these systems. Without the associated 
training data, it is difficult to backward-engineer the construction of the algorithm and assess its 
potential for, e.g., biases in content moderation or potential for data-based discrimination within 
recommender systems. 
These problems may largely be addressed by existing and planned legislation. The proposed AI Act will 
be a horizontal legislation applicable to all the actors involved in online advertising. The AI Act may 
tackle discrimination, as the current proposal suggests addressing algorithmic bias and requiring more 
transparency, better documentation and traceability for (high-risk) AI systems368. 
                                                             
366  Global Data Hub, 2020, Beware 'dark patterns' – data protection regulators are watching. 
367  In the US, users can report websites to their respective Attorney General if they feel they are subjected to a dark pattern. Available at: 
https://darkpatternstipline.org/report/. 
368  European Commission, 2021, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on 
artificial intelligence (artificial intelligence act) and amending certain Union legislative acts,  21.4.2021 COM(2021) 206 final 2021/0106 
(COD), arts 7-19. 
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Moreover, the non-discrimination principle is enshrined in different EU legislative instruments like the 
“Race Directive”369, the “Employment discrimination Directive”370, the “Gender equality Directive”371, 
and the “Gender Directive”372, some of which may be applicable to digital advertising. In addition, the 
GDPR includes an “explainability” rule regarding algorithms373 and the AVMS Directive explicitly 
requires non-discrimination in relation to video sharing platforms374. Meanwhile the DSA proposal 
addresses illegal content (which should encompass content which breaches EU and national legislation 
forbidding discrimination)375. However, the DSA could nonetheless further contribute to ensuring that 
rules regarding discrimination are adhered to in the context of digital advertising through: 
• Greater transparency concerning targeting itself and the main parameters thereof as well as 
giving the possibility to change those parameters (see suggestions above); and 
• Regular vetting of systems and training data by accredited researchers will offer new insights 
on how to mitigate systemic risks and lead to lessened information asymmetries. 
5.1.5. Ensure that minors are not subject to harmful targeted advertising which exploits 
their vulnerabilities 
User profiling can enable certain vulnerable consumer groups including minors to be identified and 
shielded from inappropriate advertising. However, the same profiling techniques could also be used to 
exploit such users’ vulnerabilities and display inappropriate advertisements. 
The FTC in the US uses Section 5 complemented by privacy-related statutes to protect consumer privacy, 
including the Children’s Online Privacy Protection statute. In December 2020, the FTC issued orders to 9 
social media and video streaming companies under Section 6B of FTC act that allows them to collect 
information from companies. The orders require the companies to provide data on how they collect, use, 
and present personal information, their advertising and user engagement practices, and how their 
practices affect children and teens.  
In the EU, the AVMS Directive already includes obligations to protect minors from harmful content in 
advertising, causing physical, mental or moral detriment. However, the provisions apply only to video 
sharing platforms376. More generally, targeting advertising towards children is addressed indirectly by 
the provisions of the GDPR that make clear that children cannot give consent377.  
However, to clarify that minors (and potentially other vulnerable customer groups) should be 
protected from targeted advertising: 
                                                             
369  Council of the European Union, 2000, Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180 of 19.7.2000. 
370  Council of the European Union, 2000, Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303 of 02.12.2000. 
371  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2006, Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation (recast), OJ L 204 of 26.7.2006. 
372  Council of the European Union, 2004, Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ L 373 of 21.12.2004. 
373  GDPR, Article 22. 
374  AVMSD, Article 28b(2) which refers to Article 9(1). 
375  DSA proposal, Article 2(g) defines illegal content as “any information, which, in itself or by its reference to an activity, including the sale 
of products or provision of services is not in compliance with Union law or the law of a Member State, irrespective of the precise subject 
matter or nature of that law”. 
376  AVMSD, Article 28b(2) which refers to Article 9(1). 
377  GDPR, Article 8. 
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• The DSA could include a similar provision to that related to commercial communication of the 
AVMSD which is applicable to video sharing platforms, thereby extending the rules on the 
protection of minors to all hosting platforms.  
5.1.6. Dealing with multiple actors 
Many actors are involved in targeted advertising: publishers, ad intermediaries, and advertisers. In 
many cases, targeted advertising is pushed to the publisher’s website and to the end user without the 
intervention of the publisher. The scope of the proposed DSA is limited to intermediation services- and 
the rules on advertising are themselves limited to online platforms and VLOPS, which means that many 
websites will not be covered, whereas the issues raised in this report go beyond these actors.  
Furthermore, any legislative solution which is limited to certain platforms, needs to be mirrored up the 
value chain since the ad intermediaries are often the engines of targeted advertising solutions. 
Similarly, the notion of joint controller under the GDPR is not always crystal clear and not necessarily 
apparent to the end-user. Possible solutions may be: 
• To clarify that Article 5.3 of the DSA proposal could also apply to platforms which lead an 
average and reasonably well-informed consumer to believe that advertising is provided by the 
online platform itself or by a recipient of the service who is acting under its authority or control. 
This would ensure that the platform has an incentive to comply with all the transparency rules 
since otherwise they would be deprived of the liability exemption of Article 5.1; and 
• To potentially consider new legislation at EU level which ensures that any ex-ante legislation 
protecting consumers is also applicable to ad intermediaries.  
5.1.7. Clarifying the redress mechanisms  
Online advertising needs to comply with many EU and national rules. To date, the enforcement 
mechanisms are different depending on the specific area that is breached. The proposed DSA also sets 
out a generic mechanism for users to flag illegal content and to seek redress. This may further 
complicate matters for consumers. Potential solutions could be to: 
• Address in more detail how sector specific rules will interact with the DSA, especially on 
enforcement; 
• Include among the list of tasks for the Digital Service Coordinators the need to provide 
information to consumers on how to seek redress in relation to online advertising (among 
other areas); and 
• Envisage the adoption of a sector specific directive to address all the consumer protection 
issues linked to online advertising, thereby ending a piecemeal approach which is not 
necessarily conducive to consumer trust. 
5.1.8. Facilitating the functioning of the internal market 
The risk of legal uncertainty deriving from the potential application of national rules to advertising 
services could be mitigated by enforcing the cooperation mechanisms between Member States so that 
derogations remain the exception rather than the rule. Specifically, the condition of prior notification 
of the measure laid down in Article 3(4b) of the eCommerce Directive, could be better harmonised and 
clarified. This could be done for instance by: 
• Amending the eCommerce Directive (possibly through the DSA) by introducing precise 
deadlines and procedural conditions for the implementation of derogations by Member States 
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(e.g.: the Member State where the service is provided could not take any measure before the 
expiration of a three-month deadline)378; and 
• EU-wide codes of conduct which could be ‘vetted’ by the European Commission to define 
which types of national restrictions would be compatible with the internal market clause. 
5.2. Recommendations to better protect SMEs as publishers and 
advertisers 
5.2.1. Addressing exploitation by platforms which hold a dominant position in digital 
advertising 
Large platforms providing ad-tech services such as Google and Facebook allow access to a very high 
proportion of EU Internet users. As such, smaller firms in particular may be reliant on these channels to 
reach consumers, potentially allowing exploitation in the form of higher charges or other restrictions 
in the advertising market. 
The proposed DMA includes provisions which aim to shine a light on potential exploitation by requiring 
digital gatekeepers to provide information on prices and performance regarding digital advertising to 
advertisers379. Alongside approving the DMA provisions, potential exploitation of gatekeeper platforms 
in digital advertising could be addressed by: 
• Taking advantage of the additional information to pursue case by case enforcement under 
competition law at the EU and national level. 
5.2.2. Increase transparency concerning advertising auctions and the performance of 
advertising 
The distribution of ads via ad-auctions or RTB is marked by a lack of transparency towards both 
advertisers and publishers. According to interviews, this can create a situation where advertisers cannot 
understand why they win or lose auctions for specific keywords and how the final price for the 
impression or conversion is determined. Likewise, publishers face similar uncertainty since they 
observe only their personal ad revenue, but how much is pocketed by the intermediary remains 
unknown. The same applies to performance data of the advertisement or the ad-inventory.  
Advertisers largely depend on data that is supplied by the ad intermediaries and which has already 
been edited or aggregated in some form. Access to raw data on ad performance is lacking. This creates 
a situation in which it is difficult for advertisers to calculate their own unbiased returns on their 
advertising expenses (Ad-ROI). 
The insights of this study and the interviews conducted for this study suggest that the introduction of 
obligations for B2B side performance data provision would be a promising step. Ideally, this data 
should be unedited and in an agreed upon standardised format to maximise usability. The benefits of 
this approach are two-fold. Firstly, access to raw data allows for a quality comparison of different 
intermediary services based on actual success and conversion rates. This gives both advertisers and 
publishers the possibility to make informed decisions with respect to their ad spending and ad 
revenues.  
                                                             
378  Such recommendations are inspired by the mechanisms laid down in Article 3 of the AVMS Directive (as amended as amended by 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2018, Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 November 2018 in view of changing market realities, OJ L 303/69 of 28.112018). 
379  DMA proposal, Article 5(g) and Article 6(1)(g). 
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Furthermore, this would most likely increase the competitive pressure on large intermediaries of 
Facebook and Google, which is currently rather low, and would promote innovation in the long run. 
Secondly, increased transparency with respect to calculable click-through and conversion rates would 
strongly benefit the potential to detect ad-fraud. Currently, it is difficult for an advertiser to detect 
whether they are targeted by fraudulent behaviour or for a publisher whether fraud takes place on their 
websites. If access to raw data is granted, this change as ad-fraud would most likely lead to a significant 
increase in click-through-rates (increasing an advertiser’s costs) while conversion-rates would drop 
(absolute conversions remain constant). Hence, an unusually large discrepancy between click-through 
and conversion rates could be a first indicator for present fraud. 
The DMA proposal covers some of the following issues, at least to some degree. For example, 
gatekeepers are required by Article 6(1)(g) of the DMA proposal to provide advertisers and publishers 
with access to the performance measurement tools and information they need to independently 
validate advertising inventory. In addition, gatekeepers are obligated by Article 5(g) of the DMA 
proposal to “provide advertisers and publishers to which it supplies advertising services, upon their 
request, with information concerning the price paid by the advertiser and publisher, as well as the 
amount or remuneration paid to the publisher, for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the 
relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper”380. However, the opacity of the ad auction 
system is not entirely addressed by the latter provision. It remains unclear how the resulting prices are 
calculated, which other factors are considered in the auction process and how they are weighted when 
determining the auction winner. A potential solution could be: 
• To add to the proposed transparency obligations in the DMA obligations regarding 
transparency of the auction criteria used by the gatekeeper of the ad-tech core platform service 
that include details of the price components (CPC, CPI, CPM) as well as other factors which are 
taken into account in the auction process and their weighting.   
5.2.3. Tackling bundling and tying by gatekeeper intermediaries of premium advertising 
space 
Ad-inventory of vertically integrated large intermediaries (e.g. Facebook, YouTube (Google)) is 
considered very valuable from an advertiser’s perspective but is often exclusively marketed via their 
own Ad-Network or Ad-Exchange. This applies for example to ad inventory on Facebook or on YouTube 
which are only accessible via their respective networks. However, the non-availability of such premium 
publishers’ inventories to smaller competing ad intermediation networks may act as an entry barrier 
and limit their ability to compete. This concern has been also expressed in an interview conducted with 
a European ad-network. This issue has been recently addressed by the current DMA proposal of the 
European Commission381. According to Article 5(f) of the DMA proposal a gatekeeper shall “refrain from 
requiring business users or end users to subscribe to or register with any other core platform 
services”382. Essentially, a gatekeeper is prohibited from jointly marketing/selling multiple core services 
for which it has been designated as enjoying a gatekeeper position. 
 
                                                             
380  European Commission, 2020, Proposal of the Commission of 15 December 2020 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act), COM(2020) 842 final, 2020/0374 (COD). 
381  Cabral, L., Haucap, J., Parker, G., Petropoulos, G., Valletti, T. and Van Alstyne, M., The EU Digital Markets Act, Publications Office of the 
European Union, Luxembourg, 2021, ISBN 978-92-76-29788-8 (online), doi:10.2760/139337 (online), JRC122910. 
382  European Commission, 2020, Proposal of the Commission of 15 December 2020 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act), COM(2020) 842 final, 2020/0374 (COD). 
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Separating the intermediary services from these vertically integrated players and the ad-inventory of 
their publisher’s sites could be beneficial in reducing entry barriers and could promote competition on 
the intermediary level in the online advertising value chain. Furthermore, it could work against the 
strong concentration tendencies observed in this market and lessen concerns over market power and 
negative effects on advertising prices and consumer choice.  
5.2.4. Addressing asymmetric access to consumer data 
Due to their user-facing services, large providers of ad-tech services like Google and Facebook can 
access extensive amounts of data while other companies lack such access. This leaves challenges to 
large providers in a weaker competitive position. Concerns have been raised that these large providers 
not only bundle access to the data with the purchase of advertising solutions and services, but may 
also directly prohibit or introduce considerable obstacles to the use of the data via a competitors' 
advertising services383. Although the prohibition on bundling and self-preferencing in the DMA 
proposal provides some assistance in this regard384, further obligations could be established to address 
this issue more vigorously. Other regulations, such as the Data Governance Act, do not yet seem to fully 
address the data sharing issue. However, the forthcoming Data Act may include some data sharing 
provisions. The P2B Regulation addresses the need to be transparent in terms and conditions on data 
sharing. A recommendation could be: 
• Further research on this issue may be helpful with a focus on the obstacles to the use of data 
by third parties and which measures could be introduced to tackle barriers and foster 
innovation. 
5.2.5. Counteracting the monopolisation of the browser market 
Google’s Privacy Sandbox as well as Apple’s ad tracking restriction efforts have been introduced with 
reference to their ability to increase user privacy. While Google's measure aims to make third-party 
cookies obsolete for behavioural advertising in the future, Apple's empowers consumers with more 
control over their data. At first glance, these efforts appear to be a positive development, indicating 
that the market is addressing consumers' needs for privacy and developing mechanisms to protect 
them.  
However, both companies operate platforms that are used by a large number of consumers. As a result, 
other companies in the advertising chain are dependent on them. The restrictions will hinder these 
players in carrying out their business, at least in the short term.  
Google’s approach is viewed particularly critically. Google itself recently acknowledged that the current 
implementation of their Privacy Sandbox technology FLoC (Federated Learning of Cohorts) which is 
designed to deliver behavioural targeting without third-party cookies “might not be compatible with 
European privacy law”385. In addition, some stakeholders and experts believe that Google’s approach is 
likely to harm other players along the advertising value chain and will help to cement its current market 
position, leading to lower levels of competition and creating greater dependencies. Although blocking 
of third-party cookies is not a new approach, as Mozilla's Firefox and Apple's Safari browsers already 
                                                             
383  Autorité de la concurrence, 2018, Sector-specific investigation into online advertising; Srinivasan, D. (2020): Why Google Dominates 
Advertising Markets – Competition Policy Should Lean on the Principles of Financial Market Regulation. Standford Technology Law 
Review 24 (1): 55-175. 
384  In particular, DMA proposal, Article5(e) and 5(f) as well as Article6(1)(d). 
385  Schiff, A., 2021, Google Will Not Run FLoC Origin Tests In Europe Due To GDPR Concerns (At Least For Now), Adexchanger. 
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block third-party cookies by default386, blocking them on Google Chrome may lead to distortions in the 
market, as Google Chrome currently holds about 65% of the browser market387. In this context, 
regulatory action may need to be considered.  
5.3. Summary of conclusions 
The following table summarises the problems discussed in this chapter and links the problems to 
associated causes, as well as identifying potential solutions, in light of our analysis of the gaps 
remaining after taking into account existing legislation, and proposals for the DSA and DMA.  
In addition to the propositions linked to specific problems, it should be noted that there may also be 
lessons to be learned from an institutional perspective from the experience of enforcing existing rules, 
as shown in the case studies. Ireland, for example, demonstrates that the activities of the national 
authority can be successfully complemented by self-regulatory procedures established by the industry 
that helps to enable better and faster remedies. The establishment of a dual system could also be a 
promising approach across Europe.  
More generally, a greater level of harmonisation is needed at the EU level, especially with regard to the 
enforcement of existing legal frameworks. In addition, national authorities should use similar concepts 
and definitions for “advertising” and “commercial communication” and also “targeted advertising” in 
order to maintain consistency. 
                                                             
386  Onlinemarketing.de, 2020, Welche Auswirkungen hat die Abschaffung von Third Party Cookies auf die Werbebranche? 
387  Statcounter.com, 2021, Browser Market Share Worldwide – Statistic.  
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Table 9: Summary of conclusions  
Problem Causes Objectives 
Existing legal 
instruments  
Proposed solutions  
(DMA/DSA) 
Proposed further solutions  
Consumers do not 
know that their data 
is being used to 
target advertising. 
Lack of transparency on 
(1) ad targeting (and 
person on whose behalf 
the advertisement is 
displayed) (2) main 
parameters used for 
targeting, (3) consent 
given to use personal 






(1) eCommerce and AVMS 
Directives  (2) CRD 
amended and UCPD 
amended (3) GDPR and e-
privacy : prior consent and 
info 
For (2) DSA Article 24; 
but need to have clear 
understanding on 
which are the main 
parameters  
• Requirement to ensure transparency 
concerning the existence of targeted 
advertising (similar to ranking); 
• How (format and location) to display 
mandatory information requirements could 
be specified in codes of conduct   
• Complementing Article 24 DSA with what is 
foreseen in Article 29 on recommenders 
systems for VLOPs, i.e. to give an option to 
change the parameters used;  
• Possibly, to encourage opt-in for targeted 
advertising through self- or co-regulation 
(provided in Article 36 DSA) 
Algorithmic 
discrimination 
(e.g. based on 
gender, disability) 
 
Ability to intentionally 
exploit personal data and 
unintentional 
algorithmic bias due to 





Artificial Intelligence Act 
(AIA) proposes to address 
algorithmic bias and to 
provide transparency on 
how the algorithm has 
been trained for high risks 
application; GDPR: 
Explainability rule; AVMS: 
non-discrimination on VSP 
Not directly covered in 
proposals 
DSA covers all illegal 
content (hence also 
violations of EU and 
national discrimination 
rules) and has provision 
regarding transparency 
of profiling (Article 24) 
Introduce further rules on the DSA by: 
• Improving transparency (see above) 
• Specifying in Recitals of DSA that all EU 
instruments that prohibit certain forms of 
advertising are in any event still applicable 
as these are sector specific rules 
• Also the obligations imposed in proposed 
AIA should contribute to close the gap. 
• Regular vetting of systems and training 
data by accredited researchers will offer 
new insights on how to mitigate systemic 
risks and lead to lessened information 
asymmetries.  
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Problem Causes Objectives 
Existing legal 
instruments  
Proposed solutions  
(DMA/DSA) 
Proposed further solutions  
Privacy violations  
 
Complex legal 







Provisions exist (GDPR and 
e-privacy), but country of 
origin principle/co-
ordination challenging. 
Enforcement does not 
always work 
Not addressed in 
proposals 
• Introduce in the GDPR the same 
asymmetric enforcement mechanism as 
foreseen in proposed DSA: Commission 
may be in charge, next to the authority of 
the country of establishment, for VLOPS. 
Challenges for 
consumers to seek 
redress in case of 
illegal advertising 
Advertising can be illegal 
because it is in breach of 





on where to 
seek redress 
GDPR, national rules, 
procedures in case of 
cross-border disputes, ADR 
Not addressed except 
for in proposed DSA 
rules on flagging, 
internal complaints 
handling, and out of 
court dispute resolution 
but application is not 
clear in case of illegal 
advertising 
• Address in more detail how sector specific 
rules will interact with the DSA, especially 
on enforcement 
• Include among the list of tasks for the 
Digital Service Coordinators the need to 
provide information to consumers on how 
to seek redress in relation to online 
advertising (among other areas) 
• Envisage the adoption of a sector specific 
directive to address all the consumer 
protection issues linked to online 
advertising, thereby ending a piecemeal 
approach which is not necessarily 
conducive to consumer trust 
Dark patterns (1) Lack of guidelines  
(2) Country of origin 
principle impedes 
enforcement 
(3) Insufficient incentive 





process data  
Guidelines from EDPB, but 
only soft law 
Not addressed in 
proposals 
Amend the DSA: 
• Develop design guidelines on consent 
forms, improve enforcement (European 
authority),  
• Legal status of Guidelines - to improve 
consideration by judge/national authority  
• Interface with opt-out; provide tool to 
enable consumers to report websites 
infringing guidelines 
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Problem Causes Objectives 
Existing legal 
instruments  
Proposed solutions  
(DMA/DSA) 
Proposed further solutions  
Inappropriate 
targeting of minors 
Insufficient legal 
framework 
Protect minors GDPR: children cannot 
give consent - AVMSD for 
VSPs: specific protection 
for minors 
Not addressed in 
proposals 
• Include in DSA similar provisions as in 
Article 28(b)(2) AVMS for VSP: prohibition to 




advertisers), creates a 
possible dilution of 
responsibility 
Linked to nature of the 
market 
Make sure that 






by all actors in 




GDPR (notion of joint 
controller) 
AVMS, DSA, CDR, UCPD  
Any legal obligation 
contained in the DSA 
should be extended to 
other 
websites/publishers 
(not in scope of DSA) 
and to ad 
intermediaries 
• Make sure that the personal scope of 
application of the rules fits by possibly 
proposing legislation to mirror obligations 
of the DSA for websites/publishers and ad 
sector 
• Clarify that Article 5.3 of the DSA should 
also apply when consumers are led to 
believe that the platform is organising the 
advertising itself. This will provide an 




exploit market power 
and to raise prices 
and limit choice 
Concentration of 
intermediaries - 







Not addressed Transparency on price 
(Article 5g) and 
performance in DMA for 
gatekeeper platforms -  
to be given to 
advertiser 
• Adequately addressed in DMA  
• Case by case intervention under 
competition law, where needed 
Ad fraud Lack of information 
about source of 
clicks/revenues 
Transparency 
about source of 
clicks/revenues 
Not addressed Access to performance 
measuring tool in DMA 
(Article 6.1g) 
• Adequately addressed in DMA  
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Problem Causes Objectives 
Existing legal 
instruments  
Proposed solutions  
(DMA/DSA) 




players / make it 
more expensive to 
launch new services 
Lack of transparency in 






intervene if it 
has the effect of 
excluding SMEs 
Not addressed Not entirely covered by 
the DMA  
Price determination 
process (including role 
of quality) for auctions 
not covered 
Add to the proposed transparency obligations 
in the DMA: 
• Auction criteria used by the ad-tech 
platform service that include details of the 
price components (CPC, CPI, CPM) as well 
as other factors which are taken into 
account in the auction process and their 
weighting. 
• Obligations to provide B2B side 
performance data 
Asymmetric access to 





Large customer base and 
data sets controlled by 
gatekeeper platforms / 





Not addressed Data Governance Act 
will not address data 
sharing. DMA has some 
data provisions for 
gatekeepers (for 
search). Forthcoming 
Data Act may include 




6,1d) may help in some 
cases. P2B Regulation 
addresses need to be 
transparent in T&C on 
data sharing situation 
• To be further analysed 
• DMA may help advertising linked to search, 
but problem not wholly solved.  
May be partly addressed if targeted 
advertising declines in importance.  
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Problem Causes Objectives 
Existing legal 
instruments  
Proposed solutions  
(DMA/DSA) 
Proposed further solutions  
Lack of clarity on 
functioning of 
internal market 
clause in relation to 
advertising 
Conditions for 
derogations are wide and 




eCommerce Directive Not addressed in 
proposals 
• Amend eCommerce Directive  (possibly 
through DSA) by introducing more 
effective procedural rules to derogation 
procedure of Article 3 
• Through EU-wide codes of conduct list 
types of national derogations that could be 
applied to cross-border advertising. These 
codes could be ‘vetted’ by the European 
Commission 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration.  
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ANNEX 1: LEGISLATIVE MEASURES AND PROPOSALS 
Specific measures applicable to advertising in the digital environment 
a) eCommerce Directive  
1. Nature and scope 
The eCommerce Directive388 aims at harmonising certain legal aspects of information society services 
i.e. those that are necessary to establish an adequate level of confidence for users to make use of online 
services and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market389 (minimum harmonisation). 
Commercial communications, including unsolicited commercial communications by electronic mail 
are among these harmonised areas390.  
The eCommerce Directive applies to “information society services”. This refers to “any service normally 
provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a 
recipient of services”391, regardless of whether the recipient is a consumer or a trader. The eCommerce 
applies both to B2B (professional to professional) and B2C (professional to consumer) relationships. 
The concept of “commercial communications” is defined broadly as “any form of communication 
designed to promote, directly or indirectly, the goods, services or image of a company, organisation or 
person pursuing a commercial, industrial or craft activity or exercising a regulated profession”392.  
2. Substantial measures (relevant for targeted advertising) 
Article 6 of the eCommerce Directive creates various identification and transparency requirements for 
commercial communications which are part of, or constitute, an information society service. The 
commercial communication must be clearly identifiable as such393. The person on whose behalf the 
commercial communication is made must be clearly identifiable394. Furthermore, the eCommerce 
Directive requires promotional offers, such as rebates, and promotional competitions or games, to be 
clearly identifiable and the associated conditions easily accessible and presented clearly and 
unambiguously395. 
Article 7 contains additional requirements regarding unsolicited commercial communications sent by 
electronic mails. The commercial communication shall be clearly and unambiguously identifiable as 
such as soon as it is received by the recipient396. Moreover, the service provider using such way to 
                                                             
388  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2000, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ L 178 
of 17.07.2000 (hereafter the “eCommerce Directive”). 
389  eCommerce Directive, Recital 10. 
390  eCommerce Directive, Recitals 29 to 31. 
391  eCommerce Directive, Article 2(a) referring to the definition of “information society services” laid down in Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC 
(European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 1998, Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations, OJ L 204 of 
21.07.1998), as amended by Directive 98/48/EC (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 1998, Directive 98/48/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998 amending Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the provision 
of information in the field of technical standards and regulations, OJ L 217 of 5.08.1998). The Directive 98/34/EC is no longer in force and 
has been replaced by Directive (EU) 2015/1535 (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2015, Directive (EU) 
2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information 
in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services, OJ L 241 of 17.09.2015). The definition of the concept of 
“information society services” is now provided in Article 1(b) of the new Directive, but remains identical. 
392  eCommerce Directive, Article 2(f). 
393  eCommerce Directive, Article 6(a). 
394  eCommerce Directive, Article 6(b). 
395  eCommerce Directive, Article 6(c) and (d). 
396  eCommerce Directive, Article 7(a). 
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communicate shall consult regularly the opt-out registers, in which the recipients (natural persons) 
who do not wish to receive such communications can register, and respect such a choice397. The 
ePrivacy Directive (see below) has however consecrated an opt-in principle.  
Article 8 of the eCommerce Directive is on the use of commercial communications by regulated 
professions (such as dentists, pharmacists, lawyers, etc.)398. It creates a positive obligation for the 
Member States. They have to authorise the regulated professions to use the commercial 
communications which are part of, or constitute, an information society service. Such use shall 
nevertheless comply with the professional rules regarding, in particular, the independence, dignity and 
honor of the profession, professional secrecy and fairness towards clients and other members of the 
profession399. The establishment of codes of conduct at a European level is also promoted400. 
In addition, the internal market clause of Article 3 of the eCommerce Directive provides that 
information society service providers are subject to the law of the Member State in which it is 
established401, for the areas that are in the “coordinated field”. This “coordinated field” covers 
requirements with which the service provider has to comply in respect of “the pursuit of the activity of 
an information society service, such as requirements […] regarding the quality or content of the service 
including those applicable to advertising […]”402. As a consequence, therefore the service provider 
needs to comply with the law applicable to advertising according to legislation of the Member State 
where the service provider is established, and not with law of the Member State where the service is 
proposed (country of destination). 
3. Enforcement and penalties 
According to the directive, infringements to the principles laid down in the Directive must be 
sanctioned according to rules in the Member States. Sanctions must however be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive403. 
b) P2B Regulation 
1. Nature and scope 
The Regulation on platform to business relations (hereafter the “P2B Regulation”)404 deals with the 
relationships between online intermediation services or online search engines and professional users 
of those online services. The P2B Regulation aims at addressing “potential frictions” that can exist in 
                                                             
397  eCommerce Directive, Article 7(b). 
398  Article 2(g) of the eCommerce Directive refers to the definition provided several directives that have been replaced by Directive 
2005/36/EC (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2005, Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, OJ L 255 of 30.09.2005); Article 3, paragraph 1(a) of this 
new directive defines the “regulated profession” as follows : “a professional activity or group of professional activities, access to which, 
the pursuit of which, or one of the modes of pursuit of which is subject, directly or indirectly, by virtue of legislative, regulatory or 
administrative provisions to the possession of specific professional qualifications; in particular, the use of a professional title limited by 
legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions to holders of a given professional qualification shall constitute a mode of pursuit. 
Where the first sentence of this definition does not apply, a profession referred to in paragraph 2 shall be treated as a regulated 
profession”. 
399  eCommerce Directive, Article 8(1). 
400  eCommerce Directive, Article 8(2). 
401  eCommerce Directive, Article 3(1). 
402  eCommerce Directive, Article 2(h). 
403  eCommerce Directive, Article 20. 
404  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2019, Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services, OJ L 186 of 
11.7.2019. 
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those relationships405. It establishes, at a European level, a set of mandatory rules aiming “to ensure a 
fair, predictable, sustainable and trusted online business environment within the internal market”, so 
that professional users of the online intermediation services are granted “appropriate transparency, as 
well as effective redress possibilities406. 
The P2B Regulation applies to online intermediation services and online search engines provided to 
business users and corporate website users407.  
“Online intermediation services” are defined as follows: (1) they are information society services408; (2) 
those services “allow business users to offer goods or services to consumers, with a view to facilitating 
the initiating of direct transactions between those business users and consumers, irrespective of where 
those transactions are ultimately concluded” and (3) “they are provided to business users on the basis 
of contractual relationships between the provider of those services and business users which offer 
goods or services to consumers”409. The “business user”, under the P2B Regulation, is “any private 
individual acting in a commercial or professional capacity who, or any legal person which, through 
online intermediation services offers goods or services to consumers for purposes relating to its trade, 
business, craft or profession”410.  
The “online search engine” is the “digital service that allows users to input queries in order to perform 
searches of, in principle, all websites, or all websites in a particular language, on the basis of a query on 
any subject in the form of a keyword, voice request, phrase or other input, and returns results in any 
format in which information related to the requested content can be found”411. The websites 
concerned are particularly those of corporate website users. A “corporate website user” is defined as 
“any natural or legal person which uses an online interface, meaning any software, including a website 
or a part thereof and applications, including mobile applications, to offer goods or services to 
consumers for purposes relating to its trade, business, craft or profession”412. 
The relationships considered are business (platform) to business (professional users) relationships as 
long as the business users concerned target consumers through their use of the online platform 
services. 
2. Substantial measures (relevant for targeted advertising) 
Both online intermediation services and online search engine must inform their professional users of 
the main parameters determining ranking413 and the importance of those main parameters (including 
on the possibility to influence ranking against remuneration)414 415. 
                                                             
405  P2B Regulation, Recital 2. 
406  P2B Regulation, Recital 7. 
407  P2B Regulation, Article 1, paragraph 2. 
408  As defined in point (b) of Article 1(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535. 
409  P2B Regulation, Article 2(2). 
410  P2B Regulation, Article 2(1). 
411  P2B Regulation, Article 2(5). 
412  P2B Regulation, Article 2(7). 
413  The concept of “ranking” refers to “the relative prominence given to the goods or services offered through online intermediation services, 
or the relevance given to search results by online search engines, as presented, organised or communicated by the providers of online 
intermediation services or by providers of online search engines, respectively, irrespective of the technological means used for such 
presentation, organisation or communication” (P2B Regulation, Article 2(8)). 
414  As explained in European Commission, 2020, Guidelines of 7 December 2020 on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 
2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ C 424/1 of 8.12.2020 
415  P2B Regulation, Article 5. 
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Under the P2B Regulation, they must also inform their professional users about any differentiated 
treatment which they may give, in relation to goods or services offered to consumers, through their 
services416.  
Finally, terms and conditions of online intermediation services must contain a description of technical 
and contractual access, if any, to personal data and/or other data provided by users when using the 
service or generated through the use of the services417. 
The drawing up of codes of conduct by providers of online intermediation services together with 
business users and by online search engines shall be encouraged in order to ensure the proper 
application of the P2B Regulation418. 
3. Enforcement and penalties 
The Member States must ensure accurate and effective enforcement of the P2B Regulation419. They are 
not obliged neither to create new enforcement bodies (they can entrust existing authorities for 
ensuring such an implementation) nor to provide for ex officio enforcement or to impose fines420. Each 
Member State determines which measures shall apply to infringements to the P2B Regulation. Those 
measures must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive421. 
c) DSA Proposal  
1. Nature and scope 
The Commission’s proposed Digital Services Act422 (DSA) takes the form of a Regulation, which means 
that it will be directly applicable in the Member States’ legal order. The DSA covers technical 
intermediaries (such as internet access providers), hosting service providers (which include advertising 
servers), online platforms (that disseminate content to the public) as well as very large online platforms 
(VLOP) that have more than 45 million monthly active users in the EU423. 
2. Substantial measures (relevant for targeted advertising) 
The proposed DSA contains rules which differ according to the size of the online platform. 
The rules are aimed to make sure that users receive more information to help them make use of their 
rights as data subjects. This added transparency is also intended to enable the scrutiny by authorities 
and vetted researchers on how advertisements are displayed and how they are targeted.  
In addition to the requirements resulting from Article 6 of the eCommerce Directive, all online 
platforms would be required424 to ensure that the recipients of the service receive individualised 
information so that they can identify, for each specific advertisement displayed to each individual 
recipient, in a clear and unambiguous manner and in real time: 
• that the information displayed is an advertisement; 
                                                             
416  P2B Regulation, Article 7. 
417  P2B Regulation, Article 9. 
418  P2B Regulation, Article 17. 
419  P2B Regulation, Article 15(1). 
420  P2B Regulation, Recital 46. 
421  P2B Regulation, Article 15(2). 
422  European Commission, 2020, Proposal of the Commission of 15 December 2020 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, COM(2020) 825 final, 2020/0361 
(COD).. 
423  Article 1 of the proposed DSA. 
424  Article 24 of the proposed DSA. 
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• the (natural or legal) person on whose behalf the advertisement is displayed; and 
• meaningful information about the main parameters used to determine the recipient to whom 
the advertisement is displayed (for targeted advertising). 
VLOPs would have to comply with additional rules and in particular would have to compile and make 
publicly available through application programming interfaces (APIs) a repository containing certain 
information, while also making sure that the repository does not contain any personal data. The 
repository would have to contain at least the content of the advertisement; the person on whose behalf 
the advertisement is displayed; the period during which the advertisement was displayed; whether the 
advertisement was intended to be displayed specifically to one or more particular groups of recipients 
of the service and if so, the main parameters used; the total number of recipients reached and, where 
applicable, aggregate numbers for the group or groups of recipients to whom the advertisement was 
targeted specifically425. The Commission would have to support and promote the development of 
voluntary industry standards to ensure the interoperability of these repositories426.  
The Commission would have to encourage and facilitate the development of codes of conduct at EU 
level to support and complement the transparency obligations relating to advertisements with 
transparency obligations that would go beyond the imposed rules427. 
3. Enforcement and penalties 
The Member States where the provider is mainly established would be in charge of enforcement.428 
Member States would have to designate one or more competent authorities who would be responsible 
for the application and enforcement of the rules. One of these competent authorities would have to be 
designated as the Digital Service Coordinator (DSC) at the national level. DSCs would be given a set of 
far-reaching investigation and enforcement powers (including power to request information, on-site 
inspections, power to accept commitments from providers and to make them binding, to order the 
cessation of infringements and to impose fines)429. 
For VLOPs, the proposal sets-out an enhanced supervision system, whereby the DSC of the country of 
establishment could be asked either by the Commission or by a newly created European Board for 
Digital Services to investigate a suspected infringement. Where infringements persist, the Commission 
could itself intervene and the DSC would be removed from the case. In case of non-compliance with 
the regulation, interim measures or binding commitments, the Commission can adopt a non-
compliance decision ordering the VLOPs to comply and may fine or impose periodic payments. 
The level of fine is different according to whether VLOPs are involved or not. 
• For VLOPs, the Commission would be able to impose fines up to 6% of the company total 
turnover in the preceding financial year. Periodic penalty payments up to 5% of the company 
average daily turnover in the preceding financial year per day may also be imposed under 
conditions. 
• For other providers, Member States would have to determine the rules and levels of fines but 
the proposals sets that fines imposed by Member States could not exceed those specified for 
VLOPs430.  
                                                             
425  Article 30 of the proposed DSA. 
426  Article 34 of the proposed DSA. 
427  Article 36 of the proposed DSA. 
428  Article 38.1 of the proposed DSA. 
429  Article 38 and 41 of the proposed DSA. 
430  Article 42 of the proposed DSA. 
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d) DMA Proposal 
1. Nature and scope 
The Commission’s proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA) would also take the form of a Regulation431. It 
would apply to Core Platform Services (CPS) designated by the Commission as gatekeepers, which are 
offered to business user or end-users that are located in the EU, irrespective of the place of 
residence/establishment of the gatekeeper432. These CPS would be listed in an exhaustive manner in 
the proposed DMA and include for instance: 
• online intermediation services, as defined in the Platform to Business Regulation (see above); 
• online search engines, also defined in the Platform to Business Regulation; 
• online social networking services; 
• video-sharing platform services (as defined in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (see 
below); 
• number-independent interpersonal communication services, as defined in the European 
Electronic Communications Code; and 
• advertising services, including advertising intermediation services, as long as they are offered 
by providers of the above services. 
2. Substantial measures (relevant for targeted advertising) 
Under the proposed DMA, gatekeeper platforms would have to submit to the Commission an 
independently audited description of any consumer profiling techniques they use433. Also, they would 
not be allowed to combine personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data 
from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party 
services, unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice434. This could limit the ability 
of gatekeeper platforms to engage in targeted and personalised advertising which draw on data from 
multiple sources.  
The other rules are mainly aimed at providing more transparency in the relationship between business 
users i.e. between the gatekeepers and the advertisers and publishers: 
• Gatekeepers would also have to provide information to advertisers and publishers (if they ask 
for it) on the price paid by each of them, as well as the amount or remuneration paid to the 
publisher, for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services 
provided by the gatekeeper435; 
• Subject to regulatory dialogue, gatekeepers could also be asked to provide advertisers and 
publishers, upon their request and free of charge, with access to the performance measuring 
tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry 
out their own independent verification of the ad inventory436; and 
                                                             
431  European Commission, 2020, Proposal of the Commission of 15 December 2020 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act), COM(2020) 842 final, 2020/0374 (COD). 
432  Articles 1 and 2 of the proposed DMA. 
433  Article 13 of the proposed DMA. 
434  Article 5(a) of the proposed DMA. 
435  Article 5(g) of the proposed DMA. 
436  Article 6(g) of the proposed DMA. 
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• Subject to regulatory dialogue, gatekeepers should also refrain from the ability to engage in 
self-preferencing in relation for instance to the ranking of their products and services compared 
to products and services of third parties437.  
3. Enforcement and penalties 
The European Commission would be the competent regulatory body to enforce the DMA438. The 
Commission would have the power to develop, through delegated and implementing acts, further 
aspects of the DMA, such as the list of gatekeepers’ obligations439. It would have the power to request 
information from all undertakings, conduct on-site inspections and order interim measures. The 
Commission could also make binding commitments proposed by gatekeepers. In case of non-
compliance, the Commission could order the gatekeeper to comply with its obligations and impose 
fines of up to 10% of the gatekeeper’s total annual (global) turnover440. Other infringements (e.g. failure 
to provide access to databases or algorithms, failure to notify that the provider meets the thresholds 
to be presumed as gatekeeper) could lead to a fine of up to 1% of the gatekeeper’s total annual 
turnover441. Further, the Commission could impose periodic penalty payments of up to 5% of the 
average daily turnover442.  
e) ePrivacy (and Proposal) 
1. Nature and scope 
The ePrivacy Directive443 applies to the processing of personal data in the electronic communication 
sector but it also contains rules on use of cookies, which might be necessary for personalised and 
targeted advertising. These rules on cookies protect the terminal equipment of end users. A new e-
privacy Regulation444 is currently being negotiated between the European Parliament and the Council. 
The Council reached a general agreement on the text on 10 February 2021, which means that 
negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council can now start.  
2. Substantial measures (relevant for targeted advertising) 
The main provision of interest is the one which provides that the storing of information, or the gaining 
of access to information already stored on a device (e.g. third party cookies, accessing pictures on a 
mobile phone) unless the user has given his consent; or when this storage is necessary for the 
transmission of a communication, or to provide an information society service requested by the user445. 
With regard to unsolicited communications (by email, for instance), ePrivacy Directive sets forth the 
opt-in principle (prior consent of the users), with some exceptions446. 
                                                             
437  Article 6(d) of the proposed DMA. 
438  Article 18 of the proposed DMA. 
439  Article 37 of the proposed DMA. 
440  Article 26 of the proposed DMA. 
441  Article 26 of the proposed DMA. 
442  Article 27 of the proposed DMA. 
443  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2002, Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201 of 31.7.2002. 
444  European Commission, 2017, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private 
life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC, COM(2017) 10 final - 
2017/0003 (COD). 
445  Article 15.3 of the ePrivacy Directive. 
446  Article 13 of the ePrivacy Directive. 
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The regulation proposed by the European Commission foresees that the use of the processing and 
storage capabilities of a device and the collection of information from that device (i.e. device 
fingerprinting) is also prohibited (with the same exceptions except that first party web-audience 
measuring would be allowed). Under the proposed regulation, software permitting electronic 
communications (e.g. operating systems, browsers and other applications) would have to require 
users, upon installation, to choose whether they want to prevent third parties from storing information 
on their device (e.g. third party cookies); or processing information stored on their device447. 
3. Enforcement and penalties 
Enforcement is left to the Member States which need to specify the rules rules on penalties, including 
criminal sanctions where appropriate. They must also ensure, without prejudice to any judicial remedy 
which might be available, that the competent national authority and, where relevant, other national 
bodies have the power to order the cessation of the infringements. Member States must ensure that 
the competent national authority and, where relevant, other national bodies have the necessary 
investigative powers and resources, including the power to obtain any relevant information they might 
need to monitor and enforce national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive448. 
Under the proposed regulation, the authorities in charge would be the same as under the GDRP449. 
Fines would also be set which may do up to 4% of the total world annual turnover of the company450. 
General measures applicable to advertising 
a) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
1. Nature and scope  
The Unfair Commercial Practice Directive451 (UCPD) is a full/maximal harmonisation directive452; 
therefore, the Member States cannot adopt national rules having a higher or lower consumer 
protection level. The directive was recently amended by the Better Enforcement Directive453.  
The UCPD applies to unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices. The concept of “commercial 
practices” is defined broadly: advertising and marketing related to products are expressly included, 
regardless of whether these activities are carried out online or offline454. Personal scope is limited to 
B2C relationships (from a trader to a consumer)455.  
 
                                                             
447  Article 8 of the proposed ePrivacy Regulation. 
448  Article 15a of ePrivacy Directive. 
449  Article 18 of the proposed ePrivacy Regulation. 
450  Article 23 of the proposed ePrivacy Regulation. 
451  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2005, Directive 2005/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, OJ L 149 of 11.06.2005.. On this 
Directive, please refer to European Commission, 2016, Commission Staff Working Document, Guidance on the implementation/application 
of Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices, SWD(2016) 163 final; J. Stuyck, J., and Straetmans, G., 2016, (ed.), Commercial 
practices, Gent, Larcier. 
452  UCPD, Article 4. 
453  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2019, Directive 2019/2161 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 November 2019 amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directives 98/6/EC, 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards the better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules, OJ L 328 of 
18.12.2019. 
454  UCPD, Article 3 and Article 2(d) (definition of the “commercial practice”). 
455  UCPD, Article 2(a) and (b). 
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2. Substantial measures 
Three kinds of commercial practices are considered as unfair under UCPD and, therefore, prohibited456: 
(i) misleading or aggressive practices listed in Annex I that must in all circumstances be regarded as 
unfair; (ii) misleading or aggressive practices prohibited under semi-general clauses of Articles 6 to 9; 
and (iii) practices prohibited under the general clause of Article 5(2). Various practices related to 
advertising and, in particular, targeted advertising, may fall under the scope of the UCPD and should 
therefore be assessed under this three step test. Among others, direct exhortation to children, included 
in an advertisement, to buy a product, or persistent and unwanted solicitations by email must be 
considered as unfair commercial practices under all circumstances457. Misleading omissions may also be 
qualified as unfair practices (under the semi-general clause), especially when information requirements 
prescribed by Union Law in the field of advertising or advertising are violated458. Following the 
modifications introduced by the Better Enforcement Directive, the main parameters used for ranking 
of product and their importance are considered as material information under UPCD if the consumers 
have the possibility to search products on the basis of a query459.    
Self-regulation and codes of conducts (especially relevant in the context of advertising)460 are also 
promoted.  
3. Sanctions and enforcement 
Adequate and effective means should be implemented by the Member States to ensure that the 
practices carried out on the market comply with the rules of the UCPD. Special attention is paid to the 
burden of proof of factual claims: the trader may be requested to provide the evidence and, in case he 
fails to, the claim should be considered as inaccurate461. Effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
penalties should also be laid down462. Following the Better Enforcement Directive, criteria to be taken 
into account for the imposition of penalties are listed, and the possibility to impose fines calculated on 
trader’s annual turnover is expressly mentioned. 
b) Directive on misleading and comparative advertising 
1. Nature and scope 
Under the Directive on misleading and comparative advertising463, traders are protected against 
misleading advertising464 (from other traders), while the practice of comparative advertising465 (in B2B 
or B2C relationships) is permitted, under specific requirements.  
 
                                                             
456  UCPD, Article 5. 
457  UCPD, Annex I. 
458  UCPD, Article 7(5) and Annex II (where a non-exhaustive list of the Union Law instruments in relation to commercial communication is 
provided). 
459  UCPD, new Article 7(4a). This paragraph does not apply to providers of online search engines, as defined in Article 2 (6) of the P2B 
Regulation.  Cf. also new point 11a of the Annex, related to paid advertisement or payment specifically for achieving higher ranking of 
products within the search results. 
460  See for instance the ICC Code (2018). 
461  UCPD, Article 12. 
462  UCPD, Article 13. 
463  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2006, Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2006 concerning misleading and comparative advertising (codified version), OJ L 376 of 27.12.2006. 
464  Directive on misleading and comparative advertising, Article 2(b). 
465  Directive on misleading and comparative advertising, Article 2(c). 
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2. Substantial measures 
In order to determine whether advertising is misleading, three main criteria, related to the 
characteristics of goods and services, the price and the advertiser, are laid down in Article 3. 
Comparative advertising is authorised, provided three conditions (e.g. it compares goods or services 
meeting the same needs), and five prohibitions (e.g. it is not misleading or it does not create confusion 
among traders), are respected466.  
3. Enforcement and penalties 
Some key principles, also laid down in the UCPD, can be found in the Directive on misleading and 
comparative advertising: adequate and effective means to be taken by the Member States467, evidence 
to be provided by the advertiser468. Voluntary controls, by self-regulatory bodies, are also encouraged. 
c) Consumer Rights Directive 
1. Nature and scope 
As for the UCPD, the Consumer Rights Directive (CRD)469 is a Directive of maximal harmonisation470. 
Hence, Member States are not allowed to adopt national rules that have a higher or lower level of 
consumer protection. The CRD was also amended in 2019, by the Better Enforcement Directive471.  
The CRD applies to the conclusion of sales and services contracts, between consumers and professional 
traders472. Advertising and marketing materials may be included in its scope, when they lead to the 
conclusion of contracts between consumers and traders.  
2. Substantial measures 
The CRD ensures that consumers are provided with a minimum set of information before being bound 
by a contract with a professional trader. Among other things, the trader must provide consumers with 
information about the main characteristics of the goods or services, the identity of the trader, the total 
price of the goods or services, etc.473. There are further transparency requirements in the context of off-
premises and distance contracts, including contracts concluded online474. Since some information 
requirements must be fulfilled before the conclusion of the agreement, they could be relevant for 
advertising materials, when such materials lead to the conclusion of contracts between consumers and 
professional traders. 
Following the modifications introduced by the Better Enforcement Directive, the CRD makes it 
mandatory to inform consumers when prices were personalised by means of automated decision 
                                                             
466  Directive on misleading and comparative advertising, Article 4. 
467  Article 5 of the Directive. 
468  Article 7 of the Directive. 
469  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2011, Directive 2011/83 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 October 2011 on consumer rights, OJ L 304 of 22.11.2011.. On this Directive, please refer to European Commission, 2014, “DG Justice 
Guidance Document concerning Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer 
rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing 
Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council”, June 2014. 
470  CRD, Article 4. 
471  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2019, Directive 2019/2161 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 November 2019 amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directives 98/6/EC, 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards the better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules, OJ L 328 of 
18.12.2019. 
472  CRD, Article 3. 
473  CRD, Article 5. 
474  CRD, Article 6. 
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making, before the conclusion of a distance contract475. Since prices may be automatically personalised 
in advertising materials displayed to consumers, this modification of the CRD may be of relevance. In 
addition, if the contract is concluded on online market places, the provider must inform consumers 
about the main parameters used for the ranking of offers and their relative importance476. Where the 
ranking of offers is notably based on advertising, this provision of the CRD may prove relevant as well.  
3. Enforcement and penalties 
As for the UPCD, adequate and effective means should be implemented by the Member States to 
ensure the compliance with the Directive477. The burden of proof is upon the traders, regarding their 
information obligations478. In addition, the Directive states that effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
penalties should be laid down in national laws479. Following the modifications brought by the Better 
Enforcement Directive, criteria to take into account for the imposition of penalties are now listed in the 
CRD, and the possibility to impose fines calculated on trader’s annual turnover is detailed480. 
d) GDPR  
1. Nature and scope 
The General Data Protection Regulation481 (GDPR) applies to the (wholly or partly automated 
processing of personal data482. Both processing and personal data are broadly defined concepts that 
encompass a large scope of operations, including profiling483, which imply use of information relating 
to identified or identifiable natural person484. Personal scope of the Regulation is not limited to B2C 
relationships. The Regulation applies to relationship between data controllers (i.e. any entities 
determining purposes and means data processing operations), processors and data subjects485. Hence 
this Regulation applies to advertising practices as long as they imply use of personal data.  
2. Substantial measures 
Any data processing operation must comply with a set of principles enshrined in Article 5 of the 
Regulation which include transparency fairness and purpose limitation. Controllers must be able to 
demonstrate compliance with these principles486 and ensure that processing operation are by design 
compliant with these principles487. Data processing must also rely on a lawful ground enshrined in the 
GDPR. In this context, and depending on intrusiveness of the processing, legitimate interest of the 
controllers or consent of the data subject seems to be the only available grounds for processing related 
                                                             
475  CRD, new Article 6, paragraph 1, (ea). 
476  CRD, new Article 6a, paragraph 1, (a). 
477  CRD, Article 23. 
478  CRD, Article 6. 
479  CRD, Article 24. 
480  CRD, new Article 24. 
481  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2016, Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, OJ L 119 of 04.05.2016. 
482  GDPR, Article 2 (1).  
483  GDPR, Article 4( 4) (definition of “profiling”).  
484  GDPR, Article 4(1) (definition of “personal data”) and Article 4(2) (definition of “processing”). Also see GDPR, Recital 26 on the broad 
definition of “personal data”. 
485  GDPR, Article 4(7) (definition of “controller”) and Article 4, 8) (definition of “controller”). The GDPR also applies to joint controllers scenarios 
(i.e. when two or more entities jointly determine the purposes and means of processing operations). See GDPR, Article 26.  
486  GDPR, Article 5(2).  
487  GDPR, Article 25.  
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to targeted advertising488. Use of sensitive data, even inferred489, such as health data, or political 
opinion related data also requires explicit consent. Requirements for valid consent are however 
demanding490. In addition to information right491, and depending on the lawful ground for processing, 
controllers must grant data subjects rights which empower users facing online advertising. These rights 
include the right to withdraw consent, the right to erasure and the right to object to processing for 
marketing purposes492. Among their various obligations, controllers must assess the risks to the rights 
and freedoms carried by their processing activities and may be required to conduct a data protection 
impact assessment (DPIA)493. DPIA may be necessary, for instance when advertising practices target 
vulnerable data subjects such as children494 and imply profiling and combination of datasets from 
different sources495. Finally, the GDPR entails data subjects with the right not to be subject to fully 
automated decision to present adverting with far reaching effects if it, for instance take profit of the 
data subject’s vulnerabilities496.  
3. Enforcement and penalties 
Member States are required to establish at least one independent supervisory authority to monitor the 
application of the GDPR497. National supervisory authorities have the power to adopt corrective 
measures including ban on processing activities and imposing effective proportionate and dissuasive 
administrative fines498. Administrative fines may be calculated on the basis of the annual turnover of 
data controllers/processors499. Criteria to be taken into account for the imposition of penalties are also 
listed500. Additionally, the Regulation ensures that data subjects can obtain compensation for any 
damage caused by an infringement to the GDPR requirements501. Member States shall lay down 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for additional infringement such as those which may 
not be subject to administrative fines502.  
e) AVMS 
1. Nature and scope 
The Audiovisual Media Services Directive as amended in 2018503 is a minimum harmonisation directive, 
meaning that the Member States are allowed to introduce more detailed or stricter provisions than the 
minimum set of rules it contains. 
                                                             
488  See European Data Protection Board, 2020, Guidelines 8/2020 on the targeting of social media users, 2 September 2020; European Data 
Protection Board, 2019, Guidelines2/2019 on the processing of personal data under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR in the context of the provision 
of online services to data subjects, 8 October2019.  
489  S. Wachter, S.,2020, ‘Affinity Profiling and Discrimination by Association in Online Behavioural Advertising’,  pp. 17-22.  
490  GDPR, Article 4.11) (definition of “consent”).  
491  GDPR, Article 13 and Article 14.  
492  GDPR, Article 7(3), Article 17 and Article 21(1).  
493  GDPR, Article 35.  
494  GDPR, Recitals 38 and 75.  
495  See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2017, Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether 
processing is “likely to result in a high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 4 October 2017, WP 248rev.01. 
496  GDPR, Article 22; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2018, Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for 
the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 3 October 2018, WP251rev.01.  
497  GDPR, Article 51(1).  
498  GDPR, Article 58(2). 
499  GDPR, Article 83(4), Article 83(5) and Article 83(6).  
500  GDPR, Article 83(2) and Article 83(3).  
501  GDPR, Article 82.  
502  GDPR, Article 84. 
503  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2010, Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (codified version), OJ L 095 of 15.4.2010. 
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It was amended in 2018 and now includes rules that need to be complied with by video-sharing 
platforms (VSPs). VSPs are defined as providers of a service (provided for remuneration) or a dissociable 
section of a service; whose principal purpose “or an essential functionality” is to provide programmes, 
user-generated videos or both to inform, entertain or educate the public; where no editorial 
responsibility is exercised by the provider who however determines its organisation, including by 
automatic means or algorithms (in particular by displaying, tagging and sequencing); by an electronic 
communication network. 
2. Substantial measures 
On advertising, there are two sets of rules504.  
First, for commercial communications that marketed, sold or arranged by the platforms themselves, 
they need to respect the basic qualitative standards that apply to linear and linear broadcasters505 i.e. 
they cannot: 
• use surreptitious, use subliminal techniques (or must be readily recognisable as such); 
• prejudice respect for human dignity, discriminate (or promote discrimination) on the basis of 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, nationality, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, or 
encourage behaviours prejudicial to health or safety or to the protection of the environment; 
• promote under prescription medicines or medical treatments, cigarettes (electronic cigarettes 
and refill containers) and other tobacco products, or promote alcohol by targeting specifically 
minors or by encouraging immoderate consumption; and 
• harm minors physically, morally or mentally, show them in dangerous situations, directly 
exhort them to buy or hire a product/service by exploiting their inexperience or credulity, or 
directly encourage them to persuade their parents or others to buy the product/service, or 
exploit the trust they have in parents, teachers, etc. 
Second, for other commercial communications (uploaded by users), VSPs need to take appropriate 
measures to make sure that users comply with the standards listed above. These measures can be for 
instance to include these standards in the service terms and conditions, having a functionality for 
uploaders to declare whether videos contain commercial communications (as far as they know or can 
be reasonably expected to know) and clearly informing viewers where content includes commercial 
communications, provided the unloader has declared it or there is knowledge. The measures must be 
proportionate and practicable taking into account the size of the VSP and the nature of the service. 
3. Enforcement and penalties 
According to the AVMS Directive, the assessment of whether the measures are appropriate needs to 
be carried out by the national regulatory authority of the Member State where the VSP is established506. 
Availability of out of court redress needs to be ensured. For the rest (penalties and other sanctions), 
Member States should decide. 
  
                                                             
504  Article 28b of AVMS Directive. 
505  Article 9(1) of AVMS Directive. 
506  Article 28b of AVMS Directive. 
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Tables 
1. Nature and scope 
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P2B Regulation Regulation Platform to Business (only when 
business users target 
consumers) 
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DSA Proposal Regulation Technical intermediaries (ISPs) 
Hosting service providers 
Online platforms 
Very large online platforms  
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Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
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2. Substantial measures 






















v    v v  
P2B 
Regulation 
v     v  
DSA 
Proposal 
v     v  
DMA 
Proposal 
















 v      
CRD v       











body at EU 
level 
AVMS v     v  
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
  
IPOL | Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
 
PE 662.913 134  





































 v v     
P2B 
Regulation 
 v v     
DSA Proposal v v v v   v 
DMA Proposal v (Commission 
to enforce) 
v v    
ePrivacy (incl. 
Proposal) 
v v v v 
(proposal) 












 v   v  v 
CRD  v v v v   
GDPR v v v v    
AVMS v v v     
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration. 
  
Online advertising: the impact of targeted advertising on advertisers, market access and consumer choice 
 
 135 PE 662.913 
ANNEX 2: CASE STUDIES 
Australia  
1. National context 
Consumer protection seems to be at the forefront of the need for a regulatory response to online 
advertising in Australia. Country-specific issues identified in academic literature507 concern 
predominantly industry transparency, disclosure, consent processes and compliance practices.  
The Australian Consumer Law (ACL) is part of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, which aims 
to protect consumers and ensure fair trading in Australia. It applies in the same way to all sectors and 
in all Australian jurisdictions, i.e., all consumers in Australia enjoy the same rights and all businesses 
have the same obligations, irrespective of which state or territory they engaged in transactions. The 
ACL covers general standards of business conduct, prohibits unfair trading practices, regulates specific 
types of business-to-consumer transactions, provides basic consumer guarantees for goods and 
services, and regulates the safety of consumer products and product-related services508. 
To tackle the issues arising from online advertising in both business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-
consumer (B2C) relations, the ACCC made a number of recommendations to the Australian 
Government as part of the Final Report of the Digital Platforms Inquiry509. A number of these 
recommendations have already been implemented by the Australian Government. 
Most notably, the News Media Bargaining Code510, overseen by the ACCC and the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), is a mandatory legislative code of practice aiming to 
address the bargaining power imbalance between news media businesses and major digital platforms 
such as Google and Facebook. It promotes fair and transparent negotiating practices in reaching 
commercial arrangements with Australian news media businesses. The Code constitutes a significant 
microeconomic reform highlighting the importance of well-resourced media diversity in Australia511. 
While the Australian Government has not yet ‘designated’ any digital platforms to participate in the 
scheme, the passing of legislation in February 2021 has already encouraged both Google and Facebook 
to successfully negotiate voluntary commercial agreements with a number of large and small 
Australian news businesses. 
Other measures relevant to online advertising include continued inquiries by the ACCC of core 
competition issues arising from online advertising512 or information and privacy issues513 addressed by 
the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC). 
                                                             
507  Mathews-Hunt, K., 2019, ‘CookieConsumer: Tracking online behavioural advertising in Australia’, Computer Law & Security Review 32, pp 
55-90. 
508  The Australian Consumer Law, Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.  
509  ACCC, 2019, Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report.  
510  ACCC, 2021, News media bargaining code.  
511  Australian Government, 2018, Parliament passes News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code, media release. 
512  ACCC, 2021, Lack of competition in ad tech affecting publishers, advertisers and consumers.  
513  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Targeted advertising: Your Rights.  
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2. Design and implementation of response 
Several market sector inquiries were launched by the ACCC to better understand the specific issues 
pertaining to online advertising. The Digital Platforms Inquiry between December 2017 and July 
2019 looked at the effect that digital search engines, social media platforms and other digital content 
aggregation platforms have on competition in media and advertising services markets514. The final 
report published in 2019 contains recommendations reflecting the issues arising from the growth of 
digital platforms515. The recommendation to address the imbalance in the bargaining relationship 
between these platforms and news media businesses recently materialised in the adoption of the News 
Media Bargaining Code. 
Another noteworthy inquiry is the inquiry into markets for the supply of digital platform services, 
which commenced in February 2020 and will continue until March 2025. The first report of this inquiry 
was released in September 2020 and provides an in-depth focus on online private messaging services 
in Australia. The second report, which considers mobile app marketplaces, is to be publicly released by 
the end of April 2021516. A separate ACCC inquiry into markets for the supply digital advertising 
technology services and digital advertising agency services released an interim report earlier this 
year, with a final report due to be publicly released in September517.  
Overall, many different regulatory measures have been adopted in Australia, some of which have not 
become law yet, since industry players are generally hesitant before any significant change. The 
Australian government was quite positive and accepted vast majority of proposals made by the ACCC’s 
Digital Platforms Inquiry. The cooperation between the key regulators and Australian Government 
Departments, i.e. the ACCC and the ACMA, the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, the 
Treasury and the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and 
Communications (DITRDC) as well as cooperation with overseas regulators went smoothly.  
In the case of the Bargaining Code, it was a challenge arriving at regulatory settings that struck an 
appropriate balance between the interest of different stakeholder groups, including digital platforms, 
news businesses and consumers – including around complex and contested issues such as commercial 
negotiations and data sharing of digital platforms. Even though the existing legislation had to be 
adjusted before adopting the Code, it took less than a year to adopt it in an accelerated procedure, 
since the Government requested an urgent response to the commercial challenges being faced by 
Australian news businesses518. 
While the speed of adopting the Bargaining Code turned out to be a challenging factor due to the need 
to get all the details right, other measures have taken longer to adopt, often because many 
stakeholders are usually involved. Bringing the necessary coalition of stakeholders affected by the 
measures can be time-consuming, but also helpful519. 
In its work on the Digital Platforms Inquiry and the Bargaining Code, the ACCC held a large number of 
meetings with the most affected stakeholders such as digital platforms, media outlets, other industry 
stakeholders and consumer groups to develop an accurate understanding of all relevant policy issues 
                                                             
514  ACCC, 2019, Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report. 
515  Ibid. 
516  ACCC, 2021, Digital platform services inquiry 2020-2025.  
517  ACCC, 2021, Digital advertising services inquiry.  
518  Interview with Andrew Sudol and David Abkiewicz, Directors of the Digital Platforms Branch of the Australian Competition & Consumer 
Commission (ACCC), 30/03/2021. 
519  Ibid. 
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and ensure the lowest possible burden when it comes to complying with the recommended regulatory 
measures520. 
The aim of many recommendations of the Digital Platforms Inquiry was to address privacy concerns, 
improve consumer protection, facilitate consumer choices, and boost competition, due to the ACCC’s 
finding that there is significant overlap and interaction between these goals. For example, 
strengthened privacy and data protection laws can also empower consumers to make more informed 
choices about how their data is processed. This, in turn, is likely to increase competition between digital 
platforms regarding the privacy dimension of their services. It may also encourage the emergence of 
alternative business models that generate value for, and from, consumers in other ways521.  
3. Analysis and Evaluation 
Before any legislation is passed into law in Australia, a regulatory impact statement must be issued. 
While measures aimed at promoting competition have a clear objective, it is hard to assess the results 
of the News Media Bargaining Code measure as it is too early in the process. While none of the other 
DPI recommendations have been made into law yet, when it comes to digital platforms issues, there is 
still robust public debate regarding data use and privacy.  
The most relevant Australian consumer law court cases related to issues of online advertising 
concerned alleged misleading conduct of digital platforms. In a case against Google from 2013, the 
Federal Court decided that search engines are not liable for misleading conduct of advertisers. The 
decision was subsequently upheld by the High Court522. In another case, the ACCC successfully argued 
against misleading conduct through algorithmic ranking of hotel room rates by Trivago which 
constituted a breach of the ACL523. Two cases concerning alleged misleading conduct relating to user 
data collection against Facebook524 and Google525 respectively are still pending before the Federal 
Court. 
  
                                                             
520  Ibid. 
521  Ibid. 
522  ACCC, 2013, Google appeal upheld, media release.  
523  ACCC, 2020, Trivago misled consumers about hotel room rates, media release.  
524  ACCC, 2020, ACCC alleges Google misled consumers about expanded use of personal data, media release.  
525  Ibid. 
IPOL | Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
 
PE 662.913 138  
Germany 
1. National context 
The main issues emerging from online advertising in Germany are trademarks and copyrights 
protection, market manipulation, unfair competition, youth protection, consumer protection, 
data protection and protection of personal rights526. These challenges are the result of misleading 
and aggressive practices, such as email ads, “key words ads”, pop-up advertisement, exit-intent pop-
ups, layer-ads, interstitials, re-marketing and ads on social media527. The increasing amount528 of 
omnipresent, personalised and misleading advertising, particularly via social media, is seen to bring 
considerable damages to consumers529. The most important legislation on online advertising is the law 
against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, UWG). The UWG prohibits 
advertising that unduly constrains consumers’ freedom of choice. This is the case if as a result of an 
aggressive business act by the entrepreneur the consumer is led to undertake a business act, which it 
would have not undertaken otherwise. In particular, an undue influence is considered the misuse by 
the entrepreneur of its position of power to exert pressure on the consumer and, as a result, constrain 
its ability to make an informed and thoughtful decision530. The General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) is the relevant regulatory response as regards aspects related to data protection. To be 
considered are also youth protection regulations and copyright and trademark laws, the Telemedia Act 
and the penal law.  
2. Design and implementation of response 
The current version of the UWG, initially elaborated in 2004, is the result of two major reforms in 
2008 and 2015531. The initial version integrated, as a result of the active participation of the civil society 
and academia in the course of the elaboration of the regulation532, several national laws into a unified 
legal framework, codified important case law, considerably increasing consumer protection by 
introducing a ‘black list’ and led to a high degree of liberalisation of competition law533. Significantly, 
the UWG of 2008 harmonised Germany’s legislation with EU law (most significantly Directive 
2005/29/EG) and strengthened the EU single market534.  
The UWG is not being implemented by authorities ex officio. Rather, it is enforced by the market 
participants in court via prohibitory injunctions. The latter is a rather unusual legal instrument in 
the German civil law in so far as it has legal effects for both process participants and third parties. The 
exclusively competent court of first instance is the district court (Landgericht). A more cost-effective 
alternative is the arbitration for dispute settlements at the chambers for industry and commerce. 
However, only traders who are in direct competition with the defendant and associations promoting 
commercial and industrial interests are entitled to apply.  
                                                             
526  Buse, N., 2021, Onlinewerbung- was ist erlaubt, was ist verboten?, Buse Herz Grunst Rechtsanwälte. 
527  Ibid.  
528  Weber, M., 2020, Werbemarkt in Deutschland um 1,9 Prozent gewachsen, W&V. 
529  Interview, Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 30.03.2021.  
530  Ibid. (Fn. 1).  
531  Teplitzky, O., Peifer, K.-N., & Leistner, M., 2020, Großkommentar zum Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb mit Nebengesetzen, 
Kommentar, Article 575.  
532  Köhler, H., Bornkamm, J., Henning-Bodewig, F., 2002, Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie zum Lauterkeitsrecht und eine UWG-Reform | WRP 2002, 
1317-1328. 
533  Wilde Beuger Solmecke Rechtsanwälte, 2021, Rechtsanwälte, Irreführende Werbung.  
534  Business-Wissen, 2008, Einheitliche Werberegeln für die ganze EU.  
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Moreover, the German system is characterised by self-regulation. Two advertising standards 
organisations – the German Advertising Standards Council and the Wettbewerbszentrale – deal with 
issues of social responsibility and unfair commercial practices by applying the UWG535. 
According to Article 2(1) no. 6, the UWG targets all natural and legal persons that undertake a business 
act within the framework of their commercial, trading or professional activities and all persons that act 
in the name of or on behalf of these persons. Consequently, the UWG has a broad scope of application 
and targets advertising networks, advertising firms and agencies, publishers and publishing platforms. 
The scope of this liability is not clearly determined by the UWG and is subject to case law536. The 
overall objective of the UWG is to protect consumers from undue business acts and the public interest 
in an undistorted competition (Article 1 UWG). The GDPR, which is directly applicable in Germany, 
focuses on aspects related to data protection and applies to targeted email advertising (Recital 47)537. 
Following its overall objective, the UWG exclusively targets entrepreneurs and provides a ‘black-list’ of 
undue business actions in the attachment to Article 3(3) UWG, which includes both misleading and 
aggressive commercial practices538. The rationale of this ‘black-list’ is to protect the consumers’ 
freedom of choice and its right to make an informed and thoughtful decision.  
3. Analysis and Evaluation 
The UWG has mainly implemented Directive 2005/29/EG, which sets EU-wide minimum standards, into 
national law. Going beyond the scope of application of the directive, Article 3(1) UWG covers C2B 
(consumer to business) relations, the point of reference being the perceptible impairment of consumer 
interests. In contrast, Article 5 of Directive 2005/29/EG more generally prohibits undue business 
practices539. Moreover, Article 7(2) no. 3 UWG already sees an unreasonable harassment in cases where 
businesses send consumers email ads without the latter’s prior explicit consent, whereas the EU 
requirements do not foresee such an ‘opt-in’ (Annex I, point 26)540. In response to misleading or 
aggressive commercial practices, the UWG foresees remedy claims and prohibitory injunctions (Article 
8), claims for damages (Article 9) and claims concerning the profits skimmed as a result of undue 
business practices. Moreover, as a result of data protection violations, the consumer has non-material 
damage claims, which result from the general right of privacy.  
Consumers viewed the development of the UWG favourably541. This can be attributed to the high 
quality of the regulatory response and consumers’ high willingness to pay “free of charge” services with 
private data542. While the regulatory response has had a positive impact on consumer protection and 
established a level playing field for market competitors543, the regulatory response is generally seen 
as being insufficient, in particular, given the surge of online advertising during the COVID-19 
pandemic. The advertising market share of online advertising has increased from 12% in 2019544 to 40% 
in 2020545.  
                                                             
535  European Advertising Standards Alliance, 2021, Members: Germany.  
536  Huber, D., 2021, Werbung im Internet: Ist das rechtlich zulässig?, IT-Recht Kanzlei zum Werberecht.  
537  Schürmann, K., 2020, E-Mail-Marketing ohne Einwilligung – was ist erlaubt?, Schürmann Rosenthal Dreyer Rechtsanwälte.  
538  Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG), Annex toArticle 3(3). 
539  Wettbewerbszentrale, 2010, Synopse UWG – Richtlinie unlautere Geschäftspraktiken (UGP-RL).  
540  Ibid, p. 18.  
541  Interview, Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband, 06.04.2021.  
542  Interview, Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 30.03.2021.  
543  Interview, Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband, 06.04.2021. 
544  Statista, 2020, Marktanteile der einzelnen Werbemedien im deutschen Bruttowerbemarkt im Jahr 2019.  
545  Giersberg, F., 2020, ZAW: Werbemarkt 2020 mit deutlichen Corona-Auswirkungen.  
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The German Advertising Association demands new solutions to the rising dominance of online 
advertisement at national and European level546. There is extensive case law on online advertising. 
Most recent cases have dealt with ads on the social media platform “Instagram”. In particular, courts 
have decided that the identification of advertising via the hashtag “#ad” is insufficient if it appears at 
the end of a long list of hashtags547, that for “business-like acts” in the sense of the UWG the objective 
external effect is decisive548 and that the identification of advertising is dispensable if the advertising 
account is public (blue checkmark) and has a high number of followers549. 
 
  
                                                             
546  Ibid. 
547  OLG Celle, 08.06.2017, Az. 13 U 53/17; KG Berlin, 11.10.2017, Az. 5 W 221/17.  
548  LG Itzehoe, 23.11.2018, Az. 3 O 151/18; OLG Braunschweig, 08.01.2019, Az. 2 U 89/19.  
549  LG München I, 29.04.2019, Az. 4 HK O 14312/18.  
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France 
1. National context 
In 2018, with 40% of advertising investments, digital is now the leading medium for advertising sales 
in France, compared to 27% for television550. As mentioned by a recent report commissioned by the 
French Minister of Culture and the Secretary of State in charge of digital, a significant transfer of 
advertisement’s investments from television and traditional media to digital and online platforms 
occurred in the last years. Oliver Wyman who was commissioned by the Syndicat des Régies Internet 
(SRI) to provide an estimate of the size of the digital advertising market in France estimates the growth 
of the digital advertising market in France at +7% for the whole of 2021551. 
There is no specific legal framework for online advertising in France. The law that applies is 
therefore that of advertising in general. Main rules applicable to online advertising and are also 
applicable to traditional/offline advertising. It has to be noted however that self-regulation is 
prevalent in the field of online advertising in France as it has proven to adapt quickly to a very fast-
changing market. In terms of regulation, Decree No. 2017-159 of Feb. 9, 2017552 extends a law of 
1993 “against corruption and in favour of transparency for advertising” (so-called ‘Sapin Law’) to online 
advertising (i.e. advertisements conveyed on any devices connected to the internet) to 
apply transparency obligations that currently apply to traditional advertising. In terms of self-
regulation, the ARPP code of conduct on online advertising, mentioned above, contains 
recommendations applicable to some digital format/techniques, such as social media. For example, 
on social media networks, the ARPP recommends adding an explicit notice, if the commercial nature 
of the advert is not obvious553.  
According to the media, the extension of transparency obligation set up in the “Sapin Law” to online 
advertising (Decree No. 2017-159 of Feb. 9, 2017) has been welcomed by French advertisers554. An 
Article from Les Echos indeed states that by introducing regulation into the free space that is the 
Internet, “the publication of the decree now injects rigidity into online transactions. But perhaps it will 
succeed in lightening an increasingly suffocating atmosphere of mistrust [in the online advertising field]”555. 
2. Design and implementation of response  
The actors involved in designing and implementing the French response to online advertising are not 
specifically and solely working on online advertisement. These actors include the French competition 
authority which publishes opinions on competition matters linked to online advertisement. 
Additionally, the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) and the Conseil 
Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA) are important actors as they organise consultation and publish 
recommendations on the topic. Finally, the professional regulatory authority for advertising (ARPP) 
may intervene during the elaboration of methodologies linked to online advertisement, such as digital 
carbon footprint.  
                                                             
550  Report commissioned by the French Minister of Culture and the Secretary of State in charge of digital, 2020, Online advertising: A level 
playing field.  
551  Amiot, E., 2020, Digital Advertising in France Weakened by the Pandemic, Syndicat des Régies Internet (SRI). 
552  French Legal Statute, 2017, Decree No. 2017-159 of February 9, 2017 on digital advertising services.  
553  Autorité de régulation professionnelle de la publicité, 2015, Recommandations on digital commercial communications.  
554  Les Echos, 2017, Decree on the transparency of online advertising finally published, News Article.  
555  Ibid. 
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All French media are members of the ARPP, which allow all important stakeholders in the field of online 
advertisement to propose good practices and elaborate recommendations, in a consultative manner.  
3. Analysis and Evaluation 
To regulate online advertising effectively and restore the balance between actors in the sector, the 
report commissioned by the French Minister of Culture and the Secretary of State in charge of digital 
highlights that it would be necessary to first “align the constraints between the traditional and digital 
sectors on the one hand, and between online platforms and publishers on the other”556. To ensure a 
level playing field between these actors, the report proposes to harmonise the legal framework 
governing advertising on audiovisual media (linear or not) and display advertising on the Internet.  
The report also found that traditional competition law is “complex to implement and sometimes too 
slow in view of the speed with which the digital market is evolving”557. To solve this issue at national 
level, it was suggested that the existing arsenal of competitive regulation be expanded and renewed 
to deal effectively with the structuring nature of the major platforms, and thus act effectively on their 
sources of market power and anti-competitive behaviour in the online advertising market558. 
In France, there are no court cases specifically addressing online advertising, but the French 
competition law authority took several decisions on the matter. For example, as concerns search 
engine and advertising intermediation markets, in December 2017, the competition authority 
rejected the complaint lodged by the company 1PlusV against Google for tying sale and discriminatory 
treatment practices559. The French authority dismissed the complaint as 1PlusV failed to bring evidence 
that:  
• Google was using tying practices;  
• there was no commercial partnership between the parties; and  
• 1PlusV did not comply with the conditions to access Google’s services. 
Another example of decision taken by the French competition authority concerns the online 
advertising market, linked to search. In November 2016, the authority dismissed a complaint lodged 
by the company IAH against Google’s AdWords referencing service560. Finally, the French competition 
authority also has a consultative role and it published opinions on online advertising, such as the one 
of 6 March 2018 on data exploitation in the online advertising sector561. 
  
                                                             
556  Report commissioned by the French Minister of Culture and the Secretary of State in charge of digital, 2020, Online advertising: A level 
playing field.  
557  Ibid. 
558  Ibid. 
559  Autorité de la concurrence, 2017, Decision 17-D-24 of 18 December 2017 concerning practices implemented in the online search engine and 
online advertising intermediation sectors.  
560  Autorité de la concurrence, 2016, Decision No 16-D-25 of 23 November 2016 on practices implemented in the online advertising sector online 
advertising.  
561  Autorité de la concurrence, 2018, Opinion n° 18-A-03 of 6 March 2018 on the use of data in the internet advertising sector advertising sector. 
2018.  
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Ireland 
1. National context 
In Ireland, consumer protection appears to be one of the most regulated issues relating to online 
advertising. Privacy and data protection are also heavily regulated. Other issues which have arisen with 
Online Behavioural Advertising are privacy, non-discrimination and group level protection562. The 
review of the legal framework on online advertising and the interview show that issues Ireland faces 
are similar to the issues faced by other Member States, with perhaps the exception of the volume of 
claims the CCPC has to deal with, which has to do with the fact that a large number of online 
platforms are based in Ireland. The law on online advertising is governed by the 2011 Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services, Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations563.  
The Consumer Protection Act 2007564 (CPA) is the main Irish law that covers advertising. The 
Consumer Protection Act 2007 integrates the EU Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices565 in Ireland. 
The act includes rules on advertising in general, which also apply to online advertising. The main 
aspects related to online advertising regulated by the act are misleading advertising and false 
advertising directive. Other EU law applies in Ireland to legal advertising, namely the misleading 
advertising directive566 and the General Data Protection Regulation567. Finally, some sector specific 
regulations also apply to online targeted advertising: The Consumer Credit Act 1995568; the Copyright 
and Related Rights Act 2000569; the Trademarks Act 1996570; and the Patents Act 1992571. 
In Ireland, self-regulation is the principal method of regulation of advertising. The Advertising 
Standards Authority, an independent self-regulatory body set up and financed by the advertising 
industry, publishes a Code of Standards572, which includes rules on online behavioural advertising, 
binding for its members.  
To tackle misleading advertising (including online advertising), the Competition and Consumer 
Protection Commission (CCPC) prohibits a set of practices. The CPA established a national enforcement 
body, the CCPC, which is responsible for dealing with citizens’ complaints. Citizens can also complain 
to the Advertising Standards Authority for Ireland (ASAI), for any practice which breaches the ASAI 
Code. An innovative area in which the code regulates is online behavioural advertising (OBA)573.  
                                                             
562  Wachter, S., 2019, ‘Affinity Profiling and Discrimination by Association in Online Behavioural Advertising’, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 
Vol. 35, No. 2. 
563  Irish Statute Books, 2011, European Communities (Electronic Communications Networks and Services) (Privacy and Electronic 
Communications) Regulations.  
564  Irish Statute Book, 2007, Consumer Protection Act 2007.  
565  European Parliament and European Council, 2005, Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 
97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), Official Journal of the European Union. 
566  European Parliament and European Council, 2006, Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 
concerning misleading and comparative advertising, Official Journal of the European Union.   
567  European Parliament and European Council, 2016, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), Official Journal of the European Union.  
568  Irish Statute Book, 1995, Consumer Credit Act 1995.  
569  Irish Statute Book, 2000, Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000.  
570  Irish Statute Book, 1996, Trademarks Act 1996.  
571  Irish Statute Book, 1992, Patents Act 1992.  
572  Advertising Standards Agency for Ireland, ASAI Code, 7th edition. 
573  Advertising Standards Authority for Ireland, 2016, Code, 7th edition Section 18.1.  
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The CCPC’s activity appears to be uncontroversial in the media and the legislative framework on 
consumer protection provides a sufficient framework for the CCPC to take action if necessary.  
2. Design and implementation of response 
The ASAI Code was drawn up by the Board of ASAI after a consultation with key stakeholders including 
industry representatives, the public, consumer representatives and the CCPC. Its current version came 
into effect on the 1st of March 2016. The CCPC internally monitors certain areas where they suspect 
consumer detriment might occur. The CCPC publishes a strategy paper574 every three years, in which 
the objectives from the previous strategy are reviewed, and new ones are determined. The CCPC 
measures the number of Compliance Notices, Fixed payment Notices to bring about compliance and 
end damaging practices. The CCPC also leads a number of investigations in the area of consumer 
protection law575. To empower consumers directly, before any grief has been experienced, the CCPC 
uses its website, as a channel to equip consumers to make informed choices. The number of visits on 
the website is monitored, as well as the time spent on the website. The ASAI also monitors the respect 
of the ASAI Code and the effectivity of its activity through complaints bulletins. The bulletins are 
published periodically on the ASAI website by the Complaints Committee. They provide a summary of 
the ASAI’s work on complaints and how it ensures ads in Ireland are lawful. It is a way for the 
organisation to monitor its activity, in terms of the range and areas of complaints they deal with. 
For complaints to the CCPC, consumers will start a procedure after they have made a commercial 
decision. The CCPC will then enquire in order to decide whether the level of severity is important 
enough to pursue further action against the advertiser. In case further action is sought, the CCPC can 
either use fixed payment notices, prohibition notices or take enforcing action against the trader, 
including compensation. Consumers can also decide to take action with the ASAI. The ASAI procedure 
does not require a commercial decision to have been made. In that sense, it is sufficient for an ad to 
breach the ASAI code for consumers to take action. If a breach is identified, the ASAI will contact the 
advertiser to have them withdraw the ad. The decision is then made public.  
Both the CCPC and the ASAI organise events where stakeholders including industry representatives 
interact. For example, the ASAI recently organised the “#InfluencerMarketing in 2021 and beyond576” 
webinar which included industry representatives and the CCPC. The CCPC also communicates with 
businesses directly and regularly publishes guidance to help them deal comply with the law. For 
example in 2016, the CCPC published the guide on how to sell online577 to communicate with 
consumers through warnings on their website. For example in 2020, they published a warning about a 
website which engaged online sales. They advised consumers to exercise caution if buying goods from 
it and set up a consumer helpline to address any issues578. 
In both the ASAI code and the CPA, the rules on prohibition on unfair commercial practices target 
traders and advertiser, including online traders and advertisers. Under the Consumer Protection Act 
traders are defined as “a person who is acting for purposes related to the person’s trade, business or 
profession, or a person acting on behalf of a trader. Those who promote goods or services on behalf of 
a business may be considered a trader under consumer protection law”. 
                                                             
574  See Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, 2020, Strategy Statement 2021-2023. 
575  Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, 2019, Annual Report 2019.  
576  See: Advertising Standards Authority for Ireland, 2021, #InfluencerMarketing in 2021 and beyond, Webinar, 23rd February 2021.  
577  See: Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, 2016, Selling Online: What you need to know, Business Guide.  
578  See: Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, 2020, Consumer warning about irelandsstore .com, News.  
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The ASAI Code targets advertisers, who are defined as “anyone disseminating marketing 
communications, including promoters and direct marketers. References to advertisers should be 
interpreted as including intermediaries and agencies unless the context indicates otherwise”579. 
Regarding the definition of advertisers, the ASAI held a webinar580, during which it updated the 
definition of advertiser to include influencers. 
3. Analysis and Evaluation 
The regulatory response seems to have a positive effect on unfair commercial practices, as a significant 
number on complaints have been dealt with by the ASAI as shown by their complaints bulletins. For 
example, the latest complaints bulletin contains 8 case reports, all of which were found in breach of the 
ASAI Code. In that sense, the activity led by the ASAI seems to complement the CCPC, which deals 
predominantly with more severe breaches which have already caused harm to consumers. The ASAI 
also engages in preventive measures. 
  
                                                             
579  See for example, Section 1.1(d) of the ASAI Code. 
580  See: Advertising Standards Authority for Ireland, 2021, #InfluencerMarketing in 2021 and beyond, Webinar, 23rd February 2021. 
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United Kingdom 
1. National context 
Consumer protection appears to be the dominant issue emerging from the debate around online 
behavioural advertising (OBA) or targeted advertising in the UK. UK consumers are increasingly privacy-
conscious, with many consumers seeking to limit personalised targeting by setting privacy settings in 
their browsers or online services581. Another aspect to consider is the costs of digital advertising 
(amounting to around EUR 16.11 billion – GBP 14 billion – in the UK in 2019)582 that are reflected in the 
prices of goods and services, particularly those which make use of heavy digital advertising (for 
example consumer electronics, hotels, and flights). Indicatively, Facebook (which is paid for indirectly 
through advertising revenues) saw its average revenue per user increase from less than GBP 5583 in 2011 
to over GBP 50584 in 2019585. Market manipulation and the costs of misleading actions and aggressive 
commercial practices are another concern in the UK. In 2009, Consumer Focus estimated that 
misleading and aggressive practices cost GBP 3.3 billion586. 
The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008587, as amended in 2014 with the 
Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations588, and the Consumer Rights Act 2015589 form the 
basis of the UK’s consumer protection legal framework. The 2008 Regulations are the instrument 
implementing the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive into domestic law. In addition, The UK Code 
of Non-Broadcast Advertising and Direct Promotional Marketing (CAP Code)590 applies. While the 
Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 made it a criminal offence to use misleading or aggressive commercial 
practices, consumers had no private right of redress against a trader. The 2014 Amendment addressed 
this, introducing standard remedies and an entitlement to seek damages when a consumer has fallen 
victim to these practices. Moreover, the CAP Code supplements the gaps in the existing legal 
framework, prohibiting both misleading and harmful advertising, as well as promoting social 
responsibility around advertising of alcohol, motoring, lotteries, and gambling. 
Generally speaking, the narrative around the Unfair Trading Regulations tends to be positive, in that 
they are seen as protecting consumers from unfair or misleading trading practices591. That said, the UK’s 
data protection regulator is concerned about the programmatic advertising process known as 
real-time bidding (RTB), which makes up a large chunk of online behavioural advertising592. It 
concludes that systematic profiling of web users via invasive tracking technologies such as cookies is 
in breach of U.K. and pan-EU privacy laws. 
                                                             
581  PLUM, 2019, Online advertising in the UK, A report commissioned by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. 
582  Competition and Markets Authority, 2020, Online platforms and digital advertising: A Study.  
583  This corresponds roughly to EUR 6 [exchange rate 31.12.2011]. 
584  This corresponds roughly to EUR 59 [exchange rate 31.12.2019]. 
585  Ibid.  
586  Department for Business, Energy & industrial Strategy, 2018, Misleading and aggressive commercial practices: new private rights for 
consumers. The value corresponds roughly to EUR 4.0 billion [exchange rate 31.12.2020]. 
587  See: UK Statute Book, 2008, The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.  
588  See: UK Statute Book, 2014, The Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014.  
589  See: UK Statute Book, 2015, Consumer Rights Act 2015. .  
590  See: Advertising Standards Agency, 2014, Non-broadcast Code.  
591  Which?, 2021, Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.  
592  Tech Crunch, 2019, Behavioural advertising is out of control, warns UK watchdog, Article.  
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2. Design and implementation of response593 
The 12th edition of the CAP Code came into force in September 2010. It was released because the digital 
remit of the Advertising Standards Agency (ASA) was extended to cover online marketing 
communications. Before this, Consumer Focus had in 2009 commissioned research into consumers’ 
experience of unfair commercial practices generally594. The Committee of Advertising Practice (CAP) is 
the self-regulatory body that creates, revises and enforces the Code – it is responsible for monitoring. 
The main actor involved was the Advertising Standards Agency and its CAP Committee. CAP's members 
include organisations that represent the advertising, sales promotion, direct marketing and media 
businesses. Through their membership of CAP member organisations, or through contractual 
agreements with media publishers and carriers, those businesses agree to comply with the Code so 
that marketing communications are legal, decent, honest and truthful and consumer confidence is 
maintained595. One of CAP’s members is The Incorporated Society of British Advertisers (ISBA), which 
has over 400 members representing nearly all the UK’s major advertisers. 
It is the Advertising Standards Agency who is the UK's independent regulator of advertising across all 
media596. They apply the advertising Codes, written by the CAP. The ASA is self-regulated and is a 
non-statutory organisation, and so cannot interpret or enforce legislation. In addition to the CAP, the 
system receives support through three industry panels – the General Media Panel (GMP), the Sales 
Promotion and Direct Response Panel, and the Online Publications Media Panel. The CAP Code applies 
to all actors advertising or promoting goods or services in 8 categories of activities, including print 
(newspapers, magazines, brochures); materials in public places (posters, etc.); moving images (cinema, 
video, etc.) non-broadcast electronic media in paid-for-space (banner, pop ups, online advertisements, 
display, etc.); marketing databases which use consumer personal information; non-broadcast media, 
advertorials and advertisements; and other marketing communications in non-paid-for space online 
(e.g. own website)597. 
The purpose of the CAP Code is to ensure that statements made about products or services are accurate 
and not misleading. The CAP Committee itself says that compliance with the Code should mean that 
“marketing communications are legal, decent, honest and truthful and consumer confidence is 
maintained”598. The CAP’s purpose is therefore consumer-protection orientated. This is in line with the 
aim of the Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, which is to give consumers simple, standardised remedies 
against traders that have breached requirements. It aims to ensure that the previously relatively loosely 
regulated online marketing field is more strictly regulated, although specific details with regards to 
how it aims to change the business model are not clear. The response is focused on maintenance of 
consumer confidence through proper treatment of data, protection from unfair practices and 
standardised remedies against traders that have breached requirements. 
3. Analysis and Evaluation 
The value of self-regulation (inherent in the CAP Code) as an alternative to statutory control is 
recognised in European legislation, including those on misleading and comparative advertising 
(Directives 2005/29/EC and 2006/114/EC). Self-regulation is accepted by the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills and Trading Standards as a first line of control in protecting consumers and the 
                                                             
593  Given that the 2008 Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations merely implements the EU’s Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive, the case study will mainly consider the ‘additional’ regulatory response, namely the CAP Code. Although the UK is no longer a 
member of the EU, the substance of the implementing national legislation remains the same even after the end of the UK-EU transition 
period. 
594  Consumer Focus, 2008, Waiting to be heard: Giving consumers the right of redress over Unfair Commercial Practices. 
595  See: Advertising Standards Agency, 2014, CAP Code: Preface.  
596  See: Advertising Standards Agency, 2021, Website, https://www.asa.org.uk/. 
597  Ibid. 
598  Simply Business, 2011, Online marketing and the CAP Code – What you need to do.  
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industry599. Although ASA is non-statutory and so cannot enforce legislation, it can refer cases to 
Trading Standards, which can then impose fines and criminal sanctions. It is important to note that 
with its self-regulatory system, ASA depends upon the fact that practitioners in every sphere share an 
interest in seeing that marketing communications are welcomed and trusted by their audience: unless 
they are accepted and believed, marketing communications cannot succeed. If they are offensive or 
misleading, they discredit everyone associated with them and the industry as a whole600.  
Given that it goes beyond the scope of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the CAP appears to 
be effective in filling in gaps left by the legislation. In 2019, ASA resolved 34,717 complaints relating 
to 24,886 advertisements, 70% of which were potentially misleading. The same year, 62 sanctions were 
applied leading to compliance, and only 9 advertisers needed to be referred to Trading Standards for 
further action to be taken601. 
 
  
                                                             
599  See: Advertising Standards Agency, 2014, CAP Code: Preface.  
600  See: Advertising Standards Agency, The CAP Code: How the System Works.  
601  Advertising Standards Agency, 2019, Using technology for good – Annual Report 2019.  
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United States 
1. National context 
Consumer protection laws apply equally to online advertising and recent issues include space-
constrained screens and social media platforms. Privacy protection is also an important issue in the 
United States, and is the object of some of the Federal Trade Commission’s regulations602. In 2020, there 
were 3 top complaints related to online advertising (excluding identity theft)603: imposter scams where 
someone gets tricked into sending money to someone else604; online shopping and negative reviews 
(a lot of this was attributable to COVID-19, e.g., unreceived items, undisclosed costs, non-delivery, no 
guarantees)605; and internet services. 
The 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to act in the 
interest of consumers to prevent deceptive and unfair acts or practices. The FTC is also in charge of 
enforcing the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act606 which applies to online advertising. The 1946 
Lanham Act also contains some provisions on false advertising. The FTC also enforces a number of other 
statutes and rules that relate to digital advertising. Examples include: 
• The Restoring Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act, which prohibits any post-transaction third-
party seller from charging any financial account in an internet transaction without consent 
and demands clearly displayed terms and conditions; 
• The Mail, Internet, or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule, which requires sellers to reasonably 
predict shipping time for products; and 
• The Consumer Review Fairness Act, which protects consumers’ ability to share opinions about 
a business’s products, services, or conduct, in any forum, including online. 
The FTC provides advice to online companies and commercial websites. It published a report607 in 1998 
with guidance to companies that collect personal information from users. In February 2009, the FTC 
released a revised set of principles for the self-regulation of online behavioural advertising608.  
In the same area, the Obama administration issued the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights which is 
enforceable by the FTC and includes 7 principles intended to protect consumers’ rights and privacy. 
In conjunction to federal law and guidelines, industry has also issued policies to which they voluntarily 
adhere. The “Do not Track” initiative for example, was created by companies including Google, 
Yahoo, Microsoft and AOL. It aims to provide consumers with opt-outs for behaviour-based 
marketing. 
Most cases the FTC handles are by virtue of Section 5 of the FTC Act. However, the FTC also relies on 
more detailed guidelines (currently under review) to investigate cases. The FTC also issues significant 
guidance and FAQs on a range of consumer protection related issues.  
                                                             
602  Federal Trade Commission, 2013, Mobile Privacy Disclosures: Building Trust Through Transparency: A Federal Trade Commission Staff Report.  
603  See: Federal Trade Commission, 2020, Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book: Annual data book 2020.  
604  See: Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Advice: Imposter Scams.  
605  See: Federal Trade Commission, 2020, FTC Data Shows Record Surge in Online Shopping Complaints During Pandemic, Press Release.  
606  Federal Trade Commission, Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule ("COPPA"), Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. 
6501–6505.  
607  Federal Trade Commission, 1998, Privacy Online: a report to Congress.  
608  Federal Trade Commission, 2009, Self-Regulation Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising.  
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An important part of the FTC’s activity relating to digital advertising revolves around privacy protection. 
Unlike the EU, the US does not have a separate data protection authority or a single comprehensive 
privacy law at the federal level like the GDPR. The FTC uses Section 5 complemented by privacy-related 
statutes to protect consumer privacy, including the Children’s Online Privacy Protection statute609. 
During the pandemic, children’s time spent online has drastically increased with online learning which 
led to a range of new issues such as privacy issues in the educational technology area. Issues the FTC 
deals with also include Artificial Intelligence610 and dark commercial patterns611. To kick off awareness 
around the issue, the FTC held a workshop in April 2021 to bring together consumer advocates industry 
professionals and will publish a report612. The FTC is able to use Section 6B of FTC Act, to issue orders 
which allow them to collect information from companies613. 
2. Design and implementation of response 
There is no set time period for the FTC guidelines review, contrary to rule making procedures (e.g. the 
negative option rule making), for which some very specified procedures are set out. The procedure 
typically takes a few years. The current revision of the guidelines seeks to update them to take 
account of new marketing techniques. Through its responses to specific cases, the FTC provides 
responses to issues which signal to the market how they interpret the law from the FTC Act and Section 
5 in particular, which can sometimes become laws. The FTC can conduct investigations upon a 
complaint by the public or by a corporation and formal complaints are addressed by an administrative 
judge who may issue a cease-and-desist order or issue relief614. Complaints may also be brought before 
the largest Industry body, BBB National Programmes, which has a National Advertising Division615. 
Bringing enforcement cases is a privileged way for the FTC to tackle new consumer issues that arise 
and allow the law to keep up with the most recent market practices. 
The FTC also seeks to influence market practices in the area of privacy and digital advertising. In 
December 2020, the FTC issued orders to 9 social media and video streaming companies under Section 
6B of FTC Act, which allows them to collect information from companies616. The orders require the 
companies to provide data on how they collect, use, and present personal information, their 
advertising and user engagement practices, and how their practices affect children and teens. The FTC 
is also using this Section 6B tool in an ongoing study examining the privacy practices of broadband 
providers617.  
                                                             
609  See: Federal Trade Commission, Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule ("COPPA"), Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 
U.S.C. 6501–6505.  
610  See: Smith, A., 2020, Using Artificial Intelligence and Algorithms, blog. 
611  See: Federal Trade Commission, 29 April 2021, Bringing Dark Patterns to Light: An FTC Workshop, 29 April 2021. 
612  Ibid. 
613  See: Federal Trade Commission, 2020, FTC Issues Orders to Nine Social Media and Video Streaming Services Seeking Data About How They 
Collect, Use, and Present Information, Press Release.  
614  See: Federal Trade Commission, Truth in Advertising, Media Resources.  
615  See: Bbb National Programs, National Advertising Division, Information Page.  
616  See: Federal Trade Commission, 2020, FTC Issues Orders to Nine Social Media and Video Streaming Services Seeking Data About How They 
Collect, Use, and Present Information, Press Release.  
617  See: Federal Trade Commission, 2019, FTC Seeks to Examine the Privacy Practices of Broadband Providers, Press Release.  
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3. Analysis and Evaluation 
The significant number of cases the FTC deals with, their variety, as well as the compensation it has 
issued to customers indicate the FTC does meet its objectives in terms of consumer protection and 
privacy. Last year, the FTC provided USD 483 million618 to consumers in the US and other countries619. 
It also provided a number of reports to the Congress on digital advertising issues including one about 
social media bots and deceptive advertising620. 
Two cases which reflect the FTC’s activity in these areas are the Flo Health621 and the Everalbum622 case. 
The first which involved allegations that the developer of a period and fertility-tracking app shared 
users’ health information with third parties such as Facebook, Google, and others after promising to 
keep the information private. The settlement requires Flo Health, Inc. to, among other things, obtain 
an independent review of its privacy practices and get app users’ consent before sharing their health 
information. In the latter, the FTC sought action against Everalbum which involved allegations about 
an online company’s use of facial recognition technology and its retention of the photos and videos of 
users who deactivated their accounts. The proposed order includes a novel algorithmic remedy, 
requiring the company to delete models and algorithms it developed by using the photos and videos 
uploaded by its users. 
 
  
                                                             
618  This corresponds roughly to EUR 393 million [exchange rate 31.12.2020]. 
619  See: Federal Trade Commission, 2020, Data on Refunds to Consumers, Cases and Proceedings. 
620  Federal Trade Commission, 2020, FTC Sends Report to Congress on Social Media Bots and Deceptive Advertising, Press Releases.  
621  Federal Trade Commission, 2021, Developer of Popular Women’s Fertility-Tracking App Settles FTC Allegations that It Misled Consumers 
About the Disclosure of their Health Data, Press Release.  
622  Federal Trade Commission, 2021, California Company Settles FTC Allegations It Deceived Consumers about use of Facial Recognition in 
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In this research paper, we provide a comprehensive overview of online advertising markets and we 
analyse the challenges and opportunities concerning digital advertising. We review the degree to 
which existing and proposed legislation at EU level addresses the identified problems, and identify 
potential solutions, with reference to experience from EU Member States and third countries. We 
conclude with a synthesis and specific policy recommendations, drawing on stakeholder interviews. 
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